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ABSTRACT 
 
The nineteenth century was a period of extensive change in English rural society, in terms of 
both agriculture itself and the rural economy as a whole.  Northamptonshire in this period, 
whilst remaining a predominantly rural county, underwent a significant transformation.  This 
transformation, along with an extensive quantity of surviving data, has made nineteenth-
century Northamptonshire a subject of great interest to historians. 
 
Within this context this study examines the rural rental economy in Northamptonshire across 
the period 1801-1881 – with particular focus on the recession years 1815-1831 – and is centred on 
the factors affecting the setting and payment of rents.  Central to the study is a wealth of rental 
data, primarily extrapolated from estate account books.  This is used to examine how the rental 
economy operated on landed estates within the context of the wider economy and prevailing 
agricultural prices.  The importance of the relative roles of landowners, stewards and tenants in 
setting rents, extracting payments and negotiating reductions are the central focus, with 
investment in the land and changes in the wider economy also being examined in terms of their 
effect on the rental economy. 
 
The study began life as an examination of the moral economy of the landed estate but 
developed into an analysis of rental data, particularly estate accounts, and a study of the rental 
economy.  The account books themselves provide evidence of the rental economy on the landed 
estate in the nineteenth century but do have their limitations.  Whilst the books provide figures 
for agreed rents, payment of rents and abatements of rent, plus various memoranda, they do 
not provide acreages for holdings or distinguish types of holding.  As a result a study of agreed 
and paid rents has been undertaken but figures for rent per acre and differences by type of 
farming cannot be identified.  Instead, the study focuses on the flexibility of the rental economy 
and the importance of arrears and abatements in enabling the long-term survival of the landed 
income in Northamptonshire. 
 
The study examines accounts and rental data in terms of rent levels, the payment of rents and 
both temporary abatements and permanent rent reductions.  The accounts evidence is 
supplemented by a number of other sources including landlord and estate correspondence plus 
annotations and memoranda in the account books themselves.  The data is then placed in wider 
context (particularly that of Turner, Beckett and Afton’s 1997 study Agricultural Rent in England, 
1690-1914) and examined in depth in terms of both what it tells us about the landed estate in 
Northamptonshire and the strengths and limitations of the accounts data.   
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Chapter One: Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Introduction 
 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a period of great change in rural England.  Lands 
were improved and productivity increased dramatically.  Enclosure took place on a grand scale, 
reorganizing the rural landscape, while a rapidly expanding population and increasing 
urbanization increased demand for agricultural produce.  As a result historians have identified 
extensive changes in rural society in this period.  A substantial amount of research has been 
undertaken into the social impact of these changes and the short-term impact of the 
reorganization of the English landscape but comparatively little work has been done regarding 
landed estate management in this period. 
 
This study aims to shed some light on landed estate management and the rural rental economy 
1800-1881.  It shall be shown that rent levels, along with other estate management decisions, 
were closely linked to changes in prices, farm sizes, and agricultural improvement, but were 
also affected by social factors, tenants’ and landlords’ powers of negotiation and the 
preservation of the long-term profitability of the land.  The payment of rents will be 
distinguished from rent levels themselves and the economic and social factors affecting 
payment and abatement of rents will also be examined.  Estate accounts and landlord 
correspondence have been used extensively in order to produce an in-depth local study which 
demonstrates how estate management decisions were often as reliant on the tenantry as they 
were on the economy. 
 
This chapter will set out the framework of historical research which has already been 
undertaken on rural English society in this period, and establish the place and importance of 
this thesis in the context of both local and national studies of rural society in this period.  The 
following chapter will then introduce the estate of this study, those who managed them and the 
roles of various parties in managing the landed estate before the remainder of the thesis 
examines investment and costs of farming and the rental economy in detail. 
 
Purpose of This Study 
 
Historians of rural England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have predominantly 
concerned themselves with issues that concerned commentators at the time, meaning there has 
been a great focus on enclosure and the social impact of change.  Whilst these subjects are 
important for discussion one cannot understand rural society of this period without adequate 
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knowledge of the factors which writers of the time took for granted, such as the agricultural 
rental economy.  Indeed, the result of this has been that a great deal of research has been done 
on changes such as enclosure whilst very little has been done on subjects such as rent levels or 
even estate management in the context of the wider agricultural economy. This study aims to go 
some way towards rectifying this, adding a further dimension to our understanding of 
agricultural society 1800-1881 by strengthening our knowledge of the way landed estates were 
managed, the economic factors driving estate management decisions, and the resultant changes 
in rural society and landlord-tenant relations.   
 
The study is based on the main factor connecting tenants and landlords – rents.  Rent levels 
worked to provide both landowners and tenants with an income and can be used to identify the 
relative economic power of the two groups over time.  This, in turn, had a knock-on effect on 
decisions to enclose or improve lands, farm sizes and tenant numbers on an estate, as well as 
social effects, all of which shall be discussed in the course of this study.  Furthermore, the 
factors covered by this study also had an effect on issues which have been the subject of other 
studies such as wages and the number of labourers employed.  Importantly, the role of tenants 
in instigating changes and improvements to the land and in negotiating their rents is given 
consideration, providing evidence contrary to the assumption that all-powerful landlords 
implemented changes which often worked to the detriment of those residing on their estates.  
Thus this study adds a further dimension to our understanding of rural society and the factors 
which led to the changes historians have been so eager to discuss.  The study concentrates on 
post-enclosure parishes and estates of the nineteenth century, examining the effects of other 
improvements and changing economic factors on the landed estate; a move away from the 
traditional examination of enclosure as a turning point and a look at other changes on the estate 
in this period. 
 
F.M.L. Thompson noted both the importance of rental data and its limitations.  He pointed out 
that ‘the level of rents is normally a reasonable indicator of the general state of farming’.1  Rental 
accounts are one of the main forms of evidence used to support this thesis and rent levels and 
payments form a central theme.  They add a further dimension to the body of extant research.  
Changes in farming and improvements to the land, as well as the relative roles of landlords and 
stewards and the changing place of tenants in society, have all been studied in terms of the 
agricultural rental economy.  Furthermore, correspondence of landlords has been used to add 
further information on estate management, landlord opinions on their estates and their tenants, 
and often the thinking behind their decisions and actions.  These can all be used in order to 
                                                          
1
 F.M.L. Thompson., ‘An Anatomy of English Agriculture, 1870-1914’ in B.A Holderness. and M. Turner, Land, 
Labour and Agriculture, 1700-1920: Essays for Gordon Mingay (London, 1991), p.227. 
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determine why landed estates were managed as they were and whether landlords were wholly 
liable for negative social effects of estate management decisions.  John Steane has noted the 
interest which Northamptonshire landlords had in their estates but here their correspondence is 
used more closely with rental data in order to ascertain, in so far as is possible, the social and 
economic reasons for and the impact of their estate management decisions.2  Overall this study 
uses accounts and correspondence to analyze not only the rural economy but also the social 
changes created by the fluctuating agricultural economy and estate responses to it, adding a 
further dimension to existing studies of the rural economy in general and of rural 
Northamptonshire in this period in particular. 
 
This study examines the rental economy of the Northamptonshire landed estate in detail.  G.E. 
Mingay found that local estate evidence adds detail to a study such as how the role of great 
landlords and their stewards worked in practice, what problems were faced on landed estates 
and how they were dealt with.3  It is within this context that this study aims to discover the 
dynamics of the rural rental economy in Northamptonshire.  The agreement of rent levels and 
the adjustment of the rural rental economy across the period are of particular interest with 
agreed rent levels, arrears and abatements and the flexibility of the rental economy in 
Northamptonshire forming the central themes. 
 
Why Northamptonshire? 
 
Northamptonshire has been the subject of several important studies regarding enclosure and 
common rights in particular, most notably J.M. Neeson’s 1993 study of commons in the county.4  
Not only does it have a wealth of documents surviving for a large number of landed estates 
across the nineteenth century but it was one of the counties of England which was most affected 
by parliamentary enclosure.  As a result there has been a great deal of work undertaken on 
Northamptonshire in this period.  However, there has been little work done on estate 
management or the changing nature of the landed estate in this period, with work concentrating 
on the impact of enclosure on tenants, small owners and labourers in the county.  As a result the 
work on the county provides a skewed picture, concentrating on the negative effects of changes 
in agriculture and only those social groups worst affected.  This study provides information on 
                                                          
2
 J.M. Steane, The Northamptonshire Landscape: Northamptonshire and the Soke of Peterborough (London, 1974). 
p.223. 
 
3
 G.E. Mingay, ‘Estate Management in Eighteenth-Century Kent’, AgHR 4:2 (1956), p.108. 
 
4
 J.M. Neeson, Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Changing England, 1700-1820 (Cambridge, 1993). 
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another aspect of rural society, the reasoning behind the decisions of landowners and the effects 
of these on both the landowners and their tenants. 
 
 Estate Management and its Impact 
 
Despite the lack of attention the subject has received from historians, estate management 
decisions were central to rural society and form the context within which the agricultural 
community operated, affecting not only tenants but also the place of labourers in society, the 
impact of investment and economic change and the operation of the landed estate in rural 
society.  Indeed the place of tenants in society and the function of the landed estate were central 
to English rural society in the nineteenth century and how the landlord-tenant economy 
operated was central in dictating changes in rural society in this period. 
 
Overall this study adds a further dimension to the history of English rural society in the 
nineteenth century, taking a local study of Northamptonshire to demonstrate the complexities 
of landed estates and estate management.  This in turn adds further detail to the body of extant 
research on the subject.  Models such as E.P Thompson’s moral economy, the Hammonds’ work 
on the village labourer and even J.M. Neeson’s work on Northamptonshire do not acknowledge 
the importance of estate management or its operation but remain dominant models on which 
historians rely.  As a result landlords are generally portrayed as interested solely in their profits, 
irrespective of the social harm they were causing and tenants (those who were not 
proletarianized by enclosure in any case) have been completely overlooked.  In practice, as this 
study will show, landowners took a great interest in their estates and tenants – even where they 
employed stewards and estate managers – whereas it was often the case that tenants sought to 
maximise their profits and sought investment in their lands, larger farms and lower costs, and 
both groups were reliant on the agricultural economy.  Thus the landed estate was more 
complex than previous studies have implied and this study provides a further dimension to the 
extant body of research and looks at those who have been overlooked or misrepresented in the 
current dominant work in the field. 
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The Historical Context of This Study 
 
The ‘Agricultural Revolution’ 
 
The changes in English agriculture which occurred across the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries have often been considered to form an agricultural revolution.  Lord Ernle is often 
accredited with identifying the agricultural revolution as taking place in this period, although 
his work has been challenged since.  In his work of 1912 Ernle wrote that the agricultural 
revolution took place c.1750-1850 and consisted of large-scale enclosure, the adoption of new 
crops, the improvement of livestock and the introduction of new farming machinery.  This 
enabled England’s growing industrial population to be fed.  However, Williamson pointed out 
that his views were not new and his definition of the agricultural revolution was ‘defined in the 
terms’ of eighteenth and nineteenth-century writers such as Arthur Young.  He found that 
Ernle’s ideas were based on the assumption that English agriculture at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century had changed little since medieval times until the agricultural revolution, 
which was pioneered by large landowners and their largest tenants.5   
 
The idea of an agricultural revolution has since been challenged by a number of historians, most 
notably Eric Kerridge who wrote in the 1960s that the break from medieval farming practices 
took place before 1750 and some significant changes had been adopted before 1700, including 
convertible husbandry and artificial irrigation.6  Furthermore, he argued that much of England 
had been enclosed by 1700 and a great deal of this before 1500.  But Kerridge too has been 
challenged on a number of points.  Bruce Campbell suggested there was no post-medieval 
‘revolution’ simply because medieval farming was not as backward as historians assumed, and 
G.E. Mingay pointed out that what is referred to as the agricultural revolution actually occurred 
over a number of centuries, from the development of convertible husbandry in the sixteenth 
century, as a part of 
 
a long-term process of reorganization and change in land-use, accompanied by 
expansion of the cultivated area, that made possible a greater output without 
making a correspondingly larger demand on the labour supply.7 
                                                          
5
 T. Williamson, The Transformation of Rural England: Farming and the Landscape 1700-1870 (Exeter, 2002), pp.1-
2. 
 
6
 Williamson, Transformation., p.2; E.F. Genovese, ‘The Many Faces of the Moral Economy; A Contribution to a 
Debate’, Past and Present 58 (1973), p.163. 
 
7
 G.E. Mingay., Enclosure and the Small Farmer in the Age of the Industrial Revolution (London, 1968), pp.17-18; 
B.M.S. Campbell, English Seigniorial Agriculture, 1250-1450 (Cambridge, 2000), pp.3-4. 
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However, F.M.L. Thompson suggested that significant improvements did take place in the 
nineteenth century but only after 1830 whilst Mingay suggested they took place after 1850.8  
Mingay’s argument is reinforced by Williamson and Wade-Martins, who found that the 
investment in new agricultural machinery was a characteristic of the ‘high farming’ period of 
the mid-nineteenth century rather than of 1750-1850, which was instead characterised by 
techniques and improvements which were labour intensive but cheap in materials.9   
 
High farming itself, which is generally deemed to have been adopted across England in the 
1850s and is discussed in more detail in chapter 3, was defined by Eric Nash thus: 
 
Farming that employs a high volume of inputs per acre and aims at a high volume 
of output.  Its success or failure is measured by the yield of income, and income 
depends upon the difference between output and input. 
 
However, he found that this definition was not applied uniformly, and contemporaries often 
used the term based on abstract criteria covering improvements intended to dramatically 
increase profits and it was often used to describe almost any farmer who invested in the soil, 
seeds or livestock although the notion behind it was one of maximising income whatever the 
cost.10  Thus despite its having a narrow definition, the term high farming was often used to 
describe a number of varied changes in farming which were intended to increase profits, 
regardless of whether or not they were actually what we would consider to be farming high. 
 
Thus, even though the general consensus amongst historians is that there was no ‘agricultural 
revolution’, with improvements in agriculture beginning long before 1750 and continuing after 
1850, considerable changes did take place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as 
demand for produce rose and greater profits could be made in agriculture.  These 
improvements form an important part of this thesis as they were often carried out with the 
intention of increasing profits and had a knock-on effect on the rental economy, estate 
management as well as wider implications for rural society. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
8
 Williamson, Transformation, pp.2-3. 
 
9
 S. Wade-Martins and T. Williamson, ‘Labour and Improvement: Agricultural Change in East Anglia, circa 1750-
1870’, Labour History Review 62 (1997), p.288. 
 
10
 B.A. Holderness, ‘The Origins of High Farming’ in Holderness and Turner, Land, Labour and Agriculture, pp.150-1. 
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Enclosure  
 
One of the main changes to the English rural landscape has been the enclosure of the open 
fields.  Whilst this study examines estates which had already been enclosed before 1801, the 
historiography of enclosure not only explains the organization of enclosed landscapes but also 
discusses a number of changes which are attributed to enclosure.  However, this study will 
show that these investments and changes continued to take place long after lands were 
enclosed.  Therefore, enclosure and the changes it is accredited with bringing are of importance 
here. 
 
Enclosure changed the physical appearance of the landscape and was noted for its startling 
effect in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by writers such as Northamptonshire poet John 
Clare.  Lands were enclosed for a variety of reasons, usually with the intention of increasing the 
estate profits and productivity or enabling the improvement of the land.  Land was enclosed in 
a number of ways but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries parliamentary enclosure 
became the principal form of enclosure in England and was undertaken on a grand scale, 
changing the landscape and the way farms and rural society were constructed. 
 
David Eastwood calculated that 5.8 million acres of land were enclosed after 1730 by 3,945 Acts 
of Parliament.  This comprised of 18 percent of England’s land and covered around one-third of 
English parishes.11  However, Act of Parliament was not the only way land was enclosed.  
Wade-Martins discussed two other methods which were used to enclose lands before and 
throughout this period – piecemeal enclosure of their own lands by farmers and enclosure of 
parishes by agreement of all the landowners.  Piecemeal enclosure was undertaken by farmers 
exchanging strips between themselves and then fencing in their lands once they had an 
adequately large piece of land amalgamated.  Enclosure by agreement usually took place where 
there were few owners involved and an agreement could be reached.  Both were informal 
methods and open to legal challenge but avoided the costs of parliamentary enclosure, making 
them worthwhile options where possible and options which were frequently used even in the 
peak age of parliamentary enclosure.12  Northamptonshire underwent a great deal of 
parliamentary enclosure, in fact W.E. Tate described it as ‘the county of Parliamentary inclosure’ 
                                                          
11
 D. Eastwood, Government and Community in the English Provinces, 1700-1870 (London, 1997), p.121. 
 
12
 S. Wade-Martins, Farmers, Landlords and Landscapes: Rural Britain, 1720-1870 (Macclesfield, 2004), pp.23-4, 31. 
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and J.M. Neeson calculated that two-thirds of its agricultural land was enclosed between 1750 
and 1815.13 
 
Eastwood saw the enclosure of land, particularly by Act of Parliament, to be a move from the 
old customary method of landholding to a more structured method of landholding, set out in 
statute: 
 
As customary patterns of land-holding gave way to a new propertied order so 
customary modes of communal regulation gave way to stronger legal definitions of 
status and entitlement.  Enclosure Acts either subordinated custom to statute or, 
implicitly, translated the language of custom into the currency of a new propertied 
allocation.14 
 
Mingay, on the other hand, suggested that Parliament and the landed interest which undertook 
parliamentary enclosure considered it to be ‘a redistribution of property carried out in the 
interests of more efficient and more productive farming’ and not a loss of customs or 
subordination of the rights of tenants or labourers.  And within this Parliament’s concern with 
an enclosure was simply to establish rules for the redistribution of the land.15 
 
Even though the peak period of parliamentary enclosure was between around 1750 and 1850 
enclosure was, in fact, a long-term process, beginning long before 1750 and continuing after 
1850.16  Rachel Crawford emphasised the co-existence of open field and enclosed landscapes in 
England prior to the parliamentary enclosure of the eighteenth century and commented that 
 
By the middle of the sixteenth century the process had shifted from vicious land 
grabbing by unscrupulous lords and informal hedging-in of plots by smallholders 
toward enclosure by agreement until the middle of the eighteenth century.17 
 
                                                          
13
 J.M. Neeson, ‘The Opponents of Enclosure in Eighteenth-Century Northamptonshire’, Past and Present 105 
(1984), p.116. 
 
14
 Eastwood, Government and Community, pp.123, 165. 
 
15
 G.E. Mingay (ed.), J.L. Hammond and B. Hammond, The Village Labourer (London, 1978), p.xxiii. 
 
16
 Wade-Martins, Farmers, Landlords and Landscape, p.18. 
 
17
 R. Crawford, Poetry, Enclosure and the Vernacular Landscape1700-1830 (Cambridge, 2002), p.46. 
 
9 
 
Whatever the reason of landlords for enclosing their lands, enclosure was taking place before 
the eighteenth century.  Wordie placed the beginning of the enclosure movement as c.1500 but 
viewed the seventeenth century as the most important time in the history of enclosure.  Even 
though the acreages enclosed in this century cannot be accurately calculated, he argued, 
contemporary writers’ commentary, along with historians’ calculations, suggest that the 
piecemeal enclosure of the seventeenth century was more significant than the parliamentary 
enclosure which followed.18  He found that 1600-1760 was the most crucial period in the history 
of enclosure and England had moved from being a mostly open field to a mostly enclosed 
country in the course of the seventeenth century.19   
 
However, Wordie’s statistics, in this case, leave a lot to be desired.  For example, he calculated 
that 75 percent of England was enclosed by 1760.  If one assumes the majority of this to have 
been post-1600, as implicit in his thesis that the majority of enclosures took place between these 
two dates, this averages out to around 5 percent per decade.  If one takes it from what he 
suggests was the beginning of enclosure – 1400 – it is still an average of over 2 percent per 
decade.  Yet between 1760 and 1780 he considered the fact that almost 5 percent of the country 
was enclosed over these 20 years to be an increase on what had gone before, unlikely even if 
one does not account for peaks and troughs in previous decades.20  However, what is certain is 
that enclosure took place at a dramatic rate from the early-eighteenth century and that 
parliamentary enclosure became the dominant type from around the 1750s.  Gregory and 
Anthony Clark concluded that Parliamentary enclosure served to enclose only 22 percent of 
England’s land but by 1850 ‘virtually all agricultural land was privately held’, meaning that the 
majority of enclosure must have taken place by non-Parliamentary means.  They did find, 
however, that even in 1600 there was little more common land than was later enclosed by Act of 
Parliament, implying that common land was only enclosed in this manner.21   
 
Therefore, enclosure had a huge impact on the Northamptonshire landscape, rural society and 
the landed estate.  The primary concern of historians has been the loss of commons and 
common rights at enclosure, which I will come to shortly, but this thesis concentrates on the 
post-enclosure landscape of Northamptonshire.  Whilst enclosure itself has been viewed as 
                                                          
18
 J.R. Wordie, ‘The Chronology of English Enclosure, 1500-1914’, Economic History Review 36 (1983), pp.483-4. 
 
19
 Ibid., pp.483-503. 
 
20
 Ibid., p.486. 
 
21
 G. Clark and A. Clark, ‘Common Rights to Land in England, 1475-1839’, The Journal of Economic History 61:4 
(2001) pp.1010-1. 
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causing extensive short-term destruction and immediate change to farm sizes and rent levels, it 
has also been seen to have had a longer-term impact.  Therefore, enclosure provides a 
foundation for this work, enabling an examination of the landed estate, improvements and 
investment and the agricultural rental economy in the longer term, rather than a short-term 
study of the period directly following enclosure.  Examining economic change and estate 
management on already enclosed lands further enables an examination of estate responses to 
economic fluctuations using data which does not contain the short-term fluctuations often 
attributed to enclosure alone. 
 
Impact of Enclosure: Loss of Commons and the Small Farmer 
 
The principal work on rural Northamptonshire in this period is J.M. Neeson’s Commoners.  
Neeson’s work is primarily concerned with changing common rights and the changing place in 
society of those exploiting them as economic structures and ideologies changed, particularly at 
enclosure.22  Her work on the loss of commons and the proletarianization of the labouring 
classes provides not only a social picture of Northamptonshire to which this study adds a more 
economic viewpoint, but also provides further detail on social and economic changes in rural 
society in this period.  With the loss of commons and common rights, it is argued labourers and 
some small tenants were proletarianized but, at the same time, little has been discussed in the 
way of tenant demand for land leading to such enclosures or the economic reasoning behind 
such decisions.  The long-term impact of such enclosures has, again, been neglected by 
historians. 
 
The proletarianization of the labouring classes and the fate of the small farmer has been 
discussed at length by historians.  The majority of the research on this subject is based upon the 
work of John and Barbara Hammond.  In The Village Labourer (1911) the Hammonds argued that 
changes to agriculture in this period, particularly parliamentary enclosure, dispossessed the 
rural labouring classes, who were forced to migrate to new industrial cities and join the English 
proletariat.  The Hammonds changed the focus of studies of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries from the rural elite to the labouring poor.23  In the years since the publication of The 
Village Labourer there have been a number of criticisms of the Hammonds’ work.  Yet it remains 
an important study and has been the basis of many others on enclosure and its effect on the 
lower classes of agricultural society.  The idea of the labouring classes (and often the small 
farmer) being proletarianized remaining central to a number of works, primarily those 
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concerning themselves with enclosure and commons, including the works of G.E. Mingay and 
J.D. Chambers and more recently formed an important theme in the otherwise contrasting 
theories of Neeson and Shaw-Taylor. 
 
The second wave of parliamentary enclosure (1790-1815) has been identified as the main period 
in which wasteland was reclaimed and historians have suggested that such reclamation was 
deemed necessary as the extant open field system was under the stress of rapidly increasing 
demand in the 1760s.24  It was a mixture of expanding agricultural land and increasing yields on 
existing agricultural lands which eased this stress and around 1.8 million acres of common land 
were enclosed before 1836 and a further half million acres after.25  It must be stated, however, 
that much wasteland had been left uncultivated for so long due to its poor quality.  So much so, 
in fact, that some was cultivated in the French Wars (1792-1815) but reverted to waste 
afterwards when it was no longer profitable.  The North York Moors were predominantly lands 
of such poor quality that enclosure acts did not require lands to be fenced.  Other acts excluded 
areas of land which would not have been profitable.  However, John Chapman discovered that 
enclosure could make commons and wastes extremely profitable as even though rents on 
enclosed wasteland were lower than average for the time such lands could bring in a significant 
income on the basis of the quantity of land brought into the rental economy.26 
 
Between 6 and 7.35 million acres of common land were abolished by enclosure and with this 
common rights were lost.27  The most widespread common rights were ‘the right to graze cattle 
on land (common of pasture), to cut turf or gorse for fuel (common of turbay), and take wood 
for building, repair, or fuel (common of estover)’ and ownership of such rights adhered to lands 
or dwellings in a parish, rather than individuals.28  The extent of the common rights held by 
agricultural labourers is much debated by historians.  Neeson calculated that around half the 
households in open field villages held common rights, including labourers and tenant farmers.29  
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The extent to which the poor could keep cows on the common has also been questioned in 
recent years.  However, Clark and Clark calculated that before 1750 ‘the amount of waste per 
person was…probably less than half an acre’ which, considering common tended to be 
marginal land, meant there would be too little land for the landless to keep cows on the 
common.30  Enclosure also stopped problems associated with common pasture – damage caused 
by over-grazing could be prevented, as could theft of sheep and ‘dogging’ (driving others’ 
sheep off the best parts of the common with dogs).31   
 
Therefore, even though historians’ primary concern with regards to commons has been the 
social cost of the loss of common rights, the increase to the amount do land in cultivation and 
the reorganization of estates and farms at enclosure enabled further improvements to take place 
and, in itself, had an impact on the landed estate, its income and management. 
 
Rents and Estate Management 
 
In 1907 Robert J. Thompson undertook a study of nineteenth-century agricultural rents in the 
interests of improving the agricultural economy of England at the time.  Whilst his analysis of 
improvements and statistics on agricultural incomes are of great interest, the nature and timing 
of his study meant his sources remained anonymous so his figures cannot be verified and the 
estate used may provide a skewed picture.  However, his interest in rents and improvements 
provide a concise statistical study almost contemporary with the period.  In the introduction to 
his study Thompson noted that 
 
Until we come to the royal Commission on Agriculture of 1893-96 very little effort 
seems to have been made to obtain actual records over a series of years.32 
 
Despite this concern with the rental economy and estate incomes, the primary focus of 
historians since has been the social impact of economic changes in agriculture in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
30
 Clark and Clark, ‘Common Rights’, pp.1032-3. 
 
31
 Whyte, ‘Wild, Barren and Frightful’, pp.28-9. 
 
32
 R.J. Thompson, ‘An Inquiry into the Rent of Agricultural land in England and wales During the nineteenth 
Century’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 70:4 (1907), p.587. 
 
13 
 
Whilst historians such as G.E. Mingay, H.G. Hunt and David R. Stead have done some work on 
the economic workings of the landed estate, the principal study of rents across this period, and 
therefore the work central to this study, is that of Turner, Beckett and Afton, who studied 
national rent levels for the period 1690-1914.  Rent levels and rents paid demonstrate not only 
the state of the agricultural economy but how this affected supply and demand for land and 
how it was affected by enclosure and other improvements and developments in agriculture.  
However, as Turner et al pointed out, rents were as much a social construct as they were an 
economic one, relying on negotiations and individual personalities as much as economic 
factors.33  Thus a study of the landed estate based on the rental economy is not simply an 
economic study but a study of how landed estates operated within the prevailing economy, in 
terms of the relative place and power of individuals, the power of landlords and tenurial 
relations as well as when it was most beneficial to enclose or improve the land and the reasons 
for doing so.  However, the national rental index does leave some detail to be desired.  This 
detail can be built using a local study to identify the differences in estate management and the 
function of individual estates and this is what this study aims to do.  This study will examine 
the different aspects of estate management in the agricultural economy, studying improvements 
and investment (chapter 3) and the setting and collection of rents (chapters 4 and 5) 
 
The Agricultural Economy of the Nineteenth Century: An Introduction 
 
This study takes as its basis the primary function of the rural economy – farming.  However, it 
must be stressed that the rural economy was much wider than this, with farmers and estates 
relying on third parties and external tradesmen for tools and services.  Richard Moore-Colyer 
pointed out that husbandry in turn required the services of the miller, wheelwright and 
carpenter amongst other local craftsmen, making the overall rural economy and community 
much broader than simply those involved in farming and the land.34  Owing to its good soils, 
high productivity and proximity to London, Northamptonshire’s economy closely followed the 
trend of the national agricultural economy.  Furthermore, the trends discussed here are the 
general trends of the agricultural economy, covering both arable farming and animal products.  
A significant amount of work has been done on the rural economy of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and therefore a strong background for this study has already been 
provided, in terms of the general economic trends and changes occurring nationally throughout 
this period. 
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Before the period of this study, there were a number of changes which moved England away 
from its previous patterns of farming and changed the agricultural economy.  In line with the 
expansion of industry, Mingay established that from the eighteenth century, due to its 
dramatically rising population and therefore rising domestic demand for corn, England ‘lost its 
old position as an exporter of corn’, particularly as the population became increasingly 
urbanized.  This, he noted, was one of the reasons for another major change which took place in 
England on an immense scale at the time – enclosure, particularly parliamentary enclosure.35  
But population growth certainly increased demand for agricultural produce (and as a result 
agricultural profits).  Prices (and rents) rose steadily until 1792, with the advent of the French 
Wars, when French blockades led to a rapid increase in prices and thus demand for land and 
rents also increased.  Following the wars these artificially high prices fell and led to recession in 
the 1820s through to the early 1830s, with high farming (farming for maximum income, 
regardless of the costs incurred) becoming widely adopted in the 1840s and 50s.36 
 
In 1846 the Corn Laws were repealed, preventing the protection of domestic crop prices and no 
longer limiting import levels.  But the long-term depression predicted to result from this did not 
occur.  Over the next twenty years grain imports did increase but, Howell found, despite this, 
farmers remained prosperous, with increases in domestic demand buying up the increased 
imports, with only 1848-1852 being years of depression.37  Indeed, Tom Williamson found that 
even by 1851 imports provided only 16 percent of agricultural produce consumed in England 
and Wales.38  And with increased productivity came great profit.  The ability of England’s 
farmers to feed the growing industrial populations both enabled industrial growth and 
minimized losses to gross domestic product which would have been made by purchasing 
imports.  As a result of this, Martin Daunton found, by 1851 Britain had the highest per capita 
income in the world, despite its extensive population growth.39  Daunton’s figure fails to 
distinguish agricultural and industrial income and the latter outweighed the former by the mid-
nineteenth century.  This was a significant drop in the importance of agriculture - in 1770 
Arthur Young estimated agriculture to account for 45 percent of England’s production which 
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modern calculations suggest had fallen to 33 percent by 1800.40  Added to this the Corn Laws 
(until 1846) and transport limitations (which limited import levels until around the 1870s) 
meant that the increasing industrial population increased demand for domestic produce and 
kept food prices high for the majority of this period.  Thus even when it was no longer 
providing the majority of England’s GNP landowning (and to a lesser extent farming) was still a 
highly profitable occupation.   
 
With regards to Northamptonshire in particular, Steane established that even by 1850 the 
county remained predominantly dependent on agriculture.41  Northamptonshire remained rural 
yet suffered comparatively little civil unrest than other agricultural counties and regions across 
this period, indicating that lands were improved and remained profitable to farmers (even 
when paying their labourers liveable wages).  This, Mingay noted, was in contrast to counties 
which did not develop industrial centres or have expansion in agriculture which were subject to 
a great deal of civil unrest in the nineteenth century.42  Evidence of this study further 
demonstrates that agriculture in the county remained profitable in this period and lands were 
being invested in and improved in order to keep it that way enabling the county to survive 
economically despite its lack of industry. 
 
In all, there were a significant number of other factors contributing to the increasing demand for 
agricultural produce in the nineteenth century and the primary trend was towards growth until 
the 1870s.  The repeal of the Corn Laws had had little immediate effect resulting in a belief that 
demand for corn would continue to rise indefinitely.  This belief was shattered by the crash in 
domestic agriculture in the 1870s.43  From the 1870s onwards, improved transport enabled the 
middle-west of America to send far greater quantities of goods to England which, Howell 
argued, was of better quality than the domestic variety.44 
 
Lord Ernle wrote in the early-twentieth century that ’from time to time, circumstances combine 
to produce acute conditions of industrial collapse which may be accurately called depression.  
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Such a crisis occurred in agriculture from 1875-84, and again 1881-9’ and the general consensus 
is that this was the case.45  Steane found that this was not just a result of increased imports but 
also due to poor domestic harvests and cattle plague, both of which hit Northamptonshire in 
the 1870s.46  With a prolonged fall in prices rents also fell.  Cannadine calculated that by the 
mid-1890s rents were back around the level they had been in the 1840s and did not begin to rise 
again until around 1914.  The fall in rents passed on the struggle to landlords, many of whom 
had large mortgages and whose incomes fell dramatically.47 
 
Further to this the type of farming undertaken had an impact on the profitability of the land.  
Until 1750 pasture rents were higher but arable profits increased and rents balanced out.48  From 
the 1870s arable rents fell first, then pasture (as refrigeration techniques improved to enable 
imports) and in the 1880s-90s dairying and market gardening survived better than other types 
of farming.49 
 
The fluctuations in the wider agricultural economy affected the profitability of the land and 
therefore are an ongoing, underlying theme of this thesis.  These general trends provide the 
background to the rises and falls in the economy and the thesis will demonstrate how rural 
society and the landed estate responded to these changes.  Rent levels themselves were closely 
affected by price levels too, but this will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, where rent levels and 
payments are examined in their economic context. 
 
The Agricultural Community 
 
The agricultural community changed over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, as the economic and social ties between landlords and tenants altered and demand 
for labour, poor laws and even the extended franchise, all worked to change how landed society 
and therefore the agricultural community operated.  The Hammonds, writing in 1911, 
commented that 
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The agricultural community which was taken to pieces in the eighteenth century 
and reconstructed in the manner in which a dictator reconstructs a free government, 
was threatened from many points. It was not killed by avarice alone.50 
 
There has been a great deal of debate since the Hammonds were writing, including on the scale 
of enclosure and its effects, but their idea that rural society was changed for the worse as a 
result of the actions of wealthy landowners remains central to research on the period, including 
debates regarding the effect of enclosure and models such as Thompson’s moral economy.  
However, in practice, landlords did not seek simply to maximise rents and increase 
productivity but sought to preserve the long-term profitability of their estates, including 
maintaining tenants.  Thus, overall, agricultural society changed significantly across this period 
but not with intent to harm the lower classes or indeed indifference to them, but with the 
intention of preserving a degree of tenant prosperity. 
 
Central to the transition which occurred in rural society in the course of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were changes to farming itself, from enclosure to the adoption of different 
farming types and methods and increasing farm sizes.  On top of this Williamson and Wade 
Martins established that after around 1840 transport networks improved, allowing farmers to 
bring in materials from further afield or even overseas and as a result farms no longer 
depended on local resources but brought in materials such as marl and manufactures such as 
tile pipes, to improve their lands.51  More generally, the ‘changing geography of agricultural 
production’ plus the increasing area under cultivation also affected the agricultural community 
as commons and wastes were brought under cultivation and the skills required and numbers of 
labourers needed varied as the type of farming undertaken changed.52  Thus as agriculture 
developed the landscape of England’s countryside changed and so did the agricultural 
community.  Along with developments in farming came developments in the way the landed 
estate was managed.  Steane observed that the increasing professionalization of stewards, 
surveyors and other land management agencies came with the increasing interest of landlords 
in agriculture and improving their estates.53   
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The Importance of Landed Society and Landowners 
 
In his 1963 work English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century, F.M.L. Thompson wrote that 
 
The landed interest... at least until 1851, formed the largest group in society.  Besides 
the landowners who formed the nobility and gentry of the country it comprised the 
great body of the agricultural community, the farmers and labourers who were the 
producers, and the blacksmiths, wheelwrights and publicans who provided them 
with services.  It provided direct employment for a high proportion of the large 
class of domestic servants and for the sizeable body of estate workers of varied skills 
and trades.  But it also provided the chief means of livelihood for most of the 
professional men and retail traders of the country towns.54 
 
Despite Thompson’s assertion of the importance of studying agricultural society as a whole 
more recent scholarship has failed to do so, concentrating on the lower classes in society and 
ignoring those influential in determining how landed estates operated.55  This study seeks to go 
some way towards redressing the balance, examining how the landed estates on which the rest 
of agricultural society relied operated and providing this information in the context of extant 
studies of other groups in and aspects of society. 
 
Thompson found that the nineteenth century in particular was characterised by a changing 
social order, not one of rigidity changing only in the rapid decline from the 1880s.  Instead he 
found that as a result of economic change the structure of society was constantly changing, 
although landed magnates remained at the apex of society the character and relative 
importance of their status altered ‘under the pressures generated by industrialization’.56  
Indeed, David Spring pointed out that until the 1880s the landed gentry believed that 
‘ownership of an estate was the hallmark of England’s governing class’.57  As a result it becomes 
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clear that landed estates and landed estate management are essential to our understanding of 
English rural society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
The Importance of the Landed Elite 
 
The landed elite as a class underwent a great change over the course of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, primarily as a result of the dramatic changes which took place in the 
economy.  However, the greatest change in their position in society took place in the 1880s 
when cheap, better quality imports rendered domestic agriculture all but obsolete.  Up until the 
1880s English society was, F.M.L. Thompson noted, both socially and politically dominated by 
the landed elite.58  The importance and wealth of this landed elite is therefore central to our 
understanding of landed estates and why they were managed as they were.  Thus this section 
will show the place of the landed elite as a group in society and demonstrate their importance 
to rural society, whilst the specific landlords and estates of this study, and how they fit into this 
background, will be discussed in chapter 2. 
 
Until the 1880s land was of great importance to England’s economy and as a result the landed 
elite were of great importance in English society and politics.  J.R. Wordie commented that 
between 1700 and 1800 it was the aristocracy who ruled England, although he was keen to 
stress that this ruling class was not limited to members of the House of Lords, with social 
standing based more on the amount of land a man owned than on any title he possessed, with 
the wealth and power which came with landowning enduring even into the 1880s.59 
 
Prior to the late-nineteenth century, Thompson found, the landed aristocracy, although not 
dominant in every aspect of society, were the dominant group in politics, the church and the 
army and were the social group in which newspapers took the greatest interest.60  David Howell 
suggested there were three economic features which defined the landed gentry – a family 
mansion, a home farm adjoining and a landed estate which was let out to tenants.61  Indeed, the 
families of this study all fell into Howell’s definition of landed gentry but invariably had 
interests in politics and local society too, demonstrating that significant landed estates brought 
some degree of influence in society even where the landowners were not aristocratic.  Within 
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this context they also shared a way of life and manner of upbringing which, Thompson found, 
resulted in shared ideas of gentlemanly conduct, a prioritizing of the family interest over that of 
the individual and intermarriage, forming ties between a series of families.62   
 
In terms of estate management the conduct and beliefs of the landed elite had two effects – the 
strong links between landowners and stewards on different estates aided the dissemination of 
ideas and influenced how they ran and improved their estates, whilst prioritizing the family 
over the individual usually resulted in landowners acting to preserve the long-term profitability 
of the land even at the expense of their own short-term profits.  The latter can be identified 
where landlords abated rents in the short term to keep tenants on the land in the long term or 
where they improved the land or invested elsewhere to maintain long-term profits, often at the 
expense of short-term gain.63  Sons were also trained to manage the estates in their youth so that 
they could take over competently upon inheritance.   
 
Bogart and Richardson also suggested a further possible reason for the interest of the landed 
classes to preserve the long-term profitability of their estates.  In their work on property rights 
they found that prior to Estate Acts property rights were governed by settlements, which did 
not contain absolute rights over property but deemed the holder of the land to be holding the 
land in trust – a life tenant preserving the land for his beneficiaries.  They ascertained that 
settlements required both the current holder and his heir to agree changes in land use and were, 
from 1660, becoming obsolete with landowners seeking Estate Acts to gain full control over 
their estates.64  However, the system of settlements brought with it ideas of the longevity of the 
estate not dissimilar to those held by the landowners of this study and, indeed, preserving the 
family over the individual interest as Thompson described.  Thus, even where landlords were 
changing land use and obtaining Estate Acts to change settlements, one can identify ideas of 
long-term profitability over short-term throughout this period. 
 
With regards to ties between landlords influencing estate management, the dissemination of 
ideas occurred simply through the discussion of estates when speaking with or writing to 
friends or relatives.  This was not limited to familial ties, with Lord Overstone, for example, 
regularly discussing estates and improvements with old school friends and fellow politicians 
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sharing advice, problems and even arranging meetings for their stewards to do the same 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
 
The ties between landed estates also enabled landowners to be influential in politics.  The 
political dominance of the landed elite enabled them to retain both social power and political 
preference (i.e. policies favouring the agricultural sector over the industrial).  Furthermore, as 
mentioned above ideas disseminated through political groups just as they did those tied by 
kinship.  Matthew Cragoe has observed that the landed elite continued to have considerable 
political power right through to the end of the nineteenth century.  In 1832, for example, he 
found that landowners had a great deal of political influence in their local communities and 
were able to ‘wage political warfare’ and influence votes, and even in 1867, following the 
extension of the franchise, their influence and power remained extensive.  This political 
influence and position was, he commented, maintained ‘through the careful cultivation of 
alliances’ – primarily kinship with other great estates and the loyalty of owners of smaller 
estates, to whom such loyalty could lead to personal advancements such as Justice of the Peace 
(JP) positions or employment for their younger sons.65  In the second half of the nineteenth 
century however Mingay has identified the political domination of the landed classes as being 
challenged by increasing industrial sentiment demanding better political representation for 
industrial interests.66 
 
F.M.L. Thompson found that by the end of the eighteenth century the wealthy landowner 
‘already admitted some others as his social or near equals’ although these individuals were 
always wealthy and tended to invest in their own estates.  By 1850, he noted, the landed classes 
were often equalled in terms of wealth by those of industrial wealth and the structure of English 
politics was no longer weighted in the favour of the landed interest.  But, despite this, landed 
magnates remained at the top of the social order.67  As a result of the importance of landowning 
in society and politics, successful businessmen often invested their wealth in land.  Tom 
Nicholas determined that the changing place of the landed estate in this period is evident from 
whether or not businessmen invested their wealth in purchasing land.  In particular, in the late-
nineteenth century, Nicholas identified only a small minority of those who made their fortunes 
in business and industry investing in land.  This was because land was no longer necessary for 
men of industrial wealth to gain social position, as it once had been, but for a few it could still 
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aid their political standing or provide a beneficial financial investment.68  The shift of political 
power from land to industry took place in the late-nineteenth century and, Mingay and 
Cannadine observed, it accompanied a shift in the balance of the economy from agriculture to 
industry and a shift in the economic, social and political power of the aristocracy in the 
nineteenth century.69  
 
Even though Mingay accredited the decline of the landed aristocracy in part to the reform and 
extension of the franchise in 1867, their loss of power and influence in society (and politics) was 
primarily a result of the reduced economic importance of land in England at this time, as 
agriculture had become subsidiary in the English and Welsh economies by the late-nineteenth 
century.70  Added to this, F.M.L. Thompson commented that from the 1880s agriculture was a 
contracting sector of the economy.  However, he found that as agricultural wages fell so did 
prices and the cost of living, resulting in little fall in real wages.  Unfortunately in practice 
falling monetary wages and agricultural incomes were viewed by contemporaries as a fall in 
real income leading to further loss of confidence in the land.71  As a result demand for land fell 
in terms of both rents and sales, further contracting the agricultural sector and diminishing the 
power of the landed estate and those reliant upon it. 
 
However, as stated above one of the characteristics of the landed gentry was that they sought to 
preserve the family income in the long term, not simply their own lifetimes.  David Eastwood 
pointed out that the landed elite were “an old class, used to protecting their position and 
prepared to do things they did not like in order to preserve their power”.  As a result they 
sought to defend their property rights using their political power and influence in the 
nineteenth century.72  This could not protect them from the recession of the late-nineteenth 
century but in practice by this point, Mingay noted, the landed classes had adapted to the 
changing economy and many were involved in industry as well as large landowners.73  Thus 
even as the power and wealth of landowning diminished, diversification enabled the landed 
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elite to survive.  Only now, rather than land being the most secure method of investment, the 
poor incomes of landed estates were being propped up by industrial wealth. 
 
Thus the landed aristocracy themselves, their power and their place in society affected both the 
place of the landed estate in society and its management across the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  Their power initially lay in the wealth which the land brought them but in this 
period fortunes could be made and their incomes equalled in the industrial sector.  But the old 
wealth of the landed elite brought with it political and social power which new wealth did not, 
creating a trend of industrial magnates buying into the land.  In the late-nineteenth century, as 
landed power and profits were eroded, land became a less desirable commodity and many of 
the old landed magnates needed to adapt their investment patterns to survive.  However, for 
the majority of the nineteenth century landowning brought great wealth which was 
infrequently equalled by industry and social and political power which came from the old 
institution of the landed estate, not simply wealth or income. 
 
The Social Functions of Landed Estates 
 
Whilst this study takes as its primary focus the economic workings of the landed estate and 
their implications, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have often been studied by 
historians in terms of social change.  As shown above, the most significant works on 
Northamptonshire have been more concerned with the social impact of changes to the 
landscape than the rural economy.  More widely, historians have been concerned with the 
‘paternal’ role of landlords and the ‘moral economy’ of the English countryside. 
 
Central to studies of rural society in this period is E.P. Thompson’s model of the moral economy 
which he defined as 
 
grounded upon a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the 
proper economic functions of several parties within the community. 
 
These obligations were, he argued, fuelled by notions of the common weal and a belief that 
crowd actions were legitimate and supported by the wider community.74  The model of the 
moral economy had its origins in the paternalist model, although Thompson argued the moral 
economy could be identified in all aspects of rural life, the paternalist model all but 
disappearing outside of periods of high prices and civil unrest.75  Paternalism itself is the idea 
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that landlords aided their tenants for social and not just economic reasons.  Factors such as 
improving farm land or buildings, allowing tenants to fall into arrears for a time or even 
providing medical help for tenants have all been identified as paternal actions. 
 
Whilst eighteenth-century society had been built upon tradition, with all social groups from 
landlords to labourers bound by custom, the nineteenth century saw a move from tradition to 
the new market economy.  With this move, both Graham Seal and E.P. Thompson (amongst 
others) have noted, the rural poor saw their common rights being eroded and customary 
measures for addressing grievances disappearing.76  This Thompson identified as leading to the 
moral economy – “a selective reconstruction of the paternalist one”, including only those 
aspects which most aided the poor.77 
 
The move from a paternalist to a capitalist economy has been blamed on increased landlord 
absenteeism.  Robert Ashton blamed “prolonged periods of residence in London” for widening 
the distance between landowners and those resident on their estates, and F.M.L. Thompson 
identified it as a result of changing estate management as the role and presence of stewards 
increased in the nineteenth century.78  However, as has been identified elsewhere and as shall be 
shown throughout this thesis, landlords worked closely with stewards and took a great interest 
if not an active role in the management of their estates throughout the nineteenth century.  
Brundage and Eastwood argued that this was because a landlord could be both a good 
paternalist and a good capitalist as paternalism covered a wide range of acts and value systems, 
with an ethos which was both durable and highly adaptable.79 
 
In terms of what landlord actions could be construed to be paternalist, Matthew Cragoe 
provided the most comprehensive list.  Cragoe found that landlords in Wales invested in a 
variety of improvements, in particular land drainage and new farm buildings and that even 
beyond enclosure landlords would keep ‘good breeding animals’ and allow tenants to use them 
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at a reduced fee if not for free.80  However, whilst Cragoe considered investment in farm 
buildings as a method of keeping rent levels up, Barbara English, in her study of the Sledmere 
Estate in the late-nineteenth century, noted that farm tenants were obliged to maintain their 
own buildings in their leases but, in practice, landlords would pay out a great deal of money in 
order to maintain, repair or even replace buildings for tenants, a practice all landlords agreed 
was unprofitable.81  Even though such investment did not bring in monetary income, it would 
be likely to help keep tenants on the land and ensure lands were in re-lettable condition if 
tenants did quit, therefore maintaining the long-term profitability of the estate.  Added to this, 
David Stead observed that sometimes landlords undertook what would be perceived as 
paternalist actions in order to be considered good landlords, not simply out of a sense of 
responsibility to their tenants.82  This could be for economic reasons, such as attracting tenants 
when demand for land was low, or for other reasons such as furthering political ambition.  Lord 
Overstone, for example, can be identified undertaking (or at least claiming to have undertaken) 
a number of actions which appear paternal but worked to enhance his political persona. 
 
Thus, in all, landlords played a significant role in improving husbandry and invested a great 
deal in their estates but the idea that this was a result of paternalist notions is unconvincing.  
Seemingly paternal actions were set against a background of attempting to maximize and 
maintain estate profits.83  The long-term profitability of the land required a degree of tenant 
maintenance and negotiation as well as a great deal of investment in the nineteenth century and 
such actions will be discussed throughout this thesis.  However, as has been shown, historians 
to date have generally studied a number of investments in their social, not their economic, 
context whilst the social aspects of rental accounts management have received relatively little 
attention from historians. 
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Conclusion 
 
Thus, overall, the English landed estate was changing significantly in this period, with the 
management of landed estates adapting to (and causing) developments in the agricultural 
economy and advances in farming.  It is an era which has been of great interest to historians 
owing to the huge social, political and economic impact of changes in rural society but in the 
main research has been concerned with social change, including enclosure and the loss of 
common rights, and rural depopulation.  In terms of economic studies, little work has been 
done on the economic changes and decisions in rural society although their social impact has 
been looked at in terms of the moral economy and paternalist models.  Considering the fact that 
landed estates and rural communities were attached by economic ties as much as they were by 
social bonds there has been little work done on the economic bonds of the landed estate and 
how this affected rural society.  This thesis aims to go some way to redressing this balance, 
providing the economic ties and the social networks of the landed estate which relied on them 
in order to add a further dimension to the extant body of research. 
 
A small amount of work has been done regarding agricultural rents and their place in the 
English economy but there is a lack of detailed local research considering developments in both 
the social and economic ties within rural society in the nineteenth century.  Thus overall this 
study provides a detailed local study of rents and the economic business of the landed estate to 
both bolster the local knowledge we have of Northamptonshire and provide insight into landed 
estate management and its ties both social and economic across this period.  Chapter two will 
introduce the estates of this study; provide details of how they were managed and an overview 
of changes in both the agricultural economy and the operation of landed estates themselves 
across the period 1800-1881.  Chapter three will then discuss the impact of improvements in 
agriculture and changes across the period.  This will be discussed in terms of both landlord and 
tenant desire to improve lands and increase profits.  The place of the small farmer and his 
survival throughout this period, as well as social mobility of tenant and labourers, will also be 
considered.  
 
Chapters four and five then take an in-depth look at the rental economy and the social and 
economic factors affecting it across the period.  Chapter four looks at rents across the period and 
compares the Northamptonshire evidence to the national rental index, as well as considering 
the reasons for fluctuations in rental levels, the impact of prices and how landed estates 
operated in terms of setting rents.  Finally, chapter five is concerned with the payment of rents.  
This includes two sections – arrears and abatements.  The levels of both across the period will 
be examined and compared to national trends in arrears and abatements as well as prices and 
the wider agricultural economy.  An overview of the period 1800-1881 will be examined, 
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followed by a case study of the post-French Wars recession (1815-1831).  Thus, overall, rent 
levels and their payment as well as improvements to estates will be studied in the context of 
estate management and the desire of both owners and tenants of the estates, demonstrating the 
dynamics of the operation of landed estates and the necessity of tenant will and cooperation for 
them to operate successfully. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Landed Estates and Their Management 
 
Introduction 
 
The business of the estate and how it was actually managed could have a significant effect upon 
its economic survival and that of the tenants.  Estate management is a central interest of this 
thesis owing to the role of landowners and their stewards in setting rent levels, collecting 
payments, and encouraging or implementing improvements on their estates.  It shall be shown 
in later chapters how tenants were keen improvers as well as landlords and, indeed, how 
tenants negotiated their rent levels.  The principal concern of this chapter, however, is the 
landed estate and its management.   
 
The chapter shall begin by introducing Northamptonshire as a county and explaining the 
society in which the landed estate operated before going on to examine the business of the 
estate itself.  The relative roles of landowners and estate stewards in managing estates will be 
examined and the estates, families and stewards of this study introduced.  The different types of 
estate management will then be discussed along with the possible responses of estates to 
economic changes.  Having established the role and place of the landed estate and how estates 
were managed, the chapter will then go on to contextualize the landed estate in terms of the 
landlord’s desire to maintain the long-term profitability of his land and introduce the changes 
and improvements in farming which were implemented in this period.  It shall be shown that 
improvements to the land were usually undertaken with the desire of maintaining long-term 
profits whilst taking advantage of short-term economic trends.  Improvements to the land and 
investment are the subject of chapter 3, which will build upon the analysis of estate 
management and the reasons to improve which are covered in this chapter.   
 
The Northamptonshire Landscape 
 
The landscape itself affected farming types and improvements to the land, with this, the 
topography of the land, and the quality of the soil affecting both the profits of farming and type 
of farming which took place.  Landscape and soil type thus affected estate management 
decisions as landlords and tenants alike sought to maximise the profit from their land, with 
stewards often bringing technical knowledge of the land to aid them in this.  The subject of 
improvements will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 but the topography of the land and 
changes in farming are introduced below.   
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Both James Donaldson’s 1794 survey of the county and William Pitt’s of 1809 provide a great 
deal of evidence regarding Northamptonshire agriculture and topography in the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries.  Both calculated Northamptonshire to be 65-66 miles long and 
24 miles across at its widest point, with a total area of between 910 and 1,000 square miles (or 
582,400-640,000 acres).  They found the county was comprised of 316 parishes (falling from 330 
in recent years) which were spread across 20 hundreds.84  Of these parishes Pitt calculated that 
227 were enclosed but 89 (28%) were still open field, with 600,000 acres of the county employed 
as farmland.85 
 
Topographically Northamptonshire can be split into two distinct areas – a highland area to the 
north and east where the land is typically over 150 metres above sea level with around a third of 
the area over 200 metres above sea level and a lowland area to the south characterised by flat 
lands usually less than 150 metres above sea level. These two areas also had different soil types, 
with the highland area of the county roughly correlating with an area of heavy clay soils, 
compared to light and medium loams of the lowlands.  In terms of farming the land, David Hall 
found the county can be classified as three main types – the arable-dominated champagne area, 
the forest regions of Rockingham, Salsey and Whittlewood (which were over 70 percent 
woodland but had some arable land) and the Soke of Peterborough which had both a large area 
of high heath ground and extensive marsh in the Borough Great Fen.86   
 
The attributes of the land were only of advantage where they were understood by the farmers.  
For example, in his 1797 work Elements of Agriculture James Hutton emphasized the need for 
understanding of both climate and soil for farmers to select the correct crops and crop rotations 
to employ as well as the correct farming implements.87  Donaldson, in his survey of the county, 
found varying soil types to be problematic in Northamptonshire farming.  Rather than employ 
different techniques and implements for different soil types he noticed that all soils were 
ploughed in the same way.88  Indeed, the Victoria County History of Northamptonshire also 
suggested the soil was not always farmed in the manner to which it was best suited.  For 
                                                          
84
 W. Pitt, General View of the Agriculture of the County of Northampton (London, 1809), pp.1-2; J. Donaldson, 
General View of Agriculture in the county of Northampton: with observations on the means of its improvement 
(Edinburgh, 1794), p.9. 
 
85
 Pitt, General View of Agriculture, pp.38-9. 
 
86
 D. Hall, The Open Fields of Northamptonshire (Northampton, 1995), p.95. 
 
87
 J. Jones, ‘James Hutton’s Agricultural Research and His Life as a Farmer’, Annals of Science 42:6 (1985), p.575. 
 
88
 Donaldson, General View of Agriculture, p.14. 
 
30 
 
example, on lowland soils in parishes such as Ringstead and Irchester wheat and barley were 
grown whilst in the highland parishes of Great Addington and Finedon clay soils were also 
historically used to grow wheat and barley, despite being less suited to doing so.89 
 
The precise agricultural split of the county cannot be firmly identified but sources show that 
mixed farming was prevalent with some farmers changing land usage (with the landlord’s 
permission) on some of their holdings and many being recorded as holding amounts of arable 
and pasture land.  However, John Steane ascertained the north and east of Northamptonshire to 
be predominantly arable by the mid-nineteenth century whilst the south and west were 
dominated by pasture.  But there was a shift towards arable farming between 1850 and 1870 
resulting in two-thirds of the county being put down to crops.90  However, evidence of the exact 
nature of farming in this period is limited.  The Royal Commission on Historical Monuments 
noted in 1980 that a great deal of evidence of arable farming had been ‘obliterated’ by the 
growth of towns and the use of modern farming methods and even where evidence remained, 
ridge and furrow only tended to survive on heavy clay soils.91  But overall it appears that 
farming was generally mixed in the majority of the county although this mix changed over time. 
 
It was not just the type of soil and landscape which was important in agriculture but also the 
quality of the land.  Greenall observed in his 1979 study that Northamptonshire’s soil was 
nowhere unproductive, with soil that was unsuited to crops providing good quality grazing 
land and even in the seventeenth century there was little wasteland in the county. 92  Indeed 
Reverend J. Howlett, in his pro-enclosure leaflet of 1786, noted Arthur Young’s comment that 
the quality of Northamptonshire’s soil was so high, particularly for grazing land, that it was in 
itself a reason to enclose and to convert arable land to pasture.93  Yet landlords still expected to 
find poorer quality land within the county.  In 1860, for example, Lord Overstone described his 
recently purchased lands as including ‘not one acre of inferior or even second rate land’.94  And 
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the 1980 survey of Northamptonshire by the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments also 
identified variance in the land and soil of the county in terms of both quality and the type of 
farming to which it was best suited, correlating with both the different soil types and the split 
identified by Steane.95   
 
The amount of land under cultivation was also increasing across this period.  J.M. Neeson 
calculated from land tax returns that before 1750 as much as one acre in six of the unenclosed 
land in Northamptonshire was uncultivated wasteland, which fell to little more than a tenth of 
the county by 1800 and ‘almost no waste’ remained by 1850.96  However, as Greenall’s work and 
other studies have shown, even the wasteland of the county could be employed as profitable 
farmland. 
 
Population of the County and Owners of Land 
 
One of the major changes in nineteenth-century England occurred in terms of population 
growth.  Population in England increased dramatically in this period, rising from 5.74 million in 
1750 to 8.3 million in 1801 and by 1851 it had doubled to 18.6 million.97  This increase had not 
only to be supplied with food and goods but also needed to be utilized in the English economy.  
J.D. Chambers found that in practice the majority of this increased population was absorbed by 
the increasing demand for industrial labour.98  What is more important here, however, is the 
effect this increased population and its absorption by industry had on English agriculture, the 
agricultural economy and landed estate management.   
 
Landowners (large landowners in particular) only formed a small minority of the population of 
Northamptonshire, although a significant proportion of the population relied on them for their 
incomes.  In his 1794 report General View of Agriculture in the County of Northampton, James 
Donaldson estimated the total population of Northamptonshire to be around 167,000 with 
around 400 living in every parish and around 3,000 in each market town.99  In his 1809 report on 
the county, however, Pitt revised this estimate downwards to 150,000 and the 1811 census 
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identified the population to be 141,353, close to Pitt’s estimate.  Of these he calculated that 48.5 
in every 100 people worked in agriculture.100  By 1871 the population had increased to 243,891, 
the majority of these were still employed in agriculture but less than 5,000 (2%) owned more 
than an acre of land (see Table 2:1). 101 
 
 ENGLAND & 
WALES 
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE Northamptonshire 
as a % of Total 
POPULATION  19,458,009 243,891 1.25 
INHABITED 
HOUSES 
3,841,354 52,539 1.37 
No PARISHES  14,700 346 2.35 
TOTAL No 
OWNERS  
972,836 14,465  1.49 
OWNERS OF >1 
ACRE  
703,289 10,010 1.42 
OWNERS OF 1 
ACRE + 
269,547 4,455 1.65 
Table 2:1 Owners of Land 1873 
SOURCE: Return of Owners of Land 1873 [In England and Wales exclusive of the Metropolis] vol.2 (London, 1875), p.15.   
 
In terms of land value, in 1809 21 people owned lands worth £3,000-£5,000 per annum and a 
further 16 owned lands worth between £5,000 and £10,000 per annum with ‘few’ holding lands 
worth over £10,000 per annum.102  These valuations were only of the lands owned within 
Northamptonshire and, as large landowners often owned lands in several counties, 
landownership on a national scale was more concentrated than the Northamptonshire figures 
imply.  As with external investments, extensive landowning outside the county also had an 
effect on how landlords managed their estates.  Landlords with extensive lands were more able 
to prop up their income if there was a problem in one county or if they wished to purchase 
further lands or wanted to invest in their estates and when prices were low they could also 
manage to obtain a liveable income from their landed estates in a way smaller landowners 
could not. 
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Ownership of land was not consistent and land was sold and estates extended and consolidated 
throughout the nineteenth century.  However, what is evident from extant studies is that 
landowning was becoming more consolidated in the nineteenth century with new men of 
industrial wealth purchasing large estates whilst landowners and owner-occupiers sold their 
lands.  Neeson attributed small landowners selling their lands almost entirely to enclosure, as 
their costs were disproportionate and many could not afford the prospect.103  Whether this can 
be attributed entirely to enclosure alone, which is unlikely given the variations in the economy 
of the nineteenth century, what is certain is that by the late-nineteenth century small owner-
occupiers constituted a small fraction of the landholding body of England.  David Stead, for 
example, found that by the late-1880s small owner-occupiers comprised only 18% of the total 
number of farmers and farmed only 15% of cultivated acreage.104  Added to this, J.V. Beckett 
noted that by 1873 English and Welsh landownership was the most concentrated in Europe and 
contemporaries noted that the vast majority of land was owned by a “relatively small number 
of families”.  Rather than attributing this change to small owners selling their lands at 
enclosure, however, Beckett noted that until the recession of the 1870s land ownership remained 
concentrated due to the social standing which could be achieved by sinking one’s wealth into 
land and the possession of an extensive landed estate.105 
 
For as long as land remained profitable in the nineteenth century, Beckett found, men who had 
made their money in industry were buying into the land for the social and political power it 
brought, not simply the income and profit that could be made.  Following the extension of the 
franchise in 1867 it was also suggested that a man could further his political career by owning 
extensive tenanted lands in order to secure the votes of his tenants.  Howard Evans, writing in 
the 1870s, suggested the most prominent example of this type of landholding to be Samuel 
Jones Loyd, Lord Overstone, although this was a claim Loyd himself heavily refuted.106 
 
Within this context sources provide only snapshots of changing ownership.  However, some 
landowning families in the county had been resident for hundreds of years, estates tended to be 
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bought and sold whole and landownership consisted of a core of old families holding extensive 
estates and new families building large estates.  Within this the general composition of estates 
tended to remain the same even where lands were sold and it is unlikely that large landowners 
ever numbered much more than the 37 holding more than £3,000 of land in 1809.  Thus what is 
evident is that Northamptonshire had a number of estates of various sizes, including some of 
significant size within the county and even extending beyond it.  Those focussed on here were 
all of significant wealth and size, with a majority of the rural population reliant on landed 
estates and their management forming a crucial part of rural society.  With the recession after 
1879 landed estates’ fortunes changed and, as Beckett pointed out, those who were reliant on 
agricultural incomes at this time had to adapt, often selling lands.107  What is examined in this 
thesis is the fortune of the agricultural estate and therefore the fall in fortunes can be identified.  
However, it must be stressed there is little suggestion of the landlords of this study struggling 
to survive as all had adapted to the changing economic climate and had other forms of income 
outside of their estates. 
 
The Business of the Estate and Estate Income 
 
The main source of income from landed estates was usually in the form of rents.  The rental 
income of landlords can, Beckett argued, be used to determine the general financial position of a 
landlord.  Whilst costs of living and external incomes did vary, a general picture can be built up 
using the estate income of landlords and wealth and social status were related to the acreages 
owned and the fortunes of agriculture.108  Others have made a more detailed comparison of the 
fortunes of farming and the income of landed estates.  H.G. Hunt, for example, in his study of 
the Kent estates of Lord Darnley in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, noted 
that in the early-nineteenth century, as prices rose, not only did rents increase but landlords 
moved from longer tenancies to tenancies-at-will, enabling them to take a greater proportion of 
tenurial incomes and therefore increasing estate incomes more rapidly as agriculture increased 
in profitability.109  This view was also shared by R.C. Allen, who argued that at enclosure 
landlords were able to increase their income from their estates without contributing towards 
economic growth by way of re-organizing their estates and raising rents, creating greater 
financial inequality rather than increased prosperity in agriculture.110 
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The estates covered in this study all relied primarily on their rental income.  However, they also 
sourced timber and ran an estate farm which brought in income and supplied produce for use 
on the estate.  Further to this, landowners also had external incomes – such as industrial 
incomes or investment in commerce - which could further act as a ‘buffer’ and ensure they were 
still able to maintain their standard of living when prices were low and rents poorly paid.    
External sources of income, it will become evident throughout this thesis, affected estate 
management and rental management because the estate was less reliant on rents for its survival, 
providing more flexible options in how the estate was managed.  Indeed, Beckett identified 
estates in the late-1870s redirecting assets away from agriculture in order to survive and noted 
that in Northamptonshire, amongst other counties, those reliant solely on their landed incomes 
had little prospect of economic survival.111  However, Northamptonshire will also be shown to 
have been a county in which the primary profit was agricultural and what enabled the survival 
of estates through agricultural recession would usually be interests and investments outside of 
the county.   
 
How far landlords were reliant on their landed incomes has been debated by historians.  In 1940 
Habakkuk suggested that by 1700 landlords were earning a large proportion of their incomes 
from external sources in a way they had not been doing 60 years previously, through army 
colonelcies and pensions amongst other sources.112  In 1985 however, Clay argued the majority 
of landlords were actually reliant on rental income as their main source of income up to 1750.113  
Yet what appears to have happened on the Northamptonshire estates of this study is that the 
older, extensive estates were more than capable of managing on their rental incomes and other 
monies obtained from the land whilst new men were buying their way into the land in a 
manner significant enough that they too could survive on the income their estates brought 
them.  Even the Loyd family, who bought into the land with wealth from banking, retired from 
their banking concerns to manage their estate, making them as reliant on their landed income as 
their old aristocratic counterparts.  Thus the principal income of landed estates came from 
leasing the land to tenants but other types of income could be made from the land.   
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F.M.L. Thompson pointed out that canals had brought great benefits to landed estates, in 
lowering costs of bringing in goods and materials to the estate whilst at the same time 
extending the market for estate produce, and as a result landlords were eager to invest in 
railways and many made great profits from doing so.114  One such example was the Earl 
Fitzwilliam who, David Spring noted, invested in the South Yorkshire Railway in the 1840s.115  
Landed estates could also be exploited for mineral and coal deposits, which could bring a 
substantial income or simply provide the estate with resources which would otherwise have 
been brought in from elsewhere.  The subsoil belonged to the owner of the top soil and 
therefore resources could be mined by the landowner.  Spring identified a great number of 
landlords – of both large and small estates - in Cumberland, Lancashire, South Yorkshire and 
Staffordshire worked minerals on their estates to increase their estate incomes.  Less common 
was mining for coal but Spring found that this was also undertaken by some landowners, 
particularly those with substantial coal deposits on their estates including Earl Fitzwilliam on 
his Yorkshire estates, the Lowthers in Cumberland and the Earl of Durham.116  Landowners 
could also profit from the rapid urban growth in the nineteenth century.  Those who owned 
lands which could be amalgamated into expanding towns and cities could profit from ground 
rents or even sell their land outright.117  However, in Northamptonshire itself, leasing land, 
farming and timber sales appear to have been the predominant occupation of landed estates 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
 
On landed estates themselves John Davies observed that on the Cardiff estate of the Marquesses 
of Bute the agricultural function of the estate became less dominant throughout the nineteenth 
century and was replaced by a non-agricultural income, with the rise of the urban estate more 
than balancing out the decline of the agricultural.118  Yet the responses of Northamptonshire 
landlords to the recession of the late-nineteenth century, added to evidence of the produce of 
the county, suggests the Northamptonshire landscape was different, with Lord Overstone 
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commenting on facing ruin and proposing that an alternative way to profit from the land 
should be found.119 
 
In 1794 Donaldson commented that ‘there are no large manufacturing towns situated in this 
district’ and indeed Northamptonshire was and remained a primarily agricultural county 
throughout this period.120  Donaldson established that the produce of the county was significant 
and flour was sent to neighbouring counties as were beans.  Furthermore, in 1809, Pitt listed the 
primary produce of Northamptonshire as ‘wheat, wheat-flour, oats, beans, timber, oak-bark, fat 
cattle, fat sheep, wool, butter, and cheese’ as well as leather.  What manufacture was 
undertaken in the county was reliant on agriculture as a source of raw materials, consisting of 
‘shoes, lace and woollen stuffs’ but including providing such manufactures for the army.121  
Thus Northamptonshire was not a poor county and farming was certainly productive and 
profitable, with enough output to supply produce to both neighbouring counties and the 
military.  However, economic activity in the county was fundamentally reliant on agriculture.   
 
Outside of the produce of agriculture the land itself could be used to cultivate timber or exploit 
mineral deposits.  There is no mention in the Northamptonshire correspondence of mineral 
deposits.  However, timber sales do appear to have formed an important part of estate incomes.  
Timber sales were not a way of profiting from the land unique to Northamptonshire – Barbara 
English commented that in 1861 Yorkshire landlords were alleged to be making more money 
from timber sales than from letting land.122  Within Northamptonshire there are many examples 
of estates cultivating and profiting from timber, despite Donaldson’s suggestion in 1794 that 
more profit could have been made by cutting down the forests and letting the land for farming, 
even after compensating any common rights.123  Throughout the period the Montagu account 
books all included timber accounts following the rentals, implying the sale of timber to be the 
second most important source of estate income.  As with the rentals no acreage is given but the 
total income from timber sales was always considerably lower than that from rents, indicating 
that the majority of the land was leased out.  Timber was important to other estates too - in 1818 
Pearce wrote to James Langham explaining how to calculate the girth of trees and in 1820 sent 
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details of the sale of timber at auction and in 1830 the Ashley estate was investing in timber, 
purchasing a total of 347 trees, including 174 Ash and 133 Elm.124  Thus Northamptonshire 
estates were reliant on the land.  Within this significant incomes were made from selling timber 
but they relied primarily on tenants and their rental incomes. 
 
Thus, overall, Northamptonshire agriculture was extensive and the county as a whole was 
reliant on agriculture to sustain its income and wealth.  Whether landlords had a background in 
industry or were old landed magnates they were all reliant on the land to a significant degree.  
Some income was generated through timber sales but the majority always came from rents.  As 
a result landlords were extremely reliant on their tenants and, where prices of agricultural 
produce were good, made a significant profit from them.  The reliance of Northamptonshire 
landlords on their tenants in turn affected their estate management decisions and policies, as 
did the extent of their estates and whether or not they had any external income. 
 
Estates of This Study 
 
The choice of estates for this study has been shaped by the available sources and the longevity 
of ownership for families and estates.  The Stopford family, despite their longevity, 
geographical location within Northamptonshire and significant holdings, have little archival 
evidence for this period and therefore have not been included, whilst the Loyd family, who only 
came into the county at the beginning of the nineteenth century, have extensive archival sources 
regarding the management of the estate throughout this period and thus have been included. 
 
The two central estates of this study are therefore the Overston estate of the Loyd family and 
the Boughton estate of the Lords Montagu, both of which have significant accounts in the 
archive, reinforced with correspondence evidence in the case of the former and annotations on 
the account books in the case of the latter.  Added to this, the Cottesbrooke estate of the 
Langham family has been utilized to provide further qualitative evidence on estate 
management decisions and the interactions of landlords, stewards and tenants on the estate.  
Finally, the Fitzwilliam estate at Milton has been used to provide some examples, although the 
majority of documents for this estate cover the eighteenth and not the nineteenth century.   
 
Estates were often formed of grouped parishes but could be formed of two or three separate 
groups of parishes or even extended to further estates in other counties and C.G.A Clay 
identified a trend for consolidation of estates from the early eighteenth century onwards which 
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varied by degree but was present across every county in England.125  The estates of this study 
are concentrated primarily within the centre of the county, all falling in the lowland area with 
good arable soils but with some outlying parishes in the highlands of the county.  The two 
principal estates – the Overston and the Boughton – are also of comparable size with one 
another and were a part of greater estates covering a number of counties.  The Milton estate was 
one of the largest in the county, again providing a snapshot of the workings of a far greater 
estate which extended over a number of counties.  The Langham estate provides an example of 
a different type of estate, where Cottesbrooke was the centre of a Northampton-focussed estate 
with little land elsewhere and a middling landed family seat.  All the estates had their principal 
seat in Northamptonshire, although Lord Overstone himself did relocate to Berkshire later in 
his life. 
 
The size of estates was not constant but there are points where one can be certain of the size or 
value of certain estates.  In 1830 estate manager William Pearce valued the Langham estate at 
£18,000 per annum and described it as ‘a truly noble estate’.126  A number of Northamptonshire 
landowners also held significant lands outside of Northamptonshire as well as their estates 
within the county, which can be used to give us some idea of the extent of their holdings and 
their incomes.  For example, the size of the Finch Hatton estate in Nottinghamshire was 1,420 
acres but all we know of their Northamptonshire estates is that they were much more 
significant in size.127  Within this study, A.D.M. Phillips found that the Loyd estate at Overston 
consisted of just 3,681 acres in Northamptonshire in 1832, rising to 17,161 acres in 1850 and 
18,816 by 1877.128  In 1870, however, Lord Overstone himself noted his estate consisted of 15,045 
acres in Northamptonshire (worth £30,679 per annum) plus lands in Berkshire, Carmarthen and 
Middlesex, totalling 30,849 acres worth £58,098.129  Phillips also examined the Montagu estate at 
Boughton, which he calculated to be 11,423 acres in 1834, increasing to 12,110 acres in 1896.130  
Estates outside the county were sometimes significant and, as shall be shown, did influence 
management decisions because they added considerably to estate incomes.  
 
                                                          
125
 Clay, ‘Landlords and Estate Management’, pp.163-4. 
 
126
 NRO L(C)1501. 
 
127
 NRO FH1549. 
 
128
 A.D.M. Phillips, The Underdraining of Farmland in England During the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1989), 
p.103. 
 
129
O’Brien, Correspondence of Lord Overstone, p.727; University of London MS804/2298. 
 
130
 Phillips, Underdraining, p.101. 
 
40 
 
Introduction to the Families of this Study 
 
The families that owned the estates as well as the staff they employed provide an essential 
element in our understanding of estate management and the rural economy.  Landlords seldom 
managed their estates directly in this period but often had significant knowledge of landed 
estate management and sought to preserve the long-term profitability of the land. 
 
Barbara English observed that in East Yorkshire in the second half of the nineteenth century 
most landowners had significant knowledge of their estates and were often keen improvers 
with a great interest in agriculture.131  In Northamptonshire there is significant evidence of 
landlords being involved in managing their estates throughout the period at least insofar as 
auditing accounts and reprimanding stewards, and many even went further and discussed their 
estates with stewards and friends.  In his survey of the county in 1809, William Pitt assumed 
landlords had the best knowledge of their estates.  In fact he only obtained information from 
estate stewards when they would not forward his enquiries to absentee landlords.132  Therefore, 
in the nineteenth century landowners were expected to be knowledgeable about their estates, 
despite absenteeism and despite the fact they employed men to manage their estates for them, 
and in Northamptonshire evidence shows that landlords lived up to this expectation 
throughout the eighteenth as well as the nineteenth century.   
 
 Montagu (Boughton) 
 
The Montagu estate was centred on Boughton and included lands in the majority of the parishes 
surrounding it.  The family also held lands in other counties, including significant lands in 
Nottinghamshire and Scotland.   
 
The pedigree of the Montagu family changed over time.  Habakkuk observed that in 1640 the 
Montagu family were considered a part of Northamptonshire’s squirearchy but a hundred 
years later had been socially elevated to the ranks of the aristocracy and had moved from the 
social status of families such as the Drydens and the Ishams to that of the Fitzwilliams, one of 
the grandest, richest families of the county.133  The family held the titles of Dukes of Buccleuch 
and Queensbury, making them aristocratic by title as well as in the same social circles as the 
lords Fitzwilliam and other major landholders.   
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Furthermore, it should be mentioned here that the Montagu estate was for a time held by a 
dowager (whose accounts cover 1801-1821 in the sample).  This is the only estate of this study 
for which there are records covering a woman’s management of the estate, or at least a 
significant part thereof.  However, she did not act significantly differently to her male 
counterparts in the majority of matters and maintained the estate management team of her 
predecessor.  Her second husband, Henry Scott, Duke of Buccleuch was accredited by 
Donaldson with being an improving landlord, having employed the use of marl as a fertilizer 
across the estates and therefore appears to have undertaken at least some of the duties in 
managing his dowager wife’s estates.134 
 
Loyd (Overston) 
 
The Overstone archive provides the most significant collection of social data in the study, 
predominantly in the form of correspondence from both Lewis Loyd’s and Samuel Jones Loyd’s 
ownership.  The Loyd family did not buy into Northamptonshire until the early nineteenth 
century and before their purchase Overston changed hands several times.135  But the stability 
provided by the Loyd ownership makes Overston a useful estate to our study.  The Loyd estates 
were not limited to Northamptonshire and also included lands in Berkshire (centred on 
Wantage).136  Added to this, some accounts for the estate are available, covering the post-French 
wars recession, enabling a comparison with the Montagu estate accounts and, of course, adding 
a social dimension to the account data. 
 
The Loyd family made their money in banking and invested it in the land.  Lewis Loyd retired 
in 1844 to make the full transition to landlord.137  Samuel Jones Loyd was born in 1796, followed 
his father into the banking profession before being elevated to the peerage as Lord Overstone in 
1850.  He died in 1882.138  Samuel did not inherit the Overston estate until 1860 but 
corresponded with his father and discussed the estate and general state of agriculture with 
friends and acquaintances before his formal inheritance and even managed the estate in his 
father’s absence or illness.  In 1834, for example, Lewis Loyd was often absent from his estate 
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and he and Samuel exchanged letters, including Lewis sending instructions to be passed on to 
the steward.  Samuel Jones Loyd himself, in his later years, made over his Berkshire estates to 
his son-in-law Col. Loyd Lindsey (although no mention is made of his making over the 
Northamptonshire estates in the same way anywhere within the archive).139 
 
Langham (Cottesbrooke) 
 
The Langham estate was of significant size within, but did not extend outside of, 
Northamptonshire.  The family seat was at Cottesbrooke but from the extant correspondence 
(1799-1832) it appears that both Sir William and his successor Sir James Langham spent the 
majority of their time at the family’s London residence.  Added to this, the estate was managed 
by the London firm Kent, Claridge and Pearce.  However, despite both landowner and estate 
manager being based predominantly in London, both parties took a great interest in ensuring 
the profitability and smooth running of the estate.  James Langham even calculated all rents, 
increases and abatements personally, showing him to be one of the more involved landlords of 
this study.  Whilst there is limited evidence from the estate, landlord-steward correspondence 
primarily discusses arrears and abatements, including some figures and calculations, 
reinforcing the evidence from the Montagu and Overstone estates as well as adding the 
perspective of a middling estate. 
 
Sources 
 
The sources employed for this study are varied but the principal sources used are rental 
accounts and landlord correspondence which provide not only financial but also social data for 
this period. 
 
The Montagu archive contains extensive accounts data and family correspondence.  The 
correspondence does not concern itself with the estate but the accounts provide an invaluable 
source for the study of rent levels of this period and can be compared to Turner, Beckett and 
Afton’s rent index (see chapters four and five).  A sample of every ten years has been used, 
covering the period 1800-1881.  Further to this, the Overstone estate provides comprehensive 
accounts for the years 1828-1831.  As a result the years 1815-1831 have been used as a central 
focus, looking at the Montagu and Overstone data covering the French Wars and the recession 
which followed.  Whilst the Montagu accounts cover a longer period and are more 
comprehensive, the Overstone estate provides significant correspondence data for the majority 
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of the nineteenth century, adding a further dimension to the figures alone.  However, the 
accounts themselves were not devoid of qualitative evidence, with landlords looking over 
account books and various memoranda and comments adorning the books and providing 
evidence of the reasons for arrears and rent levels as well as the action taken. 
 
In terms of the qualitative data itself, the Overstone and Langham archives all provide 
correspondence evidence, including letters to and from stewards and estate managers as well as 
friends and acquaintances.  The Overstone correspondence is the most significant collection, 
including over 2,000 letters of Lord Overstone covering the majority of the period 1830 to 1882 
and being heavily concerned with estate management, prices and the state of the land.  A 
significant collection of correspondence also comes from the Langham estate, covering 1800-
1832 but with replies to some letters missing.  However, this archive is entirely estate 
correspondence between the Langhams and their estate steward William Pearce and his sub-
stewards, providing data on changes in rent levels, estate views on tenants and the behaviour of 
estate stewards.   
 
Thus, even though archives are varied and some are limited, together they provide data on a 
number of aspects of estate management and social and economic views contained therein.  
Even the smaller archives such as that of the Langhams provide invaluable data comparable 
with other estates as well as data unique to the estate to which they pertained.  Overall, in the 
context of the wider economy and extant studies, one can go some way to identifying patterns 
of estate management and the economic circumstances leading to various management 
decisions. 
 
The Role of Landlords in Managing their Estates 
 
C.G.A. Clay argued that what has been viewed as paternalism on the part of landlords by many 
historians was often simply neglect.  He suggested that increasing landlord absenteeism was 
accompanied by increasing neglect and disinterest in their estates and the employment of 
agents who were not necessarily competent or honest.140  However, evidence elsewhere points 
to - and this study will show - landlord absenteeism being coupled with a great interest in 
estates and the work of stewards.  Particularly where a landlord relied on his estate for a large 
proportion of his income, he would take a great interest in his estates if not an active role in 
managing them.  Indeed, Martin Daunton noticed that even by the 1870s, as prices for 
agricultural produce fell dramatically, landlords were still intent on having good tenants on 
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their lands and even maintaining their reputations as paternal landlords.141  Thus landlords took 
an interest in managing their estates both for profit and social reputation.  However, what we 
are primarily concerned with here are the economic motives for their actions and options 
available to certain landlords in particular economic circumstances. 
 
As well as neglect, a significant charge made against landowners has been that they charged the 
maximum rents they could, to the detriment and immiseration of their tenants.142  This has been 
suggested both as a way of maximising estate income and a way of driving out smaller, poorer 
tenants in favour of large capitalist farmers.  Peter Edwards identified evidence of tenants in 
Rushock, Worcestershire, being driven off the land by landlords dramatically increasing their 
rents whilst Habakkuk described what was generally considered to be a ‘perfect’ estate as one 
where ’income most closely approximates to a rent charge’ but where tenants were able to pay 
their rents in full and maintain their own holdings.143 
 
Whilst a great deal of the historiography has been concerned with the effect of changes in the 
economy on tenants, portraying landlords as wealthy men who didn’t need money raising rents 
as high as possible to the detriment of their impoverished tenants, one has to remember that if 
rents were unpaid a landlord may well have had to reduce his outgoings to compensate or even 
have been left unable to pay his own mortgages and debts.  As David Howell pointed out, 
where landlords relied heavily on their landed income and had large mortgages or other debts 
they could end up in greater financial trouble than their tenants were there a prolonged 
recession.144  When one acknowledges that in many cases landlords were as reliant on the land 
for their incomes as their tenants were, the issue of estate management can be viewed in a very 
different light.  Even though landlords had a far higher income than their tenants they had 
considerable outgoings and often debts.  It must also be noted that landlords did often take a 
practical role in the running of their estates or at the very least checked on their accounts and 
any problems with tenants. 
 
Where new tenants were coming into the land, whether they were relatives of the old tenants or 
new to the land, estate managers and landlords took a great interest in establishing that the 
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tenant would be a good tenant before lands were let.  For example, Mingay discovered that in 
the early-eighteenth century, on Sir Jacob Bouverie’s estate in Kent, Sir Jacob would need a 
reference from the tenant’s old landlord as well as the recommendation of his own stewards.145  
Even persons already resident on the estate would be assessed when their circumstances 
changed.  In 1822, for example, Pearce wrote to James Langham for his decisions as to whether 
Mrs Hales (who had been widowed and whose relatives had paid her rent as she could not) 
should be allowed to remain on her farm or if her son (whom it was noted would be heavily 
financially supported by his in-laws) should be granted the lands.146 
 
Where rents were not paid landlords did not automatically evict tenants and stewards often 
discussed accounts with landlords before any action was taken.  There is not only considerable 
evidence of stewards negotiating payments with tenants to recoup a part or the entirety of the 
tenant’s arrears but they could also seize tenants’ goods to sell to recoup their losses.147  
Daunton suggested that the power of ‘distress’ was a common law power on which landlords 
relied when tenants fell into debt.  However, this power was limited in the nineteenth century, 
primarily by judges being sympathetic to the indebted tenants and not granting notices of 
distraint.  But the nineteenth century also brought the right of landlords to summarily evict 
tenants who were in arrears.  Under the 1838 Small Tenants Recovery Act tenants with annual 
rents under £20 could be evicted following one week’s notice followed by a 21-day warrant for 
ejectment being served upon them.  However, having to collect and sell a tenant’s goods or 
evict him (leaving him with 21 days rent-free in the property too) was not the ideal situation for 
landlords to recoup monies owed.148  Thus records generally show arrears being tolerated or 
other arrangements being made to recoup estate losses.  The collection of rents, state of arrears 
and landlord and estate actions where tenants became heavily indebted are central aspects of 
estate management and crucial parts of this thesis and will be discussed in detail throughout, 
with arrears being the subject of chapter 5.   
 
Thus landlords did take an active role in managing their estates.  They played a part in directing 
their stewards and checking their actions and made decisions regarding tenants and rent levels.  
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The role and personality of individual landlords was central to the way an estate was managed 
and many had far greater awareness of how their estates were run than historians often accredit 
them with. 
 
Stewards 
 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought with them an increased use of stewards to 
manage estates and make some of the decisions regarding rent levels, tenants and even land 
purchases.  After the landowner the steward was often the most important person on the estate. 
English ascertained that the men employed to manage the land were referred to by a number of 
titles including land agents, land stewards, estate agents (although these were usually the 
sellers of land) and bailiffs (though these were generally of inferior status) and there was no 
definitive title.149  Here, for simplicity, these men are referred to as stewards throughout.   
 
Peter Mandler noted that one way landlords improved their estate management was to increase 
the professionalization of their stewards in order to improve their estates and make greater 
profits.150  Indeed the role of stewards in estate management was as essential as that of the 
landlords.  Stewards would usually have a technical knowledge of farming as well as 
management strategies and acted as an interface between landlords and tenants.  Their duties 
were varied and often included rent collection and other estate management tasks as well as 
advising landowners to whom they should let lands, how best to approach arrears and 
sometimes even what level they should set rents at.  Alongside this they often had a role in the 
day-to-day running of the estate and advised tenants and landlords on farming techniques and 
suggested improvements and changes to be made. 
 
It is generally believed that the role of stewards became increasingly professionalized in the 
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries although there is debate regarding when this 
occurred and some historians have even questioned whether it happened at all.  T.J. Raybould 
identified ‘an increase in the scale and complexity of estate economic enterprise’ which led 
landowners to seek men more capable of handling these complexities in the second half of the 
eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century.151  Indeed, James Hutton cited an example in 
his Elements of Agriculture (1797) of a ploughman he had hoped to train as steward who ‘proved 
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unequal to the task’.152  This may have been simply a poor choice in the man he was training but 
may equally have been that a ploughman no longer had the education necessary to undertake 
the increasingly complex role of steward. 
 
Webster discussed the considerable variation in when historians believe the professionalization 
of stewards occurred.  Whilst Mingay argued that estate administration was improved due to 
increasingly professional stewards in the eighteenth century, Beckett and F.M.L. Thompson 
suggested this professionalization did not take place until the nineteenth century.153  Falling 
between these two dates is Steane’s argument.  Steane noted that Arthur Young, James 
Donaldson and a number of other agricultural writers of the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries judged that stewards were becoming more professionalized as landlords 
developed ‘enlightened self interest’.154  The argument stands that as landlords became more 
interested in efficiency and profits they sought more efficient and capable stewards to 
undertake a more complex role and, as a result, stewards became more professionalized. 
 
What is certain is that steward numbers rose in this period.  P. Roebuck stated that as absentee 
landlord numbers increased in the early-eighteenth century demand for full-time stewards rose, 
having previously been limited only to the largest estates.  As numbers rose, he claimed, the 
role of stewards became increasingly professionalized and stewards’ capabilities rose by the 
mid-eighteenth century.155  However, in her study of nineteenth-century East Yorkshire English 
calculated that stewards did increase in number (although by less than 1 percent in the East 
Riding between 1840 and 1880) but they were no more professionally qualified in 1880 than 
they had been forty years previously.156 
 
Whether or not they became more professionalized in the course of the nineteenth century there 
were different types or levels of stewards which can be identified across the period.  In 
Northamptonshire one finds three types of stewards – those resident on the estates who 
collected rents, supervised work and met with tenants; a higher stratum who essentially 
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managed the first group, compiled the annual accounts and managed the estate finances but 
were not necessarily resident on the estate; and a smaller but significant group who undertook 
the duties of both the other groups being resident on the estate, personally chasing and 
collecting rents and supervising work but also managing other stewards and the estate finances.  
The Langham estate in the 1820s and 1830s, for example, employed William Pearce who 
managed the estate from his London office whilst William Dean, William Fellows and others 
undertook the majority of the work on the estate itself.  Lord Overstone’s steward Beasley, in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, undertook the same duties as 
Pearce in the early-eighteenth century but also the work on the estate (Overstone even implies 
Beasley undertook some of the manual work himself) and he also managed other stewards on 
the estate. 
   
English noted that even by the second half of the nineteenth century some Yorkshire landlords 
would run their estates personally, employing only low level bailiffs to aid them.  At the other 
end of the spectrum she identified professional land management companies which had 
appeared by the 1840s, usually firms of surveyors or occasionally solicitors.  One of the 
witnesses questioned for the 1881 report of the Royal Commission on Depressed Condition of 
Agricultural Interests, John Coleman from Derbyshire, commented that landlords let their estate 
be managed by lawyers out of necessity and many of these firms did not manage estates well 
although he believed non-resident estate managers could manage estates well so long as they 
had knowledge of practical farming.157  Thus management firms and professional stewards 
were becoming commonplace by the 1880s but knowledge of farming was still viewed as 
necessary in estate management. 
 
The majority of stewards appear to have been conscientious and efficient in their role.  Webster 
concluded that stewards played an important role in improving the estate by implementing 
efficient management and aiding the dissemination of agricultural and ‘moral’ knowledge to 
the tenants.  However, as a result of their role in collecting monies and chasing arrears stewards 
were often unpopular with the tenants of the estate.158 
 
Thus stewards undertook similar duties at varying levels and were often responsible for 
managing the estate, although their work was closely overseen by the landowner.  The role of 
an individual steward and how much control he had over an estate varied and, in itself, had an 
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effect on estate management, particularly where a steward advised his landlord on matters of 
rents, abatements or allowing tenants to fall into arrears. 
 
Stewards of this Study 
 
The evidence of stewards in this study, their roles and their work often arises from their own 
correspondence and accounts.  Additionally, there are instances of landlords discussing their 
role with the stewards themselves or external persons and higher level stewards discussing 
those under their management.  Pearce and Beasley communicated directly with their landlords 
by frequent letters but there is less evidence of other stewards.  Those on the Montagu estate are 
evident only from their accounts, although these often included justification of their actions. 
 
Lord Overstone’s steward Beasley has few letters to Overstone extant and most of the 
knowledge gleaned about him comes from Overstone’s references to him in letters to others.  
His role involved advising, accounting and having a detailed knowledge of the estate.  Beasley 
also appears to have had a hands-on role and significant knowledge of practical farming.  
Beasley advised others on animal feed mixes for the winter, advised on the treatment of crops 
after frost and seemingly managed the demesne farm personally as well as managing the estate 
rentals.159  Yet at the same time Beasley appears to have been highly respected and trusted, with 
Overstone undertaking some of the financial work and checking accounts when present on the 
estate but not seeing fit to complain about or to his steward in his correspondence. 
 
The Montagu stewards are the least represented of those in the sample, evident only in the 
accounts they made up.  However, the role of the stewards in collecting rents and chasing 
arrears can be seen in their comments in the account margins and the Lords Montagu enquiring 
why arrears are outstanding.  The accounts were checked and the actions of the stewards 
checked but how closely they were managed and whether they managed sub-agents is not clear.  
However, they were probably also knowledgeable about the estate and farming too.  In 1794 the 
steward of the Montagu estate, Mr Edmonds, was acknowledged as providing information to 
help with the agricultural survey of Northamptonshire, in particular the types of woodland and 
management of such in the county.160   
 
William Pearce, who managed the Langham estate, was nephew of Nathaniel Kent and from 
the 1790s a part of his company Kent, Claridge and Pearce who managed several estates 
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simultaneously, undertaking what Webster described as ‘a systematic and commercial 
approach to estate management’.161  He also managed several stewards on the estate who are 
represented predominantly by his and James Langham’s correspondence.  One of these - 
William Fellows - was discussed at length including his cutting the trees on the estate (which 
Pearce complained looked like brooms), monies left with him to arrange management on the 
estate itself and his eventual fraud hearing.162  Following Fellows leaving there are mentions of 
William Dean being brought in and Pearce enquired if Langham was happy with his work.  
Dean appears to have been a more educated man than Fellows and wrote to Langham 
personally about matters of the estate on a number of occasions but his duties appear to have 
been the same as his predecessor’s.163 
 
Thus landlords required trust in their stewards.  They generally employed men they deemed 
capable and trustworthy but also had a hierarchy of stewards and gained information from 
tenants were there any problems as well as making their own checks.  The levels of checks, trust 
in and respect for stewards did differ though.  Whilst Pearce was a professional and discussed 
issues with Langham, managing sub-agents on the estate, William Dean, Beasley and Mr 
Edmonds were all resident on the estate, had a good knowledge of farming and how to manage 
the land itself and were also responsible for collecting monies and managing the estate on a 
day-to-day basis.   
 
Webster argued that often neither stewards nor landlords had a detailed knowledge of estate 
finances and that this could result in incompetence or dishonesty, with little ability to 
distinguish between them.  Indeed there was a widely held belief that stewards cheated their 
landlords.164  Yet in Northamptonshire landlords appear to have taken a great interest in their 
estates and finances, calculating their own abatements and rent levels, checking their accounts 
and questioning the actions of their stewards where things did not add up.  Indeed the only 
case of fraud within the sample occurred under Pearce’s watch, where the estate was managed 
from a distance.  In this case Fellows, resident steward, was reported by the tenants for irregular 
accounting in 1818, showing limits to both Pearce and Langham’s knowledge of the estate 
finances.  However, this irregular accounting (in which payment of meat bills for Fellow’s 
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brother’s butchers was taken from the rent monies) appears to have been done in such a way 
that the accounts did not show the irregularities although a resident manager may have spotted 
the problem sooner.165 
 
Thus stewards were a vital part of estate management in this period, although their level of 
power and importance varied as did their duties and all were subject to management and 
overseen by landowners.  With regards to the debate on the professionalization of stewards in 
this period, highly trained men such as William Pearce did come into the county and undertook 
management of several estates from offices in London.  However, the majority of landlords 
appear to have undertaken the role of estate manager themselves, employing men who 
undertook day-to-day management of estates and even gave advice but whose role did not 
include making important decisions.  This group includes Lord Overstone who managed his 
father’s estates as a young man and managed Beasley in the mid- to late-nineteenth century as 
Pearce did Fellows and Dean at the beginning of the century.  Thus in some respects stewards 
did become more professionalized as a group but were employed with different levels of power 
and responsibility dependent on the amount of control a landlord wanted over his estates. 
 
Methods of Estate Management 
 
How an estate was managed was dependent upon a number of factors but primarily landlords 
were interested in long-term not short-term gain and sought to use their resources to this effect.  
The size of an estate was an important factor in determining how the estate was managed, as 
was whether or not the estate income was the only income of its owners.  Where an estate was 
extensive and/or the landowner had a significant external income more choice was available, 
whether it be to support the tenants and prop up the landed income with money from other 
sources, the ability to survive on a lower income when rents were depressed or unpaid or even 
to leave lands empty rather than compromise on rent levels in order to fill holdings or maintain 
rent levels in times of depressed prices, risking tenants quitting the land or becoming 
bankrupts.   
 
Smaller estates, particularly where there was no external income to fall back on, were more 
reliant on their rental income and needed to keep holdings tenanted in order to maintain the 
best income they could from their estates.  The state of the wider economy also had an effect on 
estate management decisions, with landlords and stewards making decisions depending on 
prices, productivity and demand for land.  For example, Habakkuk claimed that during the 
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French Wars (1792-1815) smaller gentry landlords were more likely to raise their rents as high 
as possible as prices rose and that ‘their best tenants’ would, as a result, tend to move onto the 
lands of larger landlords where rents were not so high.166  However, landlords so reliant on 
their tenantry would be unlikely to allow many of their best tenants to leave unless they knew 
suitable replacements could be found as this would cause them problems in the longer term and 
if they raised their rents high enough for tenants to quit the land it is doubtful replacements 
would be available.   
 
Overall responsibility and command of estate management ultimately lay with the landowner.  
A landlord would be influenced in his decisions by the economic and social situation and the 
impact this had on his estates, plus the advice of estate stewards who were perhaps more 
familiar with the estate and tenants. However, despite the influence of these external factors, the 
personality of an individual landlord would still affect how he reacted to changes in economic 
circumstances.167  For example, on the Montagu estate in 1831 Lord Walter Montagu did not 
help tenants in arrears, resulting in several bankruptcies.  In 1821, however, his predecessor had 
written off tenant arrears in order to avoid such an occurrence.168 
 
Tenants were often the key to landed profit, preferred over the estate taking on large farms 
itself.  Tenants would provide a more consistent income than running the estate as a farm, 
maintain their own holdings and required less work to manage.  Therefore landlord-tenant 
relations, choice of tenants, maintaining tenants on the land and landlords’ views of tenants 
were vital factors which would be considered in making estate management decisions.  E.P. 
Thompson linked landlord-tenant relations to Rostow’s ‘Social Tension Chart’ which linked 
high unemployment and food prices directly to social disturbance or, as Thompson summed it 
up, ‘people protest when they are hungry’.169  Yet tenants usually had more options than the 
unemployed when prices were high – negotiating lower rent levels, falling into arrears or 
quitting the land.  Requests for abatements, high arrears and notices to quit were therefore a 
signal to landlords that rents were too high in the same way that social disturbance was an 
indication that prices were too high or wages too low. 
 
                                                          
166
 Habakkuk, ‘English Landownership’, p.12. 
  
167
 Clay, ‘Landlords’, pp.241-2. 
 
168
 NRO Montagu Estate Accounts Nos. 378, 388. 
 
169
 E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common, (London, 1991), pp.186-7. 
 
53 
 
However, quitting the land, the main source of income to a tenant, was usually the last resort 
and many tenants would tolerate high rents and low prices for as long as they could.  Even 
though abatements could be granted if prices were low and tenants complained en masse, 
chapter 5 will show that many tolerated this struggle without complaint for a time and even 
where requested abatements were not granted only a small proportion of tenants would quit 
the land.  Within this context of tenant demand for land and the setting of rent levels in 
accordance with prices, landlords did keep a great deal of control of their estates.  Leases would 
often specify not just rent levels, but also the type of farming to take place on the holding and 
penalties were this deviated from without special agreement.170  But landlord control was 
limited.  Andrew Appleby observed that it was very rare for tenants to be evicted in any 
significant number.  Tenants would be evicted individually if they defaulted on rents but were 
not evicted in large numbers as landlords required them for their landed income.171  Turner et al 
also pointed out that landlords re-invested a considerable proportion of their incomes in 
improving and repairing tenants’ holdings as well as often keeping rents low enough so that 
tenants could invest in their holdings and still enjoy a ‘reasonable standard of living’.172  Thus 
landlords had a degree of control over tenants but were more limited when the economy was 
poor, relying on tenants for a large proportion of their incomes and even investing in the land to 
maintain or attract tenants. 
 
The choice of tenants was also an important factor in landed estate management.  Tenants were 
chosen based on their perceived ability to pay but also their perceived ability to work the land, 
keep the holding profitable and pay the rent in full and on time.  There was some compassion 
for tenants already on the land who could no longer afford to pay, often in a hope of recovery 
and payment of debts in the long term.  Habakkuk suggested another reason tenants could be 
unreliable to landlords.  On the Montagu estate in 1660, he found, the majority of the land was 
held by small freeholders who neglected it in favour of the land they owned, although by 1730 
strips had been consolidated and larger tenants moved in.173  Thus tenants were chosen based 
on who was most likely to run a holding successfully and who would negotiate a lease most 
favourable to the landlord.  Yet the relative negotiating powers of landlord and tenant changed 
with the economy.  Where the economy was strong a landlord could usually find a tenant but 
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where recession hit tenants would be more difficult to come by and thus could negotiate lower 
rents which did, as Turner et al commented, affect the class relationships of the two groups, 
especially where the landlords had negligible power in setting the rents.174   
 
What has been identified by a number of historians and is often assumed to be the principal 
focus and function of large landowners is maximizing their profits from the land and, by 
association, their tenants.  To maximise profits in the sense the term is applied here involved 
increasing rents whenever prices increased and a reluctance to abate rents.  In this way profits 
could be maximised in the short term although tenants may be lost in the medium to long term.  
Appleby noted that rent increases occurred not only as agriculture improved but also where 
demand for land increased and thus where landlords could make greater profit from their 
tenants.175  That these increased profits should go to the landowner was a belief widely held in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  In 1797, for example, after his reorganization of the 
Windsor estate, Nathaniel Kent was surprised that farms were not making profits for their 
landlords.  He felt that this was not because farmers were making undue profits on their lands 
or that rents were set too high or low but simply that those collecting the rents did not feel the 
same responsibility to ensure they gained the maximum amount possible as farmers did in 
profiting from their farms.176  Thus profit maximization was considered to be the economic ideal 
of how an estate should be managed in this period, even though only a proportion of landlords 
adhered to it and even then in the worst circumstances abatements would still be granted. 
 
Against this background of maximizing profits, an estate also needed to ensure tenants did not 
leave the land.  Where large numbers of tenants left the land an estate would be left with lands 
in hand which not only brought no rental income in but also required some investment to keep 
the lands in workable condition and maintain the farm buildings and homestead as well as the 
costs in finding a new tenant.  However, balancing the estate profit and setting of rent levels 
with the necessity to keep tenants on the land was, in itself, dependent on the size of an estate, 
income of the landlord and whether another tenant could be found willing to pay the rent asked 
in the prevailing agricultural economy. 
 
Turner et al commented that ‘at different times and in different places landlords had negligible 
powers.’177  In other words, there were times a landlord could be forced into a position whereby 
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he had to maintain tenants on his lands (even at dramatically reduced levels of rent) as he could 
not afford to lose income on holdings entirely, nor the cost of improving a holding in order to 
re-let it or avoid lands going to ruin if there was no tenant to farm them.  Thus in some 
situations it was expedient for a landlord to grant abatements or improve lands in order to 
maintain his lands in the short term and increase the estate profits in the longer term.  This was 
not necessarily a case of landlords having negligible powers but often those undertaking this 
method of management did not feel they had another choice.   
 
The need to maintain tenants can be identified by the obvious profit motives of landlords in 
granting abatements and negotiating rents.  For example, where it was deemed that a new 
tenant could be found who would pay a higher rent than the current tenant was willing to no 
abatement would be granted.  If the tenant chose to quit the land rather than pay this higher 
level of rent he would not be stopped.  In the 1820s-1830s, for example, James Langham can be 
seen abating rents through fear of losing his existing tenantry and being unable to replace them.  
However, he did not consent to all reductions, aware of the importance of profiting from his 
lands.   
 
Elsewhere, in a memorandum on his wealth c.1870 Overstone wrote of how he had invested in 
his estate in order to improve the conditions of those living and working upon it: 
 
In the management of my Landed Property I have spared no expenditure for the 
purpose of bringing it into the best possible condition – into the state best calculated 
to augment the produce of the soil, and to improve the condition both of Tenants 
and Labourers, under the Judicious guidance of Mr Beasley.  This I have done in 
respect of Farm Houses, Farm yards, Cottages, School Buildings &c.178 
 
Yet, whilst Loyd implied his actions were purely for the benefit of his tenants he also had limits 
on how well to treat his tenants or, more specifically, on when to abate rents.  In 1879, when 
faced with a terrible recession, Overstone commented on the Duke of Bedford’s actions in 
writing-off his lady day rents, condemning them as a ‘rash and indiscriminate’ gesture and 
although he advocated landlords sacrificing some luxuries in order to survive he did state that 
‘I intend to get what rent I can’.179  
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Added to this he still calculated the value of purchasing land in terms of profit.  He wrote to his 
life-long friend G.W. Norman in 1874 demonstrating a clear idea of the place of the labourer in 
particular and the necessity of profiting from land: 
 
We know nothing here of the difficulties into which you have fallen, farm thrown 
into your hands, and labourers intoxicated by high wages.  This must be 
disagreeable and troublesome – but I should feel some confidence that under a short 
course of temperate and judicious treatment the disease will abate, and you will find 
your Farm restored to a state of productive healthiness.180 
 
Here one can only take ‘productive healthiness’ to mean profit. 
 
Therefore, a balance had to be struck between estate profits and a landlord receiving what he 
deemed to be his fair share of the estate income and aiding tenants to avoid bankruptcies, 
quittals and lands falling into hand.  The idea of retaining tenants on the land was two-fold – 
firstly, rents could be increased once prices improved and therefore a fully tenanted estate may 
lose money in the short term in exchange for longer-term gains; secondly, keeping tenants on 
the land spared the estate the expense of maintaining the land and finding a new tenant.  The 
balance between profits and keeping lands tenanted was a difficult one dependent not only on 
the size of the estate and income of a landlord but being principally dictated by agricultural 
prices and demand for land.  The place of tenant retention and estate profits in the rental 
economy will be examined in detail throughout the remainder of this thesis as both were central 
factors in the setting of rents and the management of arrears and abatements throughout the 
nineteenth century. 
 
Long-Term Profitability of Land 
 
As landowners sought to maintain their family’s fortune in the long term, one needs to look at 
why land was chosen as an investment and how profitability was maintained.  Investment in 
the land was believed to be a stable, long-term investment from the early eighteenth century 
through to the late-nineteenth.181  In 1856, for example, Lord Overstone commented: 
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Land is the best form of permanent investment.  I entertain little doubt on that point.  
But beyond that I think all is uncertain speculation.182 
 
As early as 1814, however, Overstone reported to his father what a friend (Mr. Douglas) had 
told him about France, including comments on the use of the land: 
 
The Land itself is good, and in the best possible tillage, and no waste lands to be 
seen, and all that the land produces is consequently abundant and cheap there.  In 
this respect the contrast between it and our own country is great, and much to our 
disadvantage.183 
 
Therefore the relative efficiency of foreign agriculture was something which landlords were 
aware of and sought to emulate on their own estates in the nineteenth century, to improve 
profits and maintain the competitiveness of English agriculture and profitability of land.  
Maintaining the long-term profitability of the land was an aspect of estate management which 
was shared by all estates and changes to rent levels, the granting of abatements or allowing of 
arrears plus decisions to improve the land, were often made with long-term profits in mind. 
 
Where the economy was growing and prices were high, estates could turn over extensive 
amounts of money and provide a high income for the landowner.  Improving the land by means 
of enclosure, artificial fertilizers, crop rotations or any other means was usually intended to 
keep the land profitable in the long term and not simply for short-term gain.  Investment in land 
could also be a significant cost, especially where money was invested when prices were high 
but prices fell before costs were recouped.  Habakkuk found that landlords often spent a great 
deal of money improving newly purchased lands, often as a result of the tenants’ situation and 
not because this had been their intention upon buying the land and Phillips found that between 
1845 and 1849 the Montagus’ Boughton estate invested an average of £1.52 per acre in drainage 
and the Oveston estate an average of £0.98.184  Added to this was the possibility of mortgages 
taken out being an increasing burden when prices were low and interest was still accruing.  But 
overall estates were managed in such a way that they survived recessions and profited from 
high prices.  Indeed, until the agricultural market crashed in the 1870s and 1880s, properly 
managed landed estates were a highly profitable long-term investment and possibly even, as 
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Lord Overstone suggested, ‘the best form of permanent investment’, profitable to both 
landlords and their tenants. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Landed estates were defined by a number of factors and managed in a number of ways.  The 
choice of estate management depended upon not only the size of individual estates but also the 
reliance of the landlord on his landed income, the other incomes available to him, his 
personality and, of course, the wider economy at the time.  As the agricultural economy 
changed so did estate management but in the main decisions were intended to both maximise 
profits whilst retaining tenants.  All were focussed on maintaining the long-term survival of the 
estate but differed in how far they sought to aid and protect their tenants from negative 
economic conditions.  What is most important here is the fact that landlords did not take 
decisions in isolation.  Those concentrating on the negative effects of estate policies often forget 
the reliance of landowners on their estate income and the levels of debt they may well have 
been encumbered with and few acknowledge the role of landlords in preserving the long-term 
profitability of the estate as a factor affecting their short-term decisions.   
 
Many landowners employed stewards to manage their estates by this period but the majority 
still took an interest in their estates.  They sought not only to ensure they were profiting from 
the land at what they considered a reasonable rate but also that the long-term profitability of the 
land was being maintained and quite often that their tenants were not facing bankruptcy and 
were able farmers, profiting from the land themselves.  Estate management decisions were thus, 
in the main, responses to particular economic situations and aimed at maintaining a balance 
between short-term profit and the long-term survival of the estate. 
 
The remainder of this study will examine the decisions of landlords in managing their estates in 
terms of both rent levels and improvements throughout the nineteenth century.  These will be 
examined in the context of the options available to landlords at any one time within the 
prevailing agricultural economy.  Chapter 3 will examine improvements to and investment in 
the land before chapters 4 and 5 look at the setting and payment of rents in detail. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Improvements and Investment in Farming 
 
Introduction 
 
As shown in chapters 1 and 2, England underwent a transition in both rural society and the 
agricultural economy in the course of the nineteenth century, caused in part by increasing 
demand for produce and a number of improvements in farming. So much so, in fact, the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1797 claimed “Britain exceeds all modern nations in husbandry”.185  
Northamptonshire in particular was subject to significant changes in agriculture in this period - 
farm sizes were increasing, drainage was improved, artificial fertilizers and crop rotations 
became widely adopted, land use was changed and around 25% of the Northamptonshire 
landscape was enclosed between 1700 and 1870.186   
 
Throughout the nineteenth century landlords and their stewards took considerable efforts in re-
organizing their estates, implementing improvements and increasing the efficiency of the land.  
In 1820s Kent, for example, Hunt found that Lord Darnley’s steward re-organized the land in 
terms of splitting some farms to make smaller holdings, increasing the size of others and taking 
some land out of cultivation for other uses.  He also identified considerable amounts of land 
being bought and sold.187  This chapter concerns itself which such re-distribution of landholding 
and farms upon landed estates as well as other types of investment and improvement and the 
factors such improvement was undertaken in response to, as well as who led the way and 
covered the costs. 
  
Throughout the nineteenth century one can identify a consensus that to improve the land was 
to increase the income from an estate.  Indeed, writing in 1907, Robert J. Thompson noted that 
the rent increases in the first twenty years of the nineteenth century were, in part, attributable to 
the advances in farming (he uses the example of improved breeding programmes) being 
implemented more widely.  After the French Wars, as prices fell, he found that landlords 
undertook two courses of action – to reduce rents or to invest in the soil.  He stated that where 
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lands were improved in such a way rents did not fall.188  Whilst chapters 4 and 5 will show that 
estates adopted other methods of rent management than simply reducing rents and investment 
did not necessarily prevent rents falling in this period, what is important here is the relationship 
between rents and investment.  Whilst Thompson identified investing in the land as a method 
of maintaining rent levels in a recession, Robert C. Allen noted that investment in the land by 
the owner was usually recouped by way of increasing rents, transferring any financial benefit 
from the tenant to the landlord.189 
 
This chapter will therefore examine the changes taking place in agriculture in this period and 
how society caused or responded to developments in agriculture across the period.  It will 
examine the relative roles of landowners and tenants in implementing improvements to the 
land and the economic and social factors driving the decisions.  It shall be shown that enclosure 
was not vital in order to improve the land but did make it easier to implement other 
improvements.  Who took on the financial risks of farming and how landed estates adapted in 
changing economic conditions will be the central focus of this chapter before chapters 4 and 5 
move on to examining the rental system in detail. 
 
Consolidation of Landowning 
 
As noted in chapter 2, landowning was becoming increasingly consolidated across the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Larger estates were more resilient against recession and 
offered their owners more security.  They were also more profitable and a landowner could 
build up substantial wealth and an extensive annual income by increasing and consolidating his 
holdings.  Indeed, Roebuck found that by the early-eighteenth century ‘both socially and 
economically substantial landownership had come to acquire an almost unshakable stability 
and security’.190  There are several examples of the Northamptonshire landlords of this study 
consolidating their holdings in this period, not only purchasing new lands but also selling those 
disconnected from their main estates. 
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The trend towards the consolidation of estates ran across England to varying extents from the 
late-seventeenth century.191  Roebuck commented that Sir Marmaduke Constable expanded his 
East Riding estate ‘whenever possible’ in the early-eighteenth century.192  In Northamptonshire 
the most significant purchasers of land within the Northamptonshire sample were the Loyd 
family, with Lewis Loyd buying into the county in the early-nineteenth century and Samuel 
Jones-Loyd continuing to expand the estate after he inherited it in 1858.193  Indeed F.M.L. 
Thompson noted the example of the Loyd family, finding that Lewis Loyd purchased lands 
from the Earl of Westmorland amongst others, building up substantial estates by buying 
smaller estates whole in the first half of the nineteenth century.194  However, both Lewis Loyd 
and Samuel Jones-Loyd also sold some of their estates, consolidating holdings whilst still 
extending their ownership.195  James Langham was also trying to expand his estate in 1800, 
when he wrote that he had failed to purchase lands at Gratton.196  The sale of estates 
accompanying the buying of others also had advantages – Thompson found that landowners 
would sometimes sell a part of their estates for the money to invest in their remaining lands or 
to purchase other land with.197 
 
Between 1790 and 1873-83, as F.M.L. Thompson observed, great estates became more socially 
and politically important and this resulted in a concentration of landownership.  Even where 
individual owners changed, estates tended to be sold in their entirety and/or to other great 
landowners.198  Indeed, Tom Nicholas argued that businessmen sought to invest in land even 
beyond the economic downturn of the late-nineteenth century to gain social and political 
standing.199  However, only 60-80 of the 550 MPs in the Commons were considered ‘country 
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gentlemen’ in 1867, indicating that these men bought into land with the intention of influencing 
local politics or even sitting in the House of Lords in this period.200  Despite land still holding its 
appeal to some gentry in the 1870s and 1880s the decline in the agrarian economy led to a fall in 
demand for land by both tenants and purchasers alike, leaving many landowners with lands 
they could not sell and some unable to pay their mortgages or outgoings.201   
 
With regards to increasing farm sizes and improvements in agriculture in particular, the 
consolidation of estates was a factor in these changes taking place.  Where an estate was 
consolidated rather than spread across a number of counties or even parishes it was easier to 
manage – soil types and farming types would usually be similar and stewards did not need to 
travel to collect rents, check on tenants and manage the estate in the way they would were it 
fragmented.  Improvements would also be easier to implement where the topography of the 
landscape was similar as the same improvements or farming methods could be implemented.  
Enclosure would also have been easier to implement where a landlord owned the majority of 
land in few parishes than it would be if he owned a lesser quantity of land across a large 
number of parishes.  Furthermore, consolidation of landowning in itself enabled farm sizes to 
increase – farmers increasingly wanted consolidated farms and where a landlord could 
purchase lands surrounding his estate farms could be increased without the displacement of 
any of his tenants. 
 
Thus land ownership was becoming increasingly consolidated throughout this period.  As 
shown in chapter 2 only a small minority ever owned land in Northamptonshire and a number 
of these men were increasing their holdings in the county across the nineteenth century whilst 
selling lands in other counties to consolidate their estates.  There were several reasons for 
consolidating holdings in this way.  In increasing their lands in Northamptonshire landlords 
were generally increasing the size of their estates overall even when, like the Loyd family, they 
were selling some lands elsewhere; but this was not the primary purpose of consolidating their 
holdings in the county.  Consolidated estates were more convenient, easier for stewards to 
manage effectively, usually adopted similar farming types and improvements and enabled 
tenants to increase their farm sizes more easily.  As a result there was a long-term trend towards 
increasing estate size and consolidating land ownership throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, lasting until the agricultural economy collapsed in the 1870s and 1880s 
and increasing in times when the highest profits could be made.   
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Improvements in Agriculture 
 
The changes which could take place in farming were dependent to some extent on the 
topography of the land.  However, Northamptonshire was predominantly a county of good 
quality soils, even though they were suited to different purposes.  Thus a great deal of 
investment and improvement took place in the county in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, including enclosure and changes in farming types between arable and pasture as well 
as many other improvements. This included a number of improvements to the quality of the 
land such as drainage and fertilizer but also the adoption of new machinery.   
 
Sarah Webster noted that ‘to improve’ a landed estate was regarded as to increase profits or 
productivity and from the seventeenth century this was considered an important act on the part 
of landowners.202  However, as Jean Jones pointed out, improving required a degree of 
understanding of the land and climate in order to optimise the productivity of the land, 
something which was noted by a number of writers on the subject of agriculture in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.203  Thus it was as a result of investment that ‘changes in 
organisation and the development of new techniques’ improved agricultural output and profits 
in this period.204 
 
Improvements to the land, although they took place on a far greater scale in the nineteenth 
century, had been undertaken before enclosure and often long before the period of this study, 
becoming common from the seventeenth century.  For example, Mingay observed that crop 
rotations had been used long before the eighteenth century whilst others identified a number of 
improvements which had begun before this period, including the rebuilding of farm houses.205  
Furthermore, Whyte argued that after 1820 the majority of improvements which were 
implemented in English agriculture were concentrated on pasture lands and sheep farming.206  
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Other improvements to the land which had been carried out prior to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were themselves modernised in this period including the planting of 
certain root crops on heavy soils even into the nineteenth century to improve drainage and 
under-drainage becoming more common from the 1830s.207  David R. Stead found that scientific 
advances enabled further agricultural advances, with  animal medicines (“albeit somewhat 
dubious”) being developed as well as crop pests and fungi being identified, enabling farmers to 
better preserve their crops and livestock.208 
 
Despite a number of historians examining improvements in the context of the harm they did to 
tenants and labourers, some have suggested that tenants prospered as a result of their lands 
being improved.  Wordie suggested that enclosure of wastes and increasing farm sizes may well 
have promoted tenant prosperity, although he also emphasised the possibility that these 
changes were able to take place because of tenant prosperity, rather than being a cause of it.209  
Indeed, the Northamptonshire evidence considered in this study certainly supports this view, 
demonstrating tenants taking on extra lands in times of general and personal prosperity and 
improving their lands when they saw the possibility of increasing their profits as a result.  
Further to this, J.D. Chambers pointed out that living standards of tenant farmers were also 
improving in this period, with the prosperity of farming being demonstrated by the rebuilding 
of farm houses on great estates which in itself provided a better standard of living for those 
living on the estate.210 
 
Whilst the improvement of the land took place on both tenants’ holdings and landlords’ 
demesne farms, the utilization of machinery was the prerogative of only the largest farm 
holders, including only the largest of tenants and those who owned their own large farms.  
Machinery, for example, had the advantage that it could save a large farm a significant amount 
in labour and increase efficiency but many smaller farmers did not employ enough labour to 
make the costs worthwhile.  Lord Overstone wrote in 1862 that he had obtained a steam plough 
for his demesne farm in Berkshire yet the cost of improvement was still prohibitive to the tenant 
farmer:  
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there is room for further improvement and simplification in the machinery; which 
must be made before it can become a remunerating investment for an ordinary 
farmer.211 
 
Overstone clearly viewed the steam plough as a major improvement to the farming of his 
estates, still writing about its achievements in 1872 when he commented it was ‘preparing for 
the next harvest, before the present crops are completely gathered into our barns’.212  Yet this 
does demonstrate the limitations of costly improvements as an asset to rich estate farms but 
unaffordable and not cost effective to the smaller farmer. 
 
Thus landed incomes could also be maintained or increased by investment in the land.  This 
increased short-term incomes and preserved the estate in the long-term as well as helped to 
retain tenants.  However, these improvements often served to increase the supply of 
agricultural produce and therefore, even though they had in many cases been available for a 
significant period, improvements were adopted on an extensive scale in the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when population and therefore demand for produce 
increased dramatically, making them profitable and worthwhile investments.  The scale of a 
farm also had an impact on whether improvements took place or not, with some labour-saving 
measures only cost efficient where a significant amount of labour had previously been 
employed. 
 
Changing Land Use 
 
Alongside the investment in the soil, implementation of improvements on an estate and the 
reorganization of landowning in the nineteenth century, land use was also changed in order to 
increase the profits of both landowner and tenant farmer.  However, whilst some changes 
appear to be led by the estate changing land use was often at the request of the tenant (with his 
landlord’s permission) rather than a profit-making policy of the landlord. 
 
One of the principal aims of improving the land was to increase production.  Increased 
production would not only increase farm profits but would help domestic production to meet 
the increasing demand of the growing population of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
Williamson noted three ways in which arable production could be increased – expanding the 
area under cultivation, raising yields per acre and improving the geography of arable farming.  
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This third method is the subject of this section.  Changing land use involved growing crops on 
lands better suited to them and less on worse soils and thus improving quantity and quality of 
the crops grown on the same area of land.213  Thus changing land use could be of benefit to both 
landowners and their tenants, although if poor choices were made both parties would lose out.  
For example, if good arable land was put down to pasture, even if prices for meat and dairy 
were higher, it may still reduce the profitability of the land.214 
 
In the late-eighteenth century, Arthur Young credited enclosure with creating good, properly 
stocked pasture land from land which had previously been put down to arable and fallow in 
the counties of Leicestershire and Northamptonshire.215  Leland J. Bellot pointed out that 
enclosure and changing land use were considered the actions of a good landlord.  In the two 
decades following his inheritance of lands in Buckinghamshire in 1726, for example, Richard 
Grenville established himself as ‘a country gentleman fully engaged in hands-on estate 
management’ by beginning enclosure projects and putting lands down to grass for cattle 
grazing.216  The evidence of this study shows, however, that enclosure, although a major 
changing point in land use, was not the only time when land use was changed and, indeed, 
land use was not always determined by the landowners.    
 
With regards to Northamptonshire in particular, Steane observed that in the mid-nineteenth 
century the amount of land under arable cultivation was increasing and by 1870 two-thirds of 
the county was put down to crops.  In this period (1840-1870), Steane commented, rents for such 
lands were high, enabling both great profits and a significant quantity of drainage and building 
work to be undertaken in the county.217  By the late-nineteenth century demand increased for 
‘specialities’ such as fruit and poultry had increased and these were often produced by small 
farmers who saw an opportunity to profit.218  F.M.L. Thompson also commented on evidence of 
farmers themselves taking advantage of the market by changing land use.  Whilst it has been 
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supposed that farmers increased production in times of low prices in an attempt to maintain 
profits (which in practice would just drive prices down further), in the period following 1870 
Thompson suggested that some farmers actually produced fewer unprofitable goods and 
increased production of goods which remained profitable or for which prices were increasing.219   
 
As evident above, the reason behind changing land use was inevitably economic - John Broad 
found that landlords in the South Midlands (Leicestershire, Warwickshire, North 
Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire) frequently put lands down to grass in the years 
leading up to 1800 as they could obtain a considerably higher rent per acre than they could from 
arable lands.220  Thompson’s comment that farmers could change production to increase that of 
profitable goods also indicates an important factor in changing land use in this period – security 
of income.  In his study of risk management in agriculture, David R. Stead looked at methods 
tenants used to reduce their profit-risks.  He found that 
 
Many of the production decisions made by farmers were chosen in an attempt to 
lower the probability of a loss occurring, or to reduce the size of a loss once it had 
occurred. 
 
Within this context he found farmers undertaking mixed farming (although a poor harvest of 
fodder crops would push up the cost of animal feed so the two were not mutually exclusive in 
terms of risk), diversifying in the types of crops grown so there was a fall-back if one harvest 
failed and even replacing crops with more resilient counterparts, such as the replacement of 
turnips with swedes as the latter were less vulnerable to frost.  Added to these, he also 
identified the continuance of ‘alternative farming’ to minimize risk, including dairying, poultry 
keeping and growing industrial crops.  However, overall, he noted that diversification in -
farming was becoming less common throughout the period 1750-1850, as improvements led to 
farmers feeling their income risk was less than it had been previously.221 
 
Thus land use changed not only at enclosure but throughout the period.   Enclosure enabled 
further changes to take place in order to improve landed incomes of both farmers and landlords 
but land use did not change because of enclosure alone.  Both farmers and landlords sought to 
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increase their profits and changing the use of the land was a method of doing this without 
undertaking costly improvements to the land itself. 
 
Enclosure 
 
As noted in chapter 1, enclosure was a huge change to the English landscape and a point when 
farms were re-organised, rents re-negotiated and new lands brought into cultivation.  Whilst the 
parishes of this study were all enclosed by the nineteenth century, enclosure and its lasting 
impact still necessitates discussion.  The reasons for enclosing lands are an important part of 
estate management and the changes to estates and improvements implemented post-enclosure 
are of great interest owing to their economic and social implications on the estate.  Indeed, 
Beckett pointed out that enclosure offered flexibility but the increased profits usually attributed 
to it could only be secured via further investment in the land, such as improving drainage.222  It 
must also be noted here that enclosure was certainly not without its opponents or losers and 
historians have concerned themselves a great deal with the short-term social impact of 
enclosure rather than the long-term changes to estates and estate management which are of 
interest to this study.   
 
Profits and Improvements 
 
A landowner would enclose or wish to enclose his lands for a number of reasons.  Jerome Blum 
observed that landowners might have wished to enclose in response to high prices for 
agricultural produce, proximity to markets, improved transport links improving travel times to 
markets, to create more grazing land or even simply in imitation of other landowners who had 
enclosed their lands and indeed others have identified some, if not all, of these as reasons to 
enclose.223  Enclosure did, of course, have advantages.  Even though he found evidence of open-
field farmers improving their lands, Mingay noted that compact enclosed farms could be 
managed more efficiently than the dispersed strips of the open-field system and animals could 
be protected from disease in a way they could not be on the common.224  Thus we come to the 
two main reasons to enclose the land – to increase profitability and to implement improvements 
to agriculture. 
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The effects of enclosure were debated by contemporaries as well as historians.  Reverend J. 
Howlett, in his 1796 pamphlet in favour of enclosure, commented that there had been much 
debate on the subject and that  
 
Scarcely any thing at all connected with the improvements of modern agriculture, 
has been more eagerly contested, or more amply discussed, than the advantages or 
disadvantages of Enclosures.225 
 
Indeed, whilst Howlett viewed enclosure as a means of increasing farm profits and 
productivity, Arthur Young suggested it merely redistributed the wealth, increasing the 
landlord’s share of farming incomes.226 
 
Mingay suggested that the main reason landlords enclosed their lands was to increase their 
profits: 
 
From the landlord’s point of view the principal gain to be obtained from enclosure 
was the increased value of the property, which made it possible for them to charge a 
higher rent for it.227 
 
Indeed, it is widely agreed that the principal reason to enclose was to increase estate profits. 
Habakkuk, found that unimproved estates were a sought-after commodity as they could be 
enclosed to improve their value; Julian Hoppit suggested that enclosure was not an end in itself 
but enabled landlords to impose new sanctions on land use and improvement, although this 
was done with the intention of increasing rents. 228 
 
On average, landlords did increase rent at enclosure by 15-20 percent but, Mingay calculated, 
the increased profits enabled farmers to pay them.229  The contemporary view, here again 
provided from the work of Reverend Howlett, also saw rising prices as a result of enclosure.  
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Howlett even provided figures, commenting that corn prices across the country had increased 
as a result of enclosures, from 3/6-4s a bushel to 7s-7/6 per bushel.  However, he also viewed 
this as a temporary effect, stating ‘this will not be a permanent effect of enclosure’ because 
farmers turning their lands to grass had pushed the price up and as they turned back to arable 
farming the price would fall again.230  Added to this, R.C. Allen found that yields were also 
increasing and accredited enclosure with increasing yields by about a quarter.  However, he 
also noted that yields around 1800 were higher than they had been in previous years on both 
enclosed and open fields as a result of improvements.  Further to this, he argued that the reason 
for higher yields on enclosed lands was that a higher proportion of these had adopted drainage, 
not simply that they were enclosed.  Both these examples demonstrate the importance of 
enclosure as a catalyst but that improved farming was not a result of enclosure alone.231 
 
The principal focus of those discussing the negative impact of enclosure on tenants has been 
that rents were raised considerably at enclosure.  However, there were also positive effects of 
enclosure, including in enabling improvements.  Indeed, Arthur Young wrote in his Political 
Arithmetic that ‘without Inclosures there can be no good husbandry’ which Howlett interpreted 
to mean that enclosure enabled improvement in agriculture.232  Increased yields and more 
productive farming are often attributed as effects of enclosure.  However, both Blum and 
Williamson have suggested that this was not necessarily the case.  According to Blum: 
 
Better farming and increased yields per acre did not follow automatically after 
enclosure.  The writers of the county reports to the Board of Agriculture found that 
enclosures had, indeed, often produced the desired results of improved husbandry 
with higher yields and increased income.  But they also reported that often, for a 
variety of reasons, neither techniques, nor yields, nor incomes had increased after 
enclosure.233 
 
Further to this, Williamson added that the majority of parliamentary enclosures affected 
grazing not arable land and therefore did nothing to increase arable production, although 
improvements to these lands (especially commons and wastes) increased good pasture land and 
                                                          
230
 Howlett, An Enquiry, pp.8-9. 
 
231
 Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman, pp.15-16, 137-8. 
 
232
 Howlett, An Inquiry, pp.16-17. 
 
233
 Blum, ‘English Parliamentary Enclosure’, pp.502-3. 
 
71 
 
thus food production.234  Contemporaries often assumed that improvement would follow 
enclosure.  For example, Pitt, in his survey of Northamptonshire in 1809 calculated that 
enclosure could increase profits by decreasing costs including by concentrated farms requiring 
less labour, improvements to the land being easier to implement and productivity and the 
quality of livestock also being improved.235   
 
Research has shown, however, that even though enclosure made improving the land easier 
lands could be, and indeed were, improved prior to enclosure.  Mingay argued that there had 
been many improvements in open-field villages before 1760 and enclosure was often the last 
phase of improvement, not the first.236  However, the open-field system did have its limitations 
for although some improvements could be carried out farmers were tied into a communal 
farming system.  The Hammonds pointed out for example that no farmer could cultivate his 
open-field strips as he wished and David Wykes also suggested that the spread of strips and 
communing of livestock prevented some improvements under open field farming.  As a result 
he found that enclosure was not the only way the land could be improved but worked as a 
catalyst for improvement.237   
 
Compared to the open fields, enclosed lands gave the tenant a choice in which improvements 
he adopted and how he farmed his lands, enabling more productive and efficient farming.  
Neeson argued that livestock could be improved prior to enclosure so long as fields were not 
overstocked because the marketplace was the principal source of infection and animals were no 
less prone to disease on enclosed lands than they had been when commoned.238  However, 
Mingay noted that the principal improvement in the quality of livestock following enclosure 
was the keeping of better breeds.239  The improvement of arable land was also viewed by 
contemporaries as something which could not be undertaken without enclosure.  Pitt’s 
comment that the quality of arable land improved at enclosure indicates that either lands were 
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improved or chosen more carefully in order to grow crops on better quality lands, resulting in 
higher productivity arable land.  Added to this, Steane found that in 1712 Morton commented 
“I say enclosures, because there is no practising this or any other improvements in the open 
fields” indicating the increased ability of landholders to employ new methods and practices 
following enclosure.240  Thus enclosure made arable farming easier to improve as well as 
pasture and in practice many appear to have improved their lands following their enclosure. 
 
The new compact farms created by enclosure did prove advantageous to tenants, as shown by 
not only the increased profitability of farming after enclosure but also by the compact nature of 
the new farms.  Mingay noted that enclosed farms, split into fields, enabled tenants to use more 
complex patterns of crop rotations and fatten and keep livestock more efficiently.241  However, 
he concluded that a great deal of the increase in agricultural output was not a result of 
improvements or increased yields but simply a result of more land being brought into 
cultivation.242  Both Mingay and Blum also commented on the advantage of improved transport 
links which resulted from enclosure.  Commissioners set aside land at enclosure for roads, 
drains and gravel pits for the maintenance of the roads.243  As a result of these seed and 
fertilizers could be brought in and crops and livestock could be taken to market in less time or 
even further afield.244  Improvements to infrastructure which came with enclosure aided the 
increase in productivity and farm profits both by enabling improvements to be undertaken 
more easily (if at all) than they could have been otherwise and goods to be transported further 
afield for sale. 
 
Mingay also pointed out that the impact of improvements and changes in agriculture are 
difficult to distinguish from the impact of enclosure.245  Indeed, improvements continued long 
after the land was enclosed, with costs for drainage and buildings, amongst other 
improvements, being recorded in the Northamptonshire data. 
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The increased output of England’s farms following enclosure was not a result of improvements 
to the land alone.  The amount of land in cultivation was increased dramatically and Mingay 
considered this to be more responsible than improvement to the land in increasing agricultural 
output.246  But the extra lands were usually only brought into cultivation by enclosure and often 
needed improving to make them into productive farmland.  Whether productivity increased as 
a direct result of enclosure or because enclosure was followed by other improvements to the 
land is of great interest to this study.  What is certain is that productivity did increase in the 
years following enclosure, increasing in England by a factor of 3.5 between 1750 and 1850 
alone.247  Yields were increased in a number of ways, including bringing extra land into 
cultivation but also as a result of better seed selection, better organization and land use, greater 
use of fertilizers and better drainage plus the implementation of better farming machinery.248  
Indeed Williamson calculated that between 1720 and the 1840s wheat yields increased from 20 
to 30 bushels an acre (c.50%) whilst barley production had improved from 25 to 50 bushels an 
acre.249   
 
Thus it was not enclosure alone but the continuing improvement of the land which increased 
productivity across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  These improvements and the 
increased profits which both farmers and landlords obtained from them were in themselves a 
reason to enclose the land.  More importantly, however, the continued improvement of the land 
beyond enclosure maintained high profits and high rents as long as the agricultural economy 
continued to grow.  Thus, as shall be seen with regards to rents in chapter 4, it was not 
enclosure alone but continued improvement which caused a general upwards trend in rent 
levels in Northamptonshire across the period of this study. 
 
Opposition to Enclosure 
 
Noting the positive effects of enclosure is not to say that it did not have a negative impact or 
was wholly supported.  Neeson calculated that in Northamptonshire two-thirds of successful 
enclosure bills had some landowners or cottagers who refused to sign them and in half of these 
cases those refusing to sign owned between 10 and 30 percent of the land.  Not all enclosure 
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was opposed but a significant amount was, including the enclosure of Geddington Chase in 
1792.250  Where there was opposition, opponents often took every measure available to them to 
resist enclosure, legal and illegal.  Jane Humphries identified opposition to enclosure even 
when opponents faced ‘severe legal, economic and social sanctions’ such was the extent of 
feeling against enclosure.251   
 
The actual opponents of enclosure consisted of several groups in rural society.  The supporters 
of enclosure, Neeson found, usually encompassed all those hoping to profit from it.  The main 
opponents, on the other hand, were poor farmers, labourers, local craftsmen and small owner-
occupiers (who owned 40 acres or less).  Added to these, neighbouring gentry with no material 
interest in the enclosure may well be approached to support the opposition.  However, Neeson 
also observed that the majority of opposition to enclosure failed although, as Neeson put it ‘if 
landlords and farmers eventually won the battle for enclosure, rural artisans and agricultural 
labourers may have had some say in the terms of surrender’.252 
 
The groups which form the focus of this thesis – the landlords and tenant farmers Neeson 
viewed as ‘winning the battle’ – appear to have enjoyed the positive effects of enclosure and 
sought improvement and increased profitability of the land.  So for these groups enclosure 
appears to have been a generally beneficial experience.   
 
The Effect of Improvements to Transport Infrastructure 
 
Roads were usually improved and the transport infrastructure made more logical and effective 
when a parish was enclosed.  The improved roads, as well as the rise of canals and railways, 
themselves enabled further improvements to the land.  As a result of improved transport 
networks materials such as fertilizers and seeds could be brought in and crops and animals 
taken to market more easily than had been possible before the parish was enclosed or the 
railway or canal had been constructed.253  Indeed, R.J. Thompson noted the importance of 
railway links for agriculture in enabling farmers to take their produce to better markets as well 
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as lowering production costs.254  As a result improved roads and transport infrastructure were a 
great asset to the rural communities of England, enabling the movement of stock and the 
bringing in of materials for changes and improvements to the land and agricultural practice.  
Steane suggested that it was generally accepted by landowners, farmers and merchants that 
roads needed improving when a parish was enclosed and land trended to be allotted for gravel 
pits for the upkeep of the roads, enabling better transport links following enclosure.255   
 
Thus agriculture could be further improved as a result of improved transport infrastructure.  
This occurred in part as a result of enclosure, which improved the parish roads and as more 
enclosures took place led to an improved road network across significant parts of England.  The 
rise of canals and railways further improved transport links across England.  This meant that 
demand in towns and cities for agricultural produce could be more easily met and materials for 
the improvement of agriculture could be more easily brought into the countryside.  As a result 
improved transport links acted as a catalyst for agricultural improvement and enabled farmers 
to increase their profits and widen their markets. 
 
Initiators of Land Management Changes 
 
As shown above changing land use was not always something imposed by landlords but was 
often desired by tenants who sought to increase their own profits.  Yet it was not only the 
geography of farming which was changed by tenurial demand in this period. Tenants were 
often the instigators of improvement to the land and even increasing farm sizes.  In this context 
one sees landlords investing in the land with the agreement (or even at the insistence of) their 
tenants and rents increasing as a result of the financial outlay, not directly due to the perceived 
increased profitability of the land. 
 
There has been a degree of debate amongst historians regarding who wanted to improve the 
landscape and whether tenants were injured or proletarianized by the adoption of new farming 
techniques and machinery as well as increasing farm sizes.  However, although landlords did 
wish to improve their lands to increase estate profits, tenants also sought to improve their 
holdings to increase their personal profits.  Yet a landlord’s role in improvement did go beyond 
approving his tenants’ requests to improve their holdings.  David Howell observed that 
landlords encouraged improvements in farming in a number of ways including ‘supporting 
agricultural societies, ploughing societies, farmers’ clubs, sheep dog trials and the like’, not just 
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by allowing farms to expand or farmers to change the type of farming undertaken on their 
lands.256  Furthermore, Cragoe found that in Wales landlords did not just support 
improvements in agriculture but also funded them, investing in drainage and building work as 
well as attempting to aid the dissemination of new ideas.  Yet where landlords did invest in 
improvements the tenant was often expected to pay a proportion of the cost meaning the 
decision to improve farms on an estate did not lie solely with the landlord but also required 
some tenurial input.257  As shall be seen with Northamptonshire, landlords paying for 
improvements and tenants paying a proportion of the cost or repaying loans via increased rents 
were a common characteristic of rural society although landlords and stewards took a personal 
interest (as well as an economic interest) in how the estate was farmed.   
 
Thus larger farms and improved, more profitable land were desired not only by landlords but 
also by tenants and often pressure could come from both directions in order for both parties to 
increase their profits.  However, in practice both landlords and tenants had specific roles in 
implementing improvements to the land, with landlords able to impose changes on tenants and 
tenants being required to gain permission for any changes they wished to make and, as noted 
above, landlords often providing at least a proportion of the capital for improvements his 
tenants wished to make to their farms.   
 
Landlord’s Role 
 
With regards to the landowners’ role in both deciding on and funding improvements to the 
land, these were not always led by profit motive or desire to improve farming on the estate.  An 
improvement which would benefit the tenant might have been costly and not something from 
which the landowner would have profited (such as rebuilding farmhouses) or the landowner 
might have invested the money upfront for an improvement the tenant requested.  These 
improvements did occur and appear to have been undertaken almost as a duty of the landlord 
rather than as an investment.  However, in such cases landlords did often seek to recoup at least 
some of their losses by way of a rent increase, their investment acting like a loan to a tenant but 
one which was only paid back as long as the tenant remained on his holding.   
 
The Montagu accounts list a number of rent increases where lands had been improved at the 
landowner’s expense - in 1861 alone two rents on the estate were increased due to landlord 
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expenditure on drainage for the lands and in the same year two tenants’ houses were rebuilt.258  
In the same period, in order for a tenant to pay upfront towards improvements, Cragoe pointed 
out that tenants needed assurances that their tenure would not be terminated before they were 
able to recoup their investment, particularly as many were men of little capital.259  Thus a 
landlord paying for improvements and the tenant paying him back by way of increased rents 
appears the more logical model for payment for improvements.  Improving the land was so 
important on landed estates in this period that Williamson found five Land Improvement 
Companies - which would provide capital to landowners for improvements - were set up by 
Parliamentary Act between 1847 and 1860 and evidence of landowners taking out loans and 
mortgages to invest in their lands.260   
 
Beckett noted that the purpose of investing in the land was both social and economic: 
  
the chief concern was to maximise estate income without undercutting their socio-
political role as leaders of the community. 
 
Within this context, it was generally understood that a landlord would provide the fixed capital 
for improvement whilst the tenant provided the working capital.261  R.J. Thompson calculated 
that investment in the land required a significant proportion of landed incomes and profit was 
therefore rental income minus costs of both repairs and improvements.  He calculated that pipe 
drainage cost up to £7 per acre whilst fencing cost 17s per acre.  In total, he considered 
maintenance and improvements of the land to constitute around 35% of the set rent.  
Furthermore, this situation could become problematic for landlords in a recession.  Where loans 
had been taken out repayments remained due and costs of repairs increased as tenants were 
less willing to undertake the work themselves, meaning that landlords outgoings could not be 
reduced to the same extent as their incomes had been.262   
 
However, investment was undertaken with a view to increasing estate profits.  John Stuart Mill 
noted that landlords invested capital which tenants paid back by way of increased rents, a point 
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to which R.J. Thompson added that this increase would pay back the capital plus interest.263  
Indeed, A.D.M. Phillips, in his study of land drainage, found that it was usual for a landlord to 
undertake the initial outlay for improving the land but this would then be passed on to the 
tenant by way of a rent increase.  Indeed, he found that landlords funding land drainage in this 
manner could expect between 4% and 7% return on their investment.264  Elsewhere, the rate of 
return for landlords on their investments has been examined by Beckett, who discussed the 
different returns for investments (such as enclosure yielded a higher profit than land drainage) 
but began entirely on the assumption that landlords would profit from their investment and not 
just seek repayment of a loan from their tenants.  This he views as understood by both parties, 
with inefficient tenants being replaced by those seeking to maximise their own profits so the 
estate could maximise its income.265 
 
Landlords also undertook a great interest in how the land was improved and invested in the 
land in non-financial capacities too.  Within Northamptonshire, McDonagh noted that Elizabeth 
Prowse, in her 40-year management of the Wiken estate in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, improved the estate considerably, including introducing machinery, new crops and 
drainage.266  In the second half of the nineteenth century Northamptonshire landlords were still 
taking an interest in improving agriculture on their estates and Lord Overstone led the way 
with improvements to his demesne farm. This appears to have been based not on management 
style but on a landlord’s interest in improvements and personal opinion regarding their 
profitability.  Having invested in a Steam Plough for his own farm, for example, Lord 
Overstone viewed it as a great success but viewed the technology as yet unprofitable for use on 
small farms.267  It is interesting that Lord Overstone viewed the failure of the steam plough for 
smaller farmers to be a fault of the technology rather than a reason to increase farm sizes on his 
estate but primarily this example shows the interest he took in improving farming not only on 
his own farm but also on the lands of his tenants, including those on small farms.. 
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Thus landlords were vital in improving the land – they often provided the capital to do so 
(there is evidence of Lord Overstone and the Lords Montagu doing this) and had to provide the 
security of tenure to encourage their tenants to invest and tenants could not improve or change 
their farms without landlord permission.  Added to this landlords and their stewards were 
active in spreading ideas of improvements and encouraging interest in improving the land 
amongst their tenants.  Indeed, without landlord support and investment few tenants would 
have been able to improve their holdings. Several historians have noted the role of landlords in 
encouraging improvements on their estates, including Bowen, who viewed the desire of 
landowners and their stewards as the driving force behind improvement and advances at a 
local level.268  However, Wordie pointed out that one cannot tell the extent to which landlords 
dictated changes: 
 
Agrarian changes such as the amalgamation and consolidation of tenancies, the 
enclosure of waste land, and the steady rise of the large farm may have done 
something to promote tenant prosperity on the estates, but it is also possible that the 
general level of tenant prosperity itself regulated the pace of these changes.269 
 
In Northamptonshire 1700-1885 evidence shows that landlords were allowing improvements, 
financing them and introducing them to lead the way but this could not be carried out unless 
tenants accepted them.  Tenant farmers were more limited in their powers to improve or refuse 
improvements but they did have a significant part to play in the changes in English agriculture 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
Added to this, there is evidence of stewards in Northamptonshire advising landlords, tenants 
and other stewards and sharing their knowledge of farming and improvement.270  This was not 
unique to Northamptonshire though, with Bettey finding that George Boswell (1735-1815) 
suggested improvements on estates around Puddletown where he was steward and sought 
advice from John Bailey who by 1789 had made his own threshing machine whilst working as 
steward for Lord Tankerville.271  Thus, as important as the role of the landlord in driving 
improvement was the advice he was given by his stewards. 
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Farmer’s Role 
 
Tenant farmers were themselves avid improvers with a vested interest in increasing their own 
profits throughout the period.  David Stead noted that farmer’s took the majority of the 
financial risks in farming as they agreed to a rent and if they did not make enough profit this 
was still due from them.  Stead looked at the profits to be made by the men farming the land 
and calculated that in boom years they could earn as much as 11 percent on the capital 
employed and in a recession may still earn as much as 6-10 percent.  He found this comparable 
with other ‘risky industries’ such as brewing or coal mining, which also saw varying profits of 
about 5-14% of the capital employed.  However, farmer’s profits were dependent upon a 
number of factors and risk management (and indeed perception) was essential in farming.  As 
well as the fact produce prices for the next year had to be predicted, weather and disease may 
affect output, costs could vary and war may disrupt trade.  However, Stead also viewed farmers 
managing the risks they faced in a number of ways.  Insurance became increasingly available 
for farming risks in the course of the nineteenth century, although there was proportionately 
little uptake, particularly amongst smaller farmers.  He also found them to be protecting against 
risks in a number of ways - ways which many would see as improvements – including changing 
crop choices and employing animal medicines amongst others.272 
 
John Beckett went further than Stead’s study of risk management, and viewed farmers as active 
improvers, often showing the initiative in improving their farms.  Indeed, he found that “large 
tenant farmers were usually reckoned to be among the most enlightened agriculturalists”.  
Further to this, he found that the advantages of external improvements, transport in particular, 
required “communication changes” to ensure landlords and tenants utilized them to improve 
estate output and profits.273  Phillips went further, not only arguing that tenants of farms of all 
sizes shared a certain zeal for improvement but stating that 
 
Although desirous of having his agricultural land drained, the landowner in effect 
was little more than a supplier of capital.274 
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The nature of this study means that improvements to the soil are traced primarily via rental 
accounts.  However, from these one finds a number of examples in Northamptonshire of 
tenants having their rents raised as a result of the lands being improved at their request.  Prior 
to the nineteenth century, tenants on the Fitzwilliam estate were seeking to plough up their 
lands.  By the mid-nineteenth century, investment in the soil continued but the improvements 
being undertaken had changed.  In the 1851 and 1861 Montagu accounts, for example, a number 
of rent increases were noted to be interest on the costs of drainage paid in advance by Lord 
Montagu.275   
 
In enclosed landscapes in Northamptonshire, McDonagh identified tenants initiating a move to 
reorganise tenancies as they wanted longer leases and security of tenure.276  The changing of 
tenancies as lands were improved was certainly nothing new, it was what Lord Fitzwilliam had 
done in the early-eighteenth century and has been identified by Stead as a method of estate 
management adopted throughout this period.  However, what is important here is that it was 
the tenants seeking longer leases so that they could benefit fully from the improvements they 
had instigated.  Later, the adoption of ‘high farming’  required increased investment in livestock 
and fertilizers at the expense of the tenant but Daunton found that it also required permanent 
investment to improve drainage and buildings, for which the landlord would often provide the 
materials and the farmer the labour, thus splitting the cost.277  This is probably the explanation 
for the high levels of investment in drainage on the Montagu estate in the 1860s where a 
number of rents on large farms are noted to have increased to pay off the costs outlaid by Lord 
Montagu to cover the investment in drainage.  For example, one William Smith is noted to have 
had his £262.10.0 rent ‘increased £2 per annum for interest of money expended on draining’.  
The same account also notes that two buildings (not dwellings or cottages as noted elsewhere) 
had been rebuilt.278 
 
To undertake successful improvements to the land it was also important that the tenant 
understood farming and the land he worked.  Farming literature of the time, such as Hutton’s 
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1797 work on improving agriculture, emphasised the importance of farmers having an 
understanding of the land so that crops could be chosen beneficially without costly trial and 
error.  He also emphasised the importance of maintaining the fertility of the land, something 
which those on short-term or insecure leases may have failed to do in order to maximise short-
term profits.279  Thus the most obvious difference between how the landlord and how the tenant 
approached improving the land was that a tenant only sought to increase his own profits whilst 
the landlord sought to preserve the longer term profitability of his estate.  As the examples 
above of Lord Fitzwilliam’s regulation of his tenants’ farming practices and the Lords Montagu 
investing in their tenants’ farms show, landowners were concerned about maintaining the land 
for future tenants whilst tenants wished to take advantage of current prices. 
 
Overall, both tenants and landlords played a part in improving the land.  Whilst landlords had 
to support improvements so did tenants if they were to be successful and while it was usually 
the landlord who paid the cost of improving upfront it was often the tenant who showed the 
initiative to improve.  However, landlords had to regulate tenurial activity to ensure lands were 
not exhausted in the short-term to increase tenant profits and thus as well as paying the money 
to improve in advance landlords would also ensure improvements were carried out correctly 
and the quality of the soil was maintained.  However, it must also be stated that tenants and 
landlords were aware of the economic situation in which they operated and both sought to 
increase their profits where possible. 
 
Prices 
 
Prevailing agricultural prices were a central factor in the agricultural economy of nineteenth-
century England.  Stead noted that English farmers were price takers in the market as the 
number of producers was extensive and all were selling to the same national market.  Whilst 
farmers were able to some extent to ‘self-insure’ in periods of low prices by keeping grain from 
market in times of low prices, he also found that the cost of storage and risk of losses through 
crops spoiling prevented this being worthwhile.280  Prices were an essential factor in the 
calculation of rent levels, the payment of rents, the level of investment in the land and the 
payment of labourers (which in turn had a knock-on effect on the Poor Rate due from 
landowners and farmers).  As seen above, investment in the land was a significant financial 
commitment and was therefore more likely to be undertaken where prices were high and were 
expected to be for the foreseeable future.  However, low prices were also linked to investment 
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in the land as in order to maintain rents a landlord may well invest in the land to keep the 
profits of his farms up.  Therefore, improvements and investments were dependent on rental 
income which was, in turn, dependent on prices. 
 
From the tenant-farmer’s point-of-view, if prices fell he would struggle to maintain his standard 
of living and to meet costs such as rent.  Adversely, from the landlord’s point-of-view, where 
prices were low the estate would need to be preserved and rents and payments had to be 
properly managed in order to preserve the long-term profitability of the estate.  Where prices 
were high or rising, however, a landlord who did not increase rents on his estate may well 
perceive himself to be losing out on a considerable income he considered to be due to him 
whilst his tenants enjoyed greater profits at his expense. 
 
Turner et al described rents as dependant on “the ability of the farmer to pay” which, in turn, 
depended on his own income.281  Whilst one cannot entirely ignore the willingness of a tenant to 
pay and whether he prioritised his standard of living or other costs above paying his rent, it 
seems that the majority of tenants on the estates of this study were fairly diligent in paying their 
rents and generally widespread or abnormally high levels of arrears demonstrate inability over 
unwillingness, but this will be examined in detail in chapter 5. 
 
In terms of rents due rather than rents paid, one finds that rent levels were set based on 
prevailing prices and tenants agreed to them based on the levels of profits they felt they could 
make (although it must be noted this was rarely if ever owing to precise predictions of priced or 
calculating of income).  Matthew Cragoe studied evidence of a number of estate stewards 
calculating rent levels based on prevailing prices.  Sussex land surveyor Robert Clutton, for 
example, calculated rent due as gross product minus labour, marketing and repair costs, tithe, 
poor rates, local charges and an allowance for the farmer’s profits.  J.R. Davy, on the other hand, 
worked out the value of crops based on a 12-month average and calculated rent as one third of 
what the tenant was expected to make.282  Even though Clutton’s method leaves the amount of 
farmers’ profits open to interpretation and Davy’s appears to show a far from profit-
maximizing calculation both demonstrate how crucial prices were in setting rent levels.  Where 
prices changed this would therefore be reflected in rent levels although there was usually a time 
lag where rents were renegotiated or temporary abatements were used.283  
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As well as being affected by a number of factors in the economy prices were also a factor 
affecting other aspects of the economy, agrarian life and estate management.  J.D. Chambers’ 
1953 article demonstrates this most clearly.  Chambers demonstrated how an increasing 
population fulfilled the increasing demand for labour from the 1750s when rents and prices 
rose, arrears fell and interest rates remained low, enabling farmers and industrialists to afford to 
increase their labour forces.284  Therefore rents, prices, arrears and other debts and labour costs 
were all inexorably linked.  Further to this K.D.M. Snell found that in periods of high enclosure 
levels price rises led to ‘landlords increasing rent to readjust to new price levels’ to the extent 
that the annulment of long leases became a reason to enclose.285  Indeed, it is generally agreed 
that rent levels were directly linked to prices.   
 
As has been shown, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries population was 
increasing dramatically and with that came increased demand for produce.286  Mingay noted 
that enclosure, in particular where new land was brought into cultivation, helped to feed 
growing demand for food for a growing population.287  Ricardo, however, had viewed 
increasing population as causing a divide in the profitability of farms.  Overall, he calculated, 
demand for corn would rise, causing prices to rise.  To meet the new demand the land under 
cultivation would be expanded into inferior wastes with lower yields.  High prices would 
enable those farming inferior marginal lands to make an ordinary level of profit but those on 
good quality lands would obtain abnormally high profits.  However, this difference in farmers’ 
profits (plus the population increase itself) drove up demand for land, particularly superior 
quality land, and enabled landlords to increase rents.  Rent would, as a result, take a larger 
share of a farmer’s income, reducing his income to the bare minimum.288  In practice, however, 
marginal lands were improved to increase yields and increased productivity stopped prices 
increasing dramatically.  Added to this the negotiation of rent levels meant that farmers would 
not take on leases unless they thought they could make a profitable living from the land at the 
agreed rent. 
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However, despite an increasing population increasing demand for produce, there was a great 
deal of variation in agricultural prices across this period, with a number of peaks and troughs 
resulting from changes in both supply and demand across the period. Indeed, across the period 
landlords appear to have taken action to aid tenants in times of economic slump, although this 
did not necessarily prevent tenant poverty, but this is an issue which will be dealt with in 
chapter 5.  What is important here is the fall in productivity which depressed farmers’ incomes, 
although prices were also an issue. 
 
With the advent of the French Wars and barricades preventing imports, coupled with 
provisions for troops and uniforms, price levels became more directly responsible for farmers’ 
profits.  Turner et al commented on the steep price rises of the second half of the eighteenth 
century and the class conflicts this provided as labourers suffered a drop in real income, 
farmers’ profits rose and landlords did not necessarily profit from increased farming incomes as 
they only had the opportunity to increase rents at the end of tenure and/or with the tenant’s 
agreement.289  In 1786 we have a record of prices from Reverend Howlett who observed that 
nationally corn prices had risen by almost 90 per cent from 3/6d-4d to 7s-7/6d.  He suggested 
these to be a result of enclosure and said they would fall again when farmers who had 
converted their lands to pasture returned to arable farming.290  However, after 1793 the main 
factor one can attribute dramatic price rises to at the end of the eighteenth century was not a 
fashion of enclosing in order to create pasture but the French Wars.  Howell accredited the high 
prices of the Napoleonic Wars to ‘the interaction of an abnormal run of bad harvests, 
inflationary finance and, to a lesser extent, the difficulties in obtaining imports’.291   
 
Yet with the end of the wars prices fell, despite the Corn Laws being introduced in an attempt 
to prevent agricultural recession.292  Even in 1814 prices began to fall in a recession continuing, 
as Lord Ernle would have it, until the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837.  However, in 
actuality, both Howell and F.M.L. Thompson pointed out; the post war recession was 
intermittent.  Howell also found that this depression hit wheat farmers on heavy clays the 
hardest, as did the recession which occurred from 1873.  Thompson also identified the crises in 
farming across this period as affecting cereal farmers worst.  He calculated that the price fall 
from 1814-15 was followed by deflation in 1821-3 and there was a further period of low prices 
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from 1833-5.293  However, Smith also argued that in years of productive harvests the Corn Laws 
failed farmers and falling corn prices actually led to a fall in agricultural incomes.294  The price 
falls of this period hit farmers even harder owing to the higher rents which resulted from the 
war period.  During the French Wars, Thompson noted, rents increased both in terms of ‘pure’ 
rent and interest on capital invested in the land, especially with regards to the varying quality 
of land and the improvements necessary to bring increasingly poor quality wastes into 
cultivation.295  Added to the high rents and falling prices for arable farmers, prices also fell for 
dairy and animal products meaning mixed farmers, livestock farmers and those who had 
converted lands to pasture did not escape the recession, although they had also been subject to 
rising rents during the French Wars.296  But it was the fall in crop prices after the French Wars 
which was most significant, with wheat prices ‘settling down’ in the 1820s-30s to around two-
thirds of their average 1800-15 levels.297  By 1830, however, prices were beginning to recover.298 
 
It was not only farmers who suffered as a result of the price changes of the first half or the 
nineteenth century.  As a result of falling prices agricultural wages fell.  This led to unrest 
amongst labourers, demonstrating the severity of the impact of lower wages on agricultural 
labourers.  In East Anglia, for example, Graham Seal identified a number of riots occurring in 
1816, with rioters demanding fixed wages and stable employment plus ‘a reasonable or fixed 
price of flour’ as those on the breadline were especially susceptible to fluctuations in price.299  As 
noted above there is no evidence of riot in the Northamptonshire sources for this period but 
there is discussion of some unrest in Cottesbrooke in 1830, which was settled by James 
Langham lowering rents for his tenants on the condition that they increased their labourers’ 
wages by the same amount.300 
 
                                                          
293
 Ibid., p.4; Thompson, English Landed Society, p.231.  Added to this, Hunt, ‘Agricultural Rent, p.103 found prices 
were at their lowest in 1822. 
 
294
 Smith, ‘Thomas Tooke’, p.361. 
 
295
Thompson, ‘An Inquiry’, p.591; Thompson, English Landed Society, p.217. 
 
296
 Howell, Land and People, p.5. 
 
297
 Thompson, English Landed Society, p.232. 
 
298
 Thompson, ‘An inquiry’, p.592.  
 
299
 G. Seal, ‘Tradition and Agrarian Protest in Nineteenth-Century England and Wales’, Folklore 99:2 (1988), p.156. 
 
300
 NRO L(C)1184. 
 
87 
 
John Davies established that the Bute estate in Glamorgan rent trends closely reflected price 
trends, paralleling national rent levels.  He found rents increased rapidly from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century up to 1815; the early-1820s to early-1830s were characterised by 
abatements and the 1840s and 1850s were a period of high farming and these trends were 
commonplace across Britain.301  The investment and improvement historians now consider to be 
farming high was, in 1907, commented on by Robert Thompson, who associated it with “the 
general advancement of the standard of farming throughout the country”.302  The increasing 
practice of high farming did increase agricultural income but also increased costs considerably 
which limited profits and therefore the amount a landlord was able to skim off in terms of 
increased rents was limited too.  However, rent increases which resulted from enclosure and 
other improvements still took place and increasing population levels both drove up demand for 
land and kept food prices high, supply being limited and prices kept potentially artificially high 
by the Corn Laws.   
 
The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 was met with a great deal of fear that a flood of foreign 
imports would drive down prices and therefore domestic profits.  Lord Overstone, however, 
was in favour of repeal, writing in 1846 that he was ‘confident of success’ for the repeal because 
(as he had written six years previously) the increasing population of England would require 
more crops and further imports were required.303  However, the crash in the market predicted to 
follow the repeal of the Corn Laws did not occur.  Even though imports increased significantly 
in the 30 years following repeal, Howell found that aside from 1848-52 being years of 
depression, Britain was protected from the potential impact repeal could have had.  1850 has 
also been noted as a year of poor harvests and “great agricultural distress”.304  War and high 
transport costs limited imports across the period and those that did arrive did nothing more 
than supply the increase in domestic demand as population increased.  Howell found that only 
wheat was imported in sufficient quantities to depress domestic prices in this period whilst 
prices for barley and oats actually rose.305  Following the slump up to 1858, Daunton saw prices 
rising again, to peak in 1865.306 
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However, prices were not wholly depressed after 1865 and soon began to increase again, 
producing a ‘golden age’ and peaking, in the majority of cases, in the early 1870s.307  The effect 
of repealing the Corn Laws, which had little effect in 1846, appears to have been significant after 
1873.  Olson and Harris calculated that as a result between 1873 and 1894 British wheat 
production fell by around 60 per cent.308  Furthermore, Richard Perren pointed out that rents 
and estate income fell to a greater extent on arable than on livestock estates between 1872-4 and 
1890-2.309 
 
From the mid-1870s however an economic slump occurred owing to a number of factors and 
which caused both prices and domestic supply to fall and, of course, farmers’ profits followed.  
Lord Ernle considered the 1870s to 1890s to be a period of depression.310  F.M.L. Thompson, on 
the other hand, noted in 1991 that 
 
The vocabulary of depression and the despondent flavours of ill-fortune and failure, 
have never disappeared from accounts of agriculture after the mid-1870s, despite 
the work of revisionists.311 
 
Indeed, Thompson further argued that the notion of a depression after the 1870s was entirely 
inaccurate.  He found that agricultural decline was not universal, with different areas and 
different types of farming being affected differently, to varying degrees and at varying times 
throughout what has been classified as the depression from the mid-1870s.  However, he did 
find that in a number of counties ‘there was agricultural decline, and probably enduring 
depression among farmers and landowners – but not labourers’.  And, amongst the counties he 
considered subject to such a depression one finds Northamptonshire.312 
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Overall there were two main factors which led to a decline of agriculture in England from the 
1870s – low domestic yields and increased imports from the Americas and the British colonies.  
These factors varied greatly between different farming types (in particular arable farming 
compared to dairying or more specialized farming such as market gardening) and as a result so 
did the level of recession.  The problem of domestic supply affected a number of agricultural 
products and types of farming.  Lord Ernle suggested that the early 1870s were characterised by 
‘bleak springs and rainy summers’ which ‘produced short cereal crops of inferior quality, 
mildew in wheat, mould in hops, blight in other crops, disease in cattle, rot in sheep, throwing 
heavy lands into foul condition, deteriorating the finer grasses of pastures’.313   
 
It has been theorised that in the 1870s-80s farmers made this bad situation worse by increasing 
their supply in order to maintain their own total profits but actually only succeeded to saturate 
the market, driving prices down even further.  However, Thompson argued that this was not 
the case.  From the 1870s to 1890s, he found, some farmers increased production of products 
that remained profitable whilst others cut back production of less profitable goods, presumably 
partly as a bid to drive up prices by restricting supply and in part to reallocate those lands to 
more profitable produce.314  However, in Northamptonshire landlords were commenting on the 
bleak weather and problems with produce which Lord Ernle described and did not discuss 
changes in land use as maintaining profitability.  Yet even where farmers did alter production 
and controlled supply to the market the problem of improved transport and the imports this 
brought in was still significant.  Whilst Britain’s railways and canals had aided domestic 
markets, improvements to overseas transport, against a market no longer protected by the Corn 
Laws pushed down prices by increasing supply.  The 1870s saw America’s railways extended 
into the mid-western prairies.  This, added to the introduction of steam carriage by sea and 
land, led to a great increase in American exports to Britain.315  The effects of these imports were 
greatest on corn producers.316 
 
Later the effects of increased imports became more widespread.  From the mid-1880s 
refrigeration techniques had also been perfected, enabling the importation of chilled and frozen 
meat as well as cheese from America and cheese, butter, bacon and eggs from Europe.  Yet 
Howell saw these as impacting negatively on domestic produce prices not because supply 
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outstripped demand – demand was rising as population increased – but because the imported 
goods arrived at a time when domestic productivity was low due to bad harvests.317 
 
Such a significant fall in prices reflected in farmers’ incomes and therefore their ability to pay 
rent.318  The result of this was that landowners’ agricultural incomes (rental and home farm) fell 
dramatically, Thompson calculated by as much as a half, in the fifteen or twenty years after 
1878.  As a result many landowners had to sell their lands as expenditure, particularly on wages 
and luxury goods, could not be reduced to the same extent as it had been necessary to reduce 
rents by.319  Therefore, even by this late in the nineteenth century a significant number of 
landlords were still reliant on tenurial income and, furthermore, still susceptible to market and 
price changes.  After the mid-1870s prices did not improve significantly until the years 
following 1897, beyond the end of the period of this study.  But even then the level was only 
that of the mid-1860s, with prices only returning to their 1870s peak levels again in 1914.320 
 
Thus prices fluctuated dramatically in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, increasing 
overall but having peaks and troughs where import levels were affected or harvests had been 
particularly good or poor.  As a result tenant profits were affected leaving them with either 
greater profits which landlords sought their share of or unable to pay their rents.  The effect of 
price changes can be seen in both levels of investment and rent levels as those coming into the 
land would negotiate different levels of rent or those on it would agree new rents as soon as 
their tenancy enabled them. 
 
Rent as Dependent on the Type of Farming Undertaken 
 
As profitability varied, rents were also dependent on the type of farming the land was put to.  
Not only did the topographical merits of the land determine this but prices of various goods 
would lead farmers or landlords to instigate a change to the type of farming on a holding or 
estate and changes with the rent accordingly.  Until around 1750, Allen found, pasture rents 
tended to be higher than arable, reflecting falling prices for arable produce.  After 1750, Turner 
et al found, the difference between arable and pasture rents was inconsistent but not a great 
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deal.321  At the other end of the period of this study, English found that when arable prices 
began to fall in the 1870s many Wolds farmers returned to pasture farming as they were no 
longer able to profit from corn.322  However, in terms of rents and their link to the type of 
farming undertaken, Turner et al argued that landlords sought to assume direct control of their 
estates which they did in part by adding ‘tightly drawn clauses’ to their leases which 
determined how the land was to be farmed.323  However, on the Northamptonshire estates of 
this study there is no evidence of landowners dictating the type of farming undertaken so 
closely, although that is not to say this did not happen - the majority of sets of Montagu 
accounts did specify the type of farming being undertaken on each holding if not for each field, 
showing that landlords did pay attention to what use the land was put to, even if they did not 
dictate its use. 
 
One point of note in the Montagu accounts is that sometimes lands were sublet.  This 
demonstrates that rents were under the maximum which could be charged as tenants would not 
sublet if they made no money from it.  Evidence of subletting in England has also been 
identified elsewhere.  Spring, for example, commented on the persistence of subletting in the 
late-nineteenth century, when  
 
The holder of the building lease was usually not the occupant.  Indeed, repeated 
subletting often led to a situation so confused that the original lessee could not be 
easily discerned.324   
 
Therefore subletting did occur in England, demonstrating that tenants could lease their lands 
out for higher rents than they themselves were paying.   
 
Therefore the use of the land was a factor considered by both tenants farming it and landlords 
leasing it.  This was usually in the interests of maximising profits on the part of tenants and, as 
differing rent levels show, this was also a factor considered by landlords.  However, as 
landlords also had a strong interest in maintaining the long-term profitability of land, their 
interest in the type of farming undertaken also further works to demonstrate an interest in 
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ensuring land was not exhausted and was improved in ways beneficial to both tenant and 
estate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus improvements and investment in agriculture were central to rural society in the 
nineteenth century and had a significant impact on the rental economy.  The improvement 
which has been of most interest to historians has been enclosure as this had the greatest impact 
on the landscape and has been argued as the cause of proletarianization of the poor as well as 
creating larger farms and leading to practices such as high farming.  However, what has been 
shown here is that improvements to the land were not all landlord-driven and that tenants had 
a personal interest in increasing productivity as it would increase their own profits.  As a result 
a number of improvements were undertaken at tenant demand (with landlord agreement).   
 
Investment in the land was usually undertaken by landlords putting up the financial 
investment whilst tenants undertook the work and rents were increased accordingly, to pay 
back what was effectively a loan by the landlord for the work undertaken, as well as 
transferring a proportion of the increased profit to the landlord.  Whilst it has been argued that 
landlords took a higher proportion of the farm’s income following investment tenants had to be 
willing to improve and, as they often instigated the changes, tenants must have profited too. 
 
Investment in the land was also highly dependent on prevailing prices, increasing when a 
greater profit could be made.  However, prolonged depression also brought about increased 
investment.  As shall be shown in chapter 4 and 5 landlords utilized a number of measures in 
order to maintain rent levels and keep tenants on the land in times of agricultural depression.  
Investing in the land was one such measure, intended to increase productivity and farm profits 
enough to keep rent levels up.  Better quality farmland was also more appealing to prospective 
tenants when demand for land was low. 
 
 
Chapter 4 – The Setting and Agreement of Rent Levels 
 
Introduction 
 
Changing rent levels were central to the agricultural economy of the nineteenth century.  Rents 
were the principal bond between landlord and tenant and the leasing of land was relied upon 
by both parties for their livelihoods.  Turner et al defined rent as ‘the price paid by one group in 
society, the farmers, to another group, the landlords, for the utility of the soil’ which was fixed 
‘under conditions agreeable to both parties’.325  Thus in order to understand rural society and 
landlord-tenant relations on landed estates one must understand why rent levels were set as 
they were.  This chapter will examine both changing rent levels and what made them 
‘agreeable’ to landlords and tenants as well as how this varied depending on individual tenants 
or wider economic conditions. 
 
Central factors governing changes in rent levels were the supply of and demand for land.  
Turner et al found a number of reasons for changes in rent levels, not only economic but also 
social.  Indeed, tenurial demand depended significantly upon the perception of the profitability 
of a farm and predicted, rather than current, price levels.326  Factors such as the soil type, 
proximity of a farm to markets, the size of the farm, the type of lease, the type of farming the 
landlord would lease it out for and the personality of a landlord all went some way towards 
determining the level of a rent.  Thus this chapter will explore both the social and economic 
factors affecting rent levels both in terms of individual negotiations and estate-wide trends 
across the nineteenth century, with an in-depth analysis of the recession following the French 
Wars in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
 
In order to examine changing rent levels in context this chapter begins with a discussion of the 
trends in rent levels across the period and the social and economic constructs which affected 
them.  Rents on two of the Northamptonshire estates of this study are examined in detail in the 
context of turner et al’s national rental index, focussing on the rapidly changing economic 
circumstances following the French Wars (1792-1815).  The chapter then moves on to discuss 
changing farm sizes across the period and their effect on rent levels across the period . 
 
Both rental figures and correspondence regarding rent levels and the setting of rents will be 
used in order to examine changes in set rents and the agreement of rent levels and the reasons 
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rents were set at the levels they were in the nineteenth century.  The changing spread of rents as 
the economy changed and lands were improved will also be examined. 
 
It will be shown that landlords and tenants were both primarily interested in their own profits 
but that landlords were often prepared to negotiate in the short term in order to preserve the 
long-term profitability of the land.  Different methods of managing, negotiating and setting 
rents and the reasons rent levels were set as they were will also be examined. 
 
The rents discussed in this chapter are however limited to rent levels agreed and permanent 
changes made to them.  The payment of rents, arrears and temporary abatements will be 
discussed in chapter 5 which will establish how the rural rental economy operated after leases 
had been agreed, in particular where the economy fell into recession. 
 
Sources 
 
The most extensive collection of rental data available for any of the estates covered by this study 
are the accounts of the Montagu estate.  Rental data for the Montagus’ Boughton estate is 
available for the majority of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Furthermore, the Lords 
Montagu and their stewards kept a notes column detailing the reasons for changes in rent levels 
and tenants, providing more information on rents across the period.  Rental accounts for the 
other estates of this study are not as complete, if they have survived at all.  However, a run of 
Overstone accounts is extant for a portion of the early-nineteenth century.  As a result, the 
quantitative data for this study is reliant on these two estates in the first instance. 
 
When it comes to rental data one must first acknowledge a number of limitations to the data 
available.  Even in 1907 Robert Thompson faced the problem that not all account books 
survived and it was difficult to separate out woods, moors, parks and residential buildings from 
the agricultural holdings.327  The issue of surviving evidence (or indeed account books being 
kept in any clear manner in the first place) is one faced elsewhere, with David Stead noting that 
Turner et al’s rental index inevitably gained bias from this and the estate of this study being 
chosen to a significant degree by availability of evidence.328  The Ashley’s of Northamptonshire, 
for example, have good records of the enclosure of their estate - Lord Ashley himself being an 
avid supporter – but the extant estate accounts consist simply of a collection of receipts for 
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income and outgoings held together by pins, making the study of rents on the estate nigh on 
impossible.   
 
Thompson’s concern with separating out non-agricultural rents was also stressed by H.G. Hunt, 
although the records he was using contained some detail on shops and public houses, enabling 
them to be removed.  Hunt also noted that the sole of land through the period may skew figures 
as a parish may change in size depending on the estate ownership within it.329  Fortunately, the 
Montagu accounts do specify the nature of holdings, minimizing this issue.  The Overstone 
accounts are not as clear but do occasionally note the nature of a holding.  Where identifiable, 
all non-agricultural holdings have been removed from analysis.  
 
An initial overview of broad trends is given for the entirety of the period using a sample of the 
Montagu data.  For this, accounts from 1801 and every tenth year following through to 1881 
have been used.  Added to this, the period 1814 to 1831 has been examined in more detail using 
detailed figures and analysis of the Montagu accounts have been used covering the period 1815-
1831.  The Overstone accounts are also available for the lands of Samuel Jones Loyd (later Lord 
Overstone) from 1827 to 1831. 
 
The rental economy following the French Wars has been chosen as it was a period of significant 
change in the rental economy, when the inflated prices of the wars fell and English agriculture 
was thrown into a prolonged recession until the 1830s.  The period has been employed in this 
chapter to examine changes in real rents whilst in chapter 5 the same data has been used to 
examine the spread of arrears and abatements of rent.  Whilst the Montagu accounts provide 
the most complete picture of the period, the late 1820s were still a period of depressed rents and 
the Overstone accounts therefore add to the general picture as well as providing a comparison 
for the changes in Montagu rents.  Both of these can then be compared to Turner, Becket and 
Afton’s national rental index in order to see how Northamptonshire rents compared to the 
country more widely. 
 
However, there are limits to the statistical data available for the Northamptonshire estates – 
whilst Turner et al relied on rent per acre the figures are unavailable for the estates of this study.  
Instead the changing spread of rents has been used in order to demonstrate the rise and fall of 
real rents.  As shall be shown the changing spread of rent on an estate year on year 
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demonstrates fluctuations in the general level of rents, even though farm size data is 
unavailable. 
 
Even though the quantitative data does form a significant part of the analysis of this study 
qualitative data is utilized to reinforce the conclusions drawn from the accounts data.  
Furthermore, landlords’ and stewards’ attitudes towards tenants and, to a lesser extent, the 
views of tenants of the estate and its management can also be gauged using both the 
memoranda in the accounts (which were utilized more freely in the Montagu accounts than the 
Overstone and provide not only views on the economy and tenant’s ability to pay but on the 
social and financial situation and even occasionally the character of individual tenants).  Added 
to this, as noted previously, there is an extensive wealth of qualitative evidence available for the 
other estates of this study.   
 
The Overstone estate in particular has a wealth of correspondence data which provides further 
information on the thinking behind rent levels and the agricultural economy more widely, 
including taxation and regulation debated in Parliament, the thinking of great estate owners of 
the time and discussions between Lord Overstone and his friends regarding the land and value 
of agriculture.  Lord Overstone also managed a significant farm on the Overstone estate, rather 
than letting out all his land, and regularly discussed farming methods and improvements with 
his peers.  The Langham estate has more limited data but this consists of correspondence 
between James Langham and his estate manager throughout the 1820s, principally concerned 
with the profitability of land in the recession following the French Wars.  The wealth of 
correspondence evidence for the period is another reason why this study has focussed on the 
post-French Wars recession.  This evidence is also heavily utilised in chapter 5 as discussion of 
rent levels in this period inevitably involved discussion of payment of rents, arrears and 
abatements. 
 
Overview of the Nineteenth-Century Rental Index 
 
Turner et al observed that in the first half of the nineteenth century annual leases replaced the 
former long leases and rents increased dramatically, transferring a larger proportion of tenurial 
income to landowners than they had previously.330  David Stead, on the other hand, argued that 
landlords utilized leases as a management strategy to maximize their own incomes, using year-
on-year tenancies where they hoped prices would improve and rents could be increased the 
next year.  Where prices were high, however, he found that tenants were willing to sign longer 
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leases, bearing the entire income risk of farming and still being liable for a high rent where 
prices later fell.331  Whether or not tenants were tied into leases affected the rent levels on an 
estate as longer leases would stabilize rent levels even where prices and agricultural incomes 
changed considerably. 
 
Figure 4:1 shows Turner et al’s national rent index for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
This shows how rents were linked to prices and fluctuated accordingly but the predominant 
trend towards increase (until the 1870s) demonstrates the increase in demand for land caused 
by a dramatically rising population across this period.  This overall increase in rents across the 
period is also notable against the trend towards increasing farm sizes, with the average rent 
rising despite larger farms usually having lower rents per acre than their smaller counterparts.  
J.D. Chambers, for example, commented on the loss of tenants through consolidation of 
holdings throughout the period following enclosure.332  Thus increases in rent over the period 
are in part negated by the consolidation of farms in the same space where there were greater 
numbers previously.  But, as shown above, whether as a result of enclosure or otherwise, farm 
amalgamation and consolidation of holdings was often tenant driven, with landlords simply 
adhering to their wishes as the loss of large tenants harmed the estate more than letting large, 
capable tenants increase their holdings. 
 
Furthermore, whilst increases show greater demand for land, falls in rent levels show changes 
to permanent rents where demand fell.  Where demand for land fell tenants would be less 
willing to pay high rents and there would be fewer tenants at all willing to lease land without 
being offered concessions.  As a result where demand for land fell rent levels would have to be 
reduced accordingly for those coming into the land.  Furthermore, tenants already on the land 
would often require their rents to be reduced in order to convince them to remain on the land, 
further reducing overall rent levels on an estate.  Yet the overall trends in national rent levels 
demonstrate the national average rent levels across the period and the socio-economic climate 
at any one time. 
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Figure 4:1 Index of agricultural rent assessed in England 1690-1914 (shillings per acre) 
SOURCE: Turner et al, Agricultural Rent, p.149. 
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It is within this framework that one can examine the spread of rents at any one time.  Whilst the 
national index shows that rents were generally increasing across the period, with fluctuations 
and depressions identifiable in the 1820s and 1880s, research has also found that farm sizes 
were increasing.  However, the spread of rents on the Northamptonshire estates of this study 
appears much more stagnant.  Changes in agreed rents and increases in farm sizes would both 
lead one to expect a change in the pattern of rents as well as the rent per acre.  However, as shall 
be shown, as larger farms came into being smaller holdings were also broken down and 
individual fields moved into different holdings. 
 
Turner et al’s national rental index shows abnormally high rents in the early-nineteenth century.  
After the French Wars ended in 1815, prices, and later rents, began to fall.  H.G. Hunt found that 
rents stagnated as prices fell, before catching up and beginning to fall too.333  But even the 
arrears and abatements with which landlords first approached the problem of falling prices 
were, to some, too slow a response to falling prices causing tenants to impoverish the soil in an 
attempt to pay their rents.334  The time-lag between falls in prices and changes to permanent 
rents is most evident here in the rental index.  Whilst prices began to fall from the end of the 
war, permanent rents did not fall until the 1820s, reductions in the interim being made by 
allowing arrears and/or granting abatements.  Despite the depth and length of the recession in 
this period, by 1850 rents had recovered sufficiently and were even increasing.  Turner et al 
found that by 1850-1 rent per acre was 35 shillings, 10 shillings more than it had been in the war 
years in 1810-11.335 
 
The final peak in rents was in the 1870s.  After this, prices began to fall dramatically, imports 
took away domestic demand and rents (and tenant numbers) fell across England.  F.M.L. 
Thompson found that from 1872/3 to 1892/3 rents fell by 16.8% across England and by 24% in 
Northamptonshire in particular.336  Following this, Beckett noted that rents plummeted from 
1879 and by 1900, Robert Thompson noted, rents were only 30% of their early-1870s level.337  
Not only does the national rental index provide corroborating evidence for this dramatic slump 
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in rentals but landlord correspondence, particularly that of Lord Overstone, demonstrates the 
extent of the economic problems this caused for wealthy landowners and the landed estate as 
an economic entity.  In 1880 Overstone even described the falling rents on his estates as having 
to ‘look ruin in the face’.338  Howell noted that the fall in rental values led to ‘financial hardship’ 
for even the wealthiest of landowners and that in difficult years larger estates even invested 
further in the land to try and attract tenants.339  Indeed, with mortgages, investment, home farm 
management and other outgoings, Barbara English found that the Sledmere estate actually 
made a loss in 1898 with outgoings of £47,951 compared to only £16,716 in 1882.340  One could 
speculate that a part of this huge leap in outgoings was due to investment in the land.  
Cannadine found that rents remained depressed for the next seventy years, causing many to 
have to sell their assets and land was no longer the safest form of investment, soon overtaken by 
business fortunes.341 
 
As noted above, however, there existed a time-lag between price changes and rent changes as 
rental markets and leases responded to changes in prevailing prices, owing to external factors 
such as confidence in the market and landlord’s ability and willingness to change rent levels.  
This is most noticeable in the change in the spread of rents in the 1820s, where levels appear to 
have remained fairly constant despite the deep recession of the decade.  However, rents did not 
remain stagnant in this period in practice, with alternative measures to reduce rents in the 
short-term being examined for the same accounts in chapter 5. 
 
Overview of the Nineteenth-Century Spread of Rents 
 
Figure 4:2 shows the changing spread of rents in a sample of Montagu accounts across the 
nineteenth century.  A sample of Montagu accounts for every ten years has been used, covering 
the period 1801 – 1881.  In the nineteenth century rents on the Montagu estate were paid 
annually at Lady Day so there is one set of accounts for each year of the sample.  This sample 
has been used in the same way in chapter 5.   
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Figure 4:2: Spread of Rents on the Montagu Estate, 1800-1881 
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Whilst figures show the total rents on the Montagu estate increasing throughout this period the 
spread of rents remained fairly consistent.  Across the nineteenth century one can pinpoint  
several trends, including a fall in lower rents in the period of high prices early in the century, 
most notable in the 1820-1821 account and a longer-term trend towards higher rents. 
 
Following the anomalous rent levels shown in the 1820-1 account one also finds changes in 
rental patterns which can be tracked across the remainder of the century.  Whilst set rents are 
shown as abnormally high in the 1820-1 account from 1830-1 onwards there are noticeably less 
tenants paying under 50 shillings per annum than in the 1810-1 account and a lower percentage 
of rents at even 1,000 shillings and under.  The number of tenants paying between 50 and 700 
shillings per annum increased and those paying below 50s fell.  However, the greatest increase 
was in the numbers paying 51-100 shillings whilst the proportion paying over 2,000 shillings 
per annum remained almost constant throughout the whole of the nineteenth century (with the 
exception of the 1820-1821 account). 
 
All this is coupled with small but sustained growth in the percentage paying over 3,000 
shillings per annum, which lasts until 1881 when this group begins to decline.  Therefore, this 
movement is consistent with Turner et al’s rental index and shows that the spread of rents was 
moving in favour of higher rents.  The accounts for 1831 and after also have a significantly 
higher number of tenants than the earlier accounts but this number remains fairly consistent for 
the rest of the century, showing an increase in the numbers of tenants paying higher rents and 
not just new lands being brought into the estates with new tenants with them. 
 
It is also of note here that although the increase in rents in the 1821 account was not sustained 
the spread of rents never returned to their pre-1821 levels and rents of under 50 shillings per 
annum were never paid by more than 41% of tenants, despite being over 50% in both the 1800-1 
and 1810-1 accounts.  This group had also fallen to just 21% of tenants by 1880-1 but was 
coupled with a significant increase in those paying 51-100 shillings (10% in 1800-1, 11% in 1831 
and 27% of tenants by 1881). 
 
However, the nature of sampling means that the above can only provide us with an overview of 
the period.  As a result a detailed analysis has been undertaken for one of the short periods of 
great change in the nineteenth century agricultural economy – the end of the French Wars 
(1792-1815) and the post-war recession, which is usually taken to have ended around 1830, 
although as has been noted in chapter 2 the nature of this recession has been debated by 
historians.  For this case studies have been undertaken for the two estates where accounts for 
this period are available – the Montagu Estate (1815-1831) and the shorter run of accounts for 
the Overstone Estate (1828-1831). 
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Case Study: The Post-French Wars Recession 
 
In terms of the post-French Wars recession, the dramatic changes to the economy in this period 
have been identified as leading to rapidly falling prices, a loss of confidence in the land and a 
fall in agreed rent levels.  Whilst it is true that prices fell considerably between 1801 and 1821, 
they had begun to rise again by 1831.  Table 4:1 shows changes in the prices of agricultural 
produce in the early-nineteenth century and the percentage change from the 1801 price of 
wheat, barley and oats.  As can be seen prices had fallen to around half their 1801 levels by 1821 
but were beginning to recover in 1831, although they had still not reached the levels they had 
been at the turn of the century.  As one would expect this had a knock-on effect on rent levels. 
 
 1801 1811 1821 1831 
Wheat 5.975 (100) 4.765 (79.75) 2.804  (46.93) 3.317 (55.51) 
Barley 3.425 (100) 2.211 (64.55) 1.300 (37.95) 1.900 (55.47) 
Oats 1.850 (100) 1.379 (74.54) 0.975 (52.70) 1.300 (70.27) 
Table 4:1 Prices of agricultural produce in £/Qtr (Prices as a percentage of 1801 price) 
SOURCE: Mitchell and Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, pp.488-9 
 
As noted above Turner et al found a significant change in rent levels in this period.  However, 
whilst both prices and rent levels were adversely affected by the price falls of this period there 
is a noticeable time-lag in changes to agreed rents, with temporary measures being used to 
reduce rents in the short-term.  This, again, will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.  Even when 
one accounts for this time-lag in changing rent levels, however, changes in the spread of rents 
were not as prevalent as one may expect, particularly over the short term.  This emphasizes the 
importance of other rent control measures and, as Cragoe pointed out, the reluctance of tenants 
to leave the land.342 
 
Figure 4:3 shows the spread of rents on the Montagus’ Boughton estate 1815-1831, 
corresponding with the post-French Wars recession.  Whilst one would expect a time-lag in the 
fall of rents or, indeed, the change in spread of rents following the wars, there is little obvious 
trend at all in the Montagu figures.  Whilst numbers of tenants and the spread of rents did 
fluctuate year on year there is no definitive trend across this 16 year period.  Some patterns can 
be identified but the majority of the changes which are apparent on the graph can easily be 
accounted for in slight changes to tenant numbers and the natural movement of tenants.   
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Figure 4:3: Montagu French Wars Figs 
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At the beginning of the period one can identify a drop in those paying under 100 shillings per 
annum from 1815-17 with rents of 51-100 shillings continuing to account for a smaller 
proportion of the total until 1821.  Outside of this there is little identifiable by way of a trend.  
The persistence of both those paying under 50 shillings per annum and those paying over 3,000 
shillings per annum suggests that large farmers still existed on the estates but their persistence 
was not at the cost of small tenants.  However, the groups in between also show no definitive 
fluctuation across the period, demonstrating that the largest and smallest tenants were not 
surviving at the expense of the middling groups. 
 
Figure 4:4, on the other hand, shows changes in the spread of rents on the Overstone estate.  
Whilst these figures are only available for 1828-1831 one can identify a trend in the spread of 
rents.  In terms of the small landholders, those paying under 50 shillings per annum fall 
consistently in each account, although only by 1-2% every 6 months.  The very smallest tenants, 
those paying under 20 shillings per annum actually rises between the first and second accounts 
but then decreases across the rest of the period, although at a slower rate than those paying 
under 50s, indicating a fall in those paying over 20s but under 50s. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, those paying over 2,000 shillings per annum are a growing 
group, despite the wider economic depression.  Increasing most dramatically between the 
second 1828 and first 1829 account (an increase of 6%).  However, within this group the 
proportion of tenants paying over 3,000 shillings per annum remains almost completely static, 
with a fall from 2% to 1% of the total in the second 1829 account which is rectified in the next 
account. 
 
However, there is a notable exception to the trends noted above – the first account of the series – 
Lady Day to Michaelmas 1828 – has noticeably lower numbers of tenants paying under 20s and 
higher numbers paying over 2,000s than in the subsequent account.  This could be accounted for 
in the time lag between the economy failing and agreed rents falling.  However, when coupled 
with the fluctuations in the middling groups of the Overstone rents across one can build a more 
direct comparison with the Montagu accounts for this period.  The Montagu accounts have no 
definitive trend across the accounts for 1828-31 (although in practice this only consists of three 
sets of figures) but this pattern, or lack thereof, is characteristic of the Montagu accounts across 
the period 1815-1831, as examined in detail above.  One reason for this could be the nature of 
the recession.  Thompson argued that the ‘recession’ following the French Wars was not simply 
one downturn in the market but a series of fluctuations in the agricultural economy which 
could be classed as a number of short recessions but without any extensive booms between.  
These, he argued, were identified as lasting until the ascension of Queen Victoria in 1838 to  
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Figure 4:4 Spread of Rents on The Overstone Estate 1828-1831 
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create the identification of a new economic era with a new monarch.343  This situation would 
have created mixed reaction and predictions of the economy, leading to differing demand for 
and valuations of land and the effect on rents and may well explain the pattern in both the 
Montagu rents and the middling groups on the Overstone estate. 
Ongoing agricultural recession, whether the result of continued recession throughout this 
period or a number of bad years for farmers and a loss of faith in the income of the land, would 
also provide a fitting explanation for the fall in those paying the smallest rents, which is 
identifiable on both estates in this period.  The rise in those paying the higher rents on the 
Overstone estate (over 2,000 shillings per annum) and the persistence of the groups paying over 
3,000 shillings on the Montagu estate also indicate the largest farmers were most able to survive 
the recession and retain their holdings.  These tenants, it will be shown in chapter 5, were the 
most likely to receive temporary abatements or have high levels of arrears tolerated by their 
landlords and therefore the high agreed rents persist although these were not always the rents 
collected in practice. 
 
Changing Rent Levels 
 
As shown in chapter 3, rent levels depended greatly on prices.  But there were also other factors 
affecting how rents were set, including negotiations with individual tenants, the quality of land, 
the size of the farm they were taking on and the financial situation and personality of the 
landowner. 
 
In his study of Agrarian capitalism Andrew Appleby distinguished two types of rent increases, 
those which resulted from ‘investments in new techniques, improvements, and new crops’ and 
those which took place without these.344  The latter was the type of rent increase more directly 
dependent on the economy and agricultural markets – as prices increased and farmers could 
not make greater profits without the need to invest in their holdings landlords may well 
increase rents to retain their share of the income from the land.  Whilst Appleby was primarily 
concerned with England up to 1700, similar trends are prevalent in the early-nineteenth 
century, when prices were artificially inflated by the French Wars.  However, the period was 
also one of high enclosure rates, high levels of investment in the land and a change from long 
leases to annual tenancies or tenancies at will.  All these factors served to increase the 
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profitability of land and brought with them further increases in rents, somewhat blurring 
Appleby’s distinction.  However, with tenancies at will making it easier for rent levels to change 
and prices being a dominant factor in the setting of and agreement to rent levels, the economic 
slump following the French Wars is one in which changes in real rents, as well as the spread of 
rents, can be examined. 
 
The link between prices and rent levels is not skewed but further enforced by rent increases 
resulting from investment in the land – investments and improvements were more common in 
times of high prices when there was more money to be made from agriculture and increased 
productivity would be of most benefit, these were also times where there was more money to 
invest.  But it must also be noted that rental figures show a time lag from price drops.  Generally 
where levels appear steady rather than rising it is because prices were falling.  Other measures 
would be used before rents were reduced, in the form of arrears and abatements which will be 
dealt with in turn in chapter 5.345 
 
Farm Sizes 
 
Farm sizes and the categories of farm associated with them have been widely debated by 
historians.  The amount of land required for subsistence has been argued as have the definitions 
of small, middling and large farms.  In terms of acreage, the most often used definition is that 
small farms consisted of those of between 25 and 100 acres, middling 100-150 acres and large 
anything over 150 acres.346  Greater farm sizes would bring with them a shift in rent levels 
upwards; even where rents themselves were not increased, and therefore they warrant 
discussion here. 
 
Changing farm sizes have been a central part of the debate regarding the negative impact of 
enclosure and changing rural society across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Farm sizes 
did increase in this period.  Whilst a number of historians have attributed this increase to a 
result of enclosure alone, Daunton found it continued throughout the nineteenth century and 
calculated that some farms became exceptionally large, with farms of under 300 acres falling in 
number across Britain after 1851 whilst those between 300 and 1,000 acres increased in 
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number.347  As a result of this shift one would expect a distinct upward turn in the rent per 
holding across this period.  However, as has been shown, the spread of rents on both the 
Montagu and the Overston estates did not change as dramatically as one would expect were 
farm sizes increasing dramatically.  It shall also be shown that farm sizes did increase as tenants 
added extra parcels of land to their holdings, although it appears that holdings were being 
fragmented, creating larger and smaller farms at the same time and thus it was possible for a 
small farmer to gradually increase his holdings and across generations small farming families 
could become the large capitalist farmers who supposedly drove them off the lands. 
 
In 1911 the Hammonds concluded that increasing farm sizes were detrimental to rural society, 
immiserated the poor and proletarianized those who would previously have been able to lease 
their own lands.  As a result they identified enclosure and increasing farm sizes as destroying 
what they termed the ‘farming ladder’ – tenants were no longer able to take on small farms to 
move up the social scale from labourer to farmer as these small farms had been eradicated.348  
More recently, J.M. Neeson came to a similar conclusion.  Neeson identified increasing farm 
sizes as negatively impacting upon agricultural communities in Northamptonshire by taking 
away land from would-be small farmers or even dispossessing the less-wealthy tenant, 
particularly at enclosure when larger farms were created and smaller ones lost.  This, she found, 
compounded the problems created by the loss of commons and common rights to these small 
tenants and left them reliant on labourers’ wages or poor rates or even caused them to migrate 
to towns and centres of industry.349  But whether a result of enclosure or just changes over time, 
the general consensus since the Hammonds has been that larger farms harmed the small tenant 
and agricultural labourer and took away the social mobility they had previously had.  Indeed, 
historians of other parts of Britain also found larger farms forcing out small tenants, although 
this was a result of a push for profits more generally and not simply a consequence of 
enclosure.  Andrew Mackillop concluded that in the Scottish Highlands the small farmer was 
not evicted but pushed out by the destruction of the old methods of farming and patterns of 
grazing and arable production applied by the small farming community.350   
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The idea of enclosure pushing out the small farmer, or indeed the small farmer being 
immiserated and dispossessed in order for larger, capitalist farmers to take their place has not 
gone without challenge.  Both J.D. Chambers and G.E Mingay viewed increasing farm sizes as a 
more gradual change and not simply a result of enclosure or any decision to run large capitalist 
farms.  Chambers argued that the increased rural to urban migration of the period which has 
been identified was not a result of small tenants or owners being pushed out of landholding at 
all but simply a result of population increase.351  Mingay’s statistical data also caused him to 
argue that changing farm sizes were not the cause of tenants leaving the land or a sudden 
change instigated by enclosure.  Mingay’s data caused him to arrive at a similar conclusion to 
that drawn from the Northamptonshire data – in general farms were increasing, but this was 
not a sudden change at the expense of the small farmer, but a gradual change which did not 
result in the ruin of the small tenant and loss of the small farm from the rural economy.352 
 
Few historians have provided significant amounts of data regarding the actual changes in farm 
sizes in this period.  Whilst Mingay looked at the long-term changes in farm sizes, J.R. Wordie 
undertook a study of the Leveson-Gower estates, which were spread across England and 
Scotland but owned by one family, between 1712 and 1832.  He found that in this period 
although large farms did increase in number on the estates so did smallholdings, both in 
numbers and terms of the acreage covered.  Wordie attributed this growth in smallholdings to 
the increase in population but he also found a decline in middling farms of between 20 and 200 
acres and evidence of consolidation of farms.  More specifically he found that following the 
Napoleonic Wars tenants and owner-occupiers holding 20-200 acres declined in number as a 
result of falling price levels, rising costs, high poor-rates and lack of economies of scale.  He also 
found that increasing farm sizes were not a result of enclosure but an ongoing amalgamation of 
tenancies.353   
 
However, it appears that whilst sometimes a farm would simply be amalgamated into its 
neighbour, more often tenants would add extra fields to their farms when they became 
available and farms would be dismantled, distributing the fields between several farmers who 
wished to increase their farms.  An extreme example can be found on the Montagu estate in 
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1831 when upon the death of a tenant in Little Oakley his cottage was divided between two 
men – William Barratt (for £1.0.0) and Thomas Joice (£1.5.0).  However, in the main it appears to 
have been the lands attached and not the cottages themselves which were divided.  In the 1851 
account one can find several examples of smallholdings being split, including those of William 
Dainty Snr’s holding and Mary Austin’s.  Dainty’s lands, for which he had paid £13pa were split 
between John Baines (£3.10.0) and John Smith (£12), an increase of £2.10.0pa.  Austin’s lands 
were split between three tenants and the increase of £2.0.10 on her £14 rent is noted in the 
account.  George Bell now leased a part of the holding for £6.10.0pa, William Chapman did 
likewise for £5 and Messers Townsend shared the final part for £4.10.0.  Of the men taking on 
these new holdings it must be noted that Baines, Smith and Bell were all middling farmers (with 
existing rents of £125-£140pa), showing that some middling farms were profiting from small 
farms being broken up and that large farms were being created in this way.  However, 
Chapman was adding to his £5pa farm whilst the Townsends were adding to other lands they 
jointly leased with James Bayes for £17pa.354  Thus, overall, as farms were split to increase 
existing holdings (both small and large) new small farms were created in the process.  In this 
process there was redistribution of significant amounts of farm land but as small farms became 
middling and middling farms large, new small farms were being created. Neeson found that by 
the mid-nineteenth century there was a notable absence of farms between 60 and 100 acres in 
Northamptonshire and the evidence of this study does show a fall in the lower rents across the 
nineteenth century.355 
 
However, overall the Northamptonshire evidence shows tenants sought to increase their farm 
sizes and when prices were good those who could afford to do so would often add vacant strips 
or fields to their holdings.  The correspondence data of my study shows small holders 
increasing in number as a result of larger farms being broken into separate lands on the quitting 
of a tenant, leaving a farm house and small quantity of land creating a new small farm whilst 
adding fields to other farms of all sizes and the Montagu accounts indicate the same.  Indeed, 
between an account document from the Ashley estate (centred on Ashby-St-Ledgers) in the late-
nineteenth century and the 1877 farm size figures for the estate there are a number of 
discrepancies, most notably Owen Faulkner’s farm which had increased by 69 acres, making it a 
middling farm instead of a small farm.  But in this period another tenant on the estate had lost 
one acre from his holding, while Faulkner and W.P. Cowley had both increased their holdings.  
Joseph Southam’s holding had decreased by 1 acre in the interim years, from 92 to 91 acres.  
Faulkner’s holding increased from 22 to 91 acres and W.P. Cowley increased his holding from 
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310 to 312 acres.356  Thus the largest increase was on a smallholding, which moved into the top 
of the middling farm category, whilst the middling farm lost land but remained in the same 
classification and the largest farm gained very little size in the same period.  Thus the small 
farmer was not being pushed out but was increasing his holding.  Therefore the above shows 
and the below will further demonstrate that farm sizes were increasing throughout this period, 
but not necessarily as a result of enclosure, nor at the expense of the small farmer, but often to 
his advantage.  
 
The Northamptonshire evidence also shows that middling farmers were also increasing their 
holdings in this period.  The Langham accounts show one Thomas Underwood taking on a farm 
‘late Dines’ in the 1822 accounts.  This is most probably that of Samuel Dines in the 1768 
account.  Dines fell into the category of middling tenant in 1768, with a holding of almost 60 
acres, whilst the holding he left in 1822 was 136 acres.  Thus some middling farmers were also 
increasing the size of their farms, moving into the category of large farmers.  Therefore 
increasing farm sizes were not only something for those already farming large holdings, there 
was definite social mobility for both the middling and the small farmer.  However, elsewhere 
middling holdings were being broken down to increase the size of other farms and, along with 
the increase in the amount of land in cultivation, also served to increase the number of small 
farms. 
 
With regards to the social mobility of small farmers, one can also find evidence on the Langham 
estate.  In the accounts for 1822 two families can be traced back to the 1768 accounts, 54 years 
earlier.  As there were no other families of the same name it is a fair assumption that the holders 
of the land were of the same families in both years.  One of these, Robert Knight was listed in 
the 1768 account as holding just over 13 acres whilst Robert Knight (possibly the same man but 
more likely a descendent or relative) in 1822 held over 95 acres.  Thus the Knight family had 
increased their holdings and social status from small farmers (holding up to 100 acres) in 1768 
to almost middling farmers in 1822.357  Thus, despite the Hammonds arguing that increasing 
farm sizes prevented small tenants moving up the farming ladder there are examples to the 
contrary, with small tenants able to become large tenants.  It must be acknowledged, however, 
that the speed with which the Knight farm grew was probably to some degree a result of the 
higher profits and increased land in cultivation due to the French Wars.  Yet it does 
demonstrate that small farmers were able and inclined to increase their holdings in this period. 
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Thus increasing farm sizes were not to the detriment of the small farmer or the village labourer.  
The breaking down of farms left increased numbers of small holdings enabling adult children of 
farmers and even some labourers to take on holdings for the first time and those already on the 
land to add fields onto their holdings and increase them gradually.  A number of examples of 
this can be found in the Montagu accounts across the nineteenth century.  Unfortunately the 
changing nature of the accounts means that some years the breakdown of farms is only evident 
where the leaving tenant had outstanding arrears, although others record in detail how a 
holding was broken down and the new rents to be paid for various parts of it.  As a result one is 
unable to calculate a rate of change or analyse the breakdown of farms in detail but there is 
enough evidence of the breakdown of farms for the expansion of others and, indeed, cottages 
with land left behind creating new smallholdings to demonstrate that the practice was common 
on the estate.   
 
In both 1851 and 1871 one finds more detailed accounts of the breakdown of the land.  In 1851 
John Smith took on £12 of land described as the ‘remainder of William Dainty’s holding’.  This 
was in addition to a £140 per annum farm he had taken on Lady Day 1839 and a £11 close added 
in 1844.  In 1871 Revd J.L. Sutton’s £48 holding was split between 4 men, including Joseph 
Bollard who added £8 of grassland to his £3 cottage and garden (held from Lady Day 1870) and 
Jonathan Smith who added £24 of grassland to his £245.5.0 farm (from Lady Day 1851), £7 
meadow (1851) and £16.10.0 grassland (added 1865).358  Thus one can see that throughout the 
period vacant holdings were being broken down to add to both large farms and smallholdings.  
Joseph Bollard is of particular note as he added £8 of land to a £3 cottage he had taken on only 
the year before, demonstrating the social mobility of landless labourers and how quickly the 
farming ladder could be climbed.359  With farm sizes increasing and even small farmers and 
new tenants adding to their holdings, the increase in smallholding numbers implies that fields 
and land would be taken from farms, leaving behind the cottage and perhaps land creating 
more cottagers and smallholdings. 
 
Furthermore, it is evident that small farmers were also able to increase the size of their farms, 
challenging the Hammonds’ idea that enclosure and increasing farm sizes prevented tenant 
mobility and immiserated the poor.  Neeson’s argument that farm size increases were primarily 
a result of enclosure has also been challenged, with other historians finding what has been 
shown in a small way above – farm sizes changed over a significant period of time and often to 
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the benefit of the tenant.360  However, Wordie’s suggestion that farm size increases were the 
result of amalgamating tenancies also has its limitations.  In Northamptonshire empty holdings 
would be split as often than they were amalgamated into one farm, creating several larger farms 
and often a smallholding attached to the farmhouse.  This is what resulted in the increased farm 
sizes and increased number of smallholdings in a society where there was still a ‘farming 
ladder’ and tenants at all levels were able to increase their farm size and improve their social 
status.   
 
Advantages of Large Farms 
 
Like other improvements, larger farms have been viewed as beneficial to both tenants and 
landlords.  Williamson observed that large farms were favoured by enclosers and farmers alike 
because of beliefs that they were more productive than their smaller counterparts.  A large farm 
was able to use labour more productively and take advantage of methods of improvement to 
enjoy higher yields per acre.  Large farms also had more capital to invest in new technology and 
improvements.361  However, he also found that despite a belief they were more productive 
 
On average, large farms actually produced lower yields than small ones because 
small farms were generally found in areas of more fertile soil and large ones in less 
favoured areas.362 
  
This was probably owing to a number of factors.  Large farmers were more likely to farm high, 
to attempt to maximise their incomes but pushing their costs up in the process.  Large farms 
were also more likely to diversify in case one type of produce failed or prices were particularly 
low as they had high rents to pay.  Diversification would usually involve using some of the land 
for growing a crop it was not best suited to.  Allen argued that large farms did not have higher 
yields but were advantageous as they had lower costs per acre than their smaller counterparts, 
although he saw farms of over 200 acres losing some of this advantage.363  Large farms may also 
have been extended onto land newly brought into cultivation, which was not as good quality as 
the lands already being farmed on an estate.  As a result smaller farms would have been more 
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productive but large farms were still able to generate greater profits as a unit than their smaller 
counterparts, even if not per acre.   
 
In keeping with this, Mingay argued that large farmers did have lower costs and were more 
ready to adopt improvements on their farms than their smaller counterparts but that this did 
not necessarily lead to greater profits per acre.  Furthermore, he suggested that large farmers 
were more ready (and able) to adopt new technologies, techniques and improvements than 
were smaller men.  He found that in general economic forces did favour larger farming units 
but this varied depending on soil type, local climate and markets.  He also found that 
economies of scale were of limited importance to large farmers before the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Whilst larger farmers were more likely to adopt improvements or changes in farming 
as they had the capital to invest in them small farmers could also profit from changes and 
improvements, especially where their lands enabled specialisation in profitable produce.364 
 
What is certain, in Northamptonshire at least is that whilst some farms grew in size the small 
farm still persisted and survived throughout this period, even beyond the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Mingay suggested that this survival was predominantly due to the specialisation of 
small farms.  He found that before the mid-nineteenth century small farms began to specialise 
in certain farming types and practices, including dairying and ‘speciality’ production, such as 
‘vegetables, fruit, poultry, eggs, milk, hops and hay’ were more ‘suited to a small acreage’.365  
Mingay’s view is, however, at odds with contemporary opinion.  Ardent improver and estate 
manager Nathaniel Kent (founder of Kent, Claridge and Pearce) went against the majority opinion 
of his time, which was in favour of large farm units and saw them as having significant 
advantages over small.  Kent suggested that there was an optimum farm size and that small 
farms were of importance.  However, what is important here is the reasoning behind Kent’s 
thinking which was not that small farms had any economic advantage which their larger 
counterparts lacked, as Mingay suggested with regards to specialisation, but that a small farmer 
was capable of farming the entirety of his holding and work ‘more zealously’ than his larger 
counterpart.366  Unusual an argument as this appears, there is quite possibly some truth in it.  As 
with landowners, tenant farmers were reliant on their income from the land and those holding 
more extensive lands had a more significant gap between profits and living costs.  As shown 
above, even rents of large farms were usually less per acre than small.  Thus those reliant on the 
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land and making little more profit than that required to feed themselves and their families may 
well be more diligent workers, eager to maximise their profits from their holdings.  Further to 
this, larger farms employed more external (as in non-family) labourers who would be owed the 
same wages however high farming production was.  However, what is certain is that small 
farms survived throughout this period, despite the growth of large farms. 
 
Tenant Numbers and Farm Size 
 
As has already been mentioned, there is a belief held by a number of historians that increasing 
farm sizes, particularly at enclosure, were harmful to and dispossessed the small tenant farmer.  
This belief has persisted in part owing to the influence of the Hammonds’ study but 
predominantly due to a large number of contemporaries condemning the depopulation which 
resulted from enclosure and the fact that landholders did form a decreasing proportion of the 
(increasing) national population across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
In 1786 one can find examples of both pro- and anti-enclosure commentators discussing the 
depopulation of the English countryside which was seen to be a result of enclosure.  Both 
viewed the level of depopulation to be considerable.  Reverend J. Howlett commented that in 
Essex population fell considerably in the 20-30 years following enclosure, leaving farm 
buildings and houses to go to ruin.  He even quoted Addington’s figures which stated that in a 
parish during the 15-20 years following enclosure ‘a hundred houses and families have 
dwindled into eight or ten’.367  Further to this, Neeson quoted an anonymous ‘country farmer’ 
who wrote in the same year of the positive features of English farming which were lost at 
enclosure: 
 
[Before enclosure] small farms were numerous, rents were low, and the land was 
tilled, not left for pasture.  Because profit did not come easily, farmers turned their 
hands to everything.  Their wives did the same.368  
 
Thus even some supporters of enclosure at the end of the eighteenth century viewed it as 
depopulating the English countryside and leaving buildings to go to ruin and those with a 
negative view finding that depopulation also had a negative effect on those remaining in rural 
society. 
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However, the idea of rural depopulation, at enclosure or otherwise, has been challenged by 
historians on a number of grounds.  J.D. Chambers, for example, argued that the consolidation 
of farms took place on such a scale as to give the illusion that the rural population was falling.369  
However, the general consensus appears to be that rural population was increasing and the 
illusion to the contrary was neither a result of rapid farm consolidation nor enclosure.  In fact as 
population increased a smaller proportion were able to hold land and some of the excess 
population migrated to towns, creating both the illusion that rural depopulation was occurring 
and the illusion that farm sizes were increasing more dramatically than they were in practice.  
Indeed, in 1953 Chambers calculated that there was no significant change in population 
following enclosure.  Of the 119 Nottinghamshire villages of his study he found that population 
increased in all of them after 1800, regardless of whether they had been enclosed or not.  More 
specifically, on the Isle of Axholme (Lincolnshire) he found that numbers of landowners 
increased by 60% between 1783 and 1800 and by a further 9% 1800-1829.  However, the 
population of the isle between 1800 and 1829 increased by 33%, meaning that a lower 
proportion of the population held land even though a greater number did so than had 
previously.370  Indeed, it is Chambers whose findings support those of this study, in the post-
French wars recession there is little difference in tenant numbers year-on year and, more 
importantly, across the nineteenth century in the Montagu sample (aside from a leap in 1821, 
where the dowager’s lands had the other parishes in the estate added to the Boughton accounts) 
there is little change in tenant numbers which can easily be attributed to normal fluctuations in 
tenant numbers as tenants died or quit the land and were replaced.371 
 
Joint Tenure 
 
Another way in which the less well-off could take advantage of the increased profitability of 
large farms was via joint tenure – several tenants taking on a holding between them and 
pooling their resources. 
 
The practice of sharing holdings – whether to use as pasture in the absence of commons or to 
make use of technological advances or improvements which could not be beneficially adopted 
on smaller holdings – was not practiced extensively in Northamptonshire in this period but the 
practice certainly took place throughout this period, making it significant enough to warrant 
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discussion here.  Its importance, however, stretches beyond the mere fact that it was practised – 
joint tenure was a way for men of little means to be able to farm significant, high profit 
holdings, pasture their livestock as they had previously done on the commons or even hold 
lands rather than be reduced to landless labourers.  Thus, in terms of the farming ladder and 
however small farm numbers changed in a locality one must acknowledge that some tenants 
were taking on far greater holdings in unison, giving would-be small farmers greater 
opportunity and profit than individual farms would have done. 
 
The only historian who has noted the practice of joint tenure in post-enclosure society is Moore-
Colyer and he gave it little more than a brief mention.  Moore-Colyer identified several enclosed 
pastures within the open fields of Great Oakley (Northamptonshire) even before the first 
enclosure act in 1784.  One of these, he noted, an enclosed pasture in Collier’s Field was leased 
jointly by three men – Wright, Fischer and Gascoigne.372  Even though Moore-Colyer makes no 
issue of joint tenure, this example demonstrates how tenants would take on joint tenancies to 
implement improvements (in this case enclosure) in order to improve their own profits. 
 
Examples of shared tenure can be found in both the 1831 and 1851 Montagu accounts and in 
more significant number in the 1871 accounts, although jointly-leased holdings remained the 
minority throughout.  The examples and comparisons below are drawn from the 1871 accounts 
but examples of joint tenure can be identified earlier in the period.  To ascertain the exact 
relationships between those sharing tenancies further, more in-depth research would be 
required.  However, the below demonstrate that the practice did take place and had moved 
beyond simply having lands leased to both husband and wife or parent and child.   
 
In 1871 George and Ann Bell were one couple recorded as jointly leasing lands.  The shared 
surname suggests that perhaps they were married.  However, the naming of both parties in the 
accounts was not a common practice for married couples, suggesting that either there was a 
particular reason for Ann Bell being named as well as her husband (such as her family 
supporting the couple financially) or the couple were not married, perhaps being siblings or 
even in-laws.  Other examples suggest perhaps more distant relations or even friendship or 
business partnerships tying the parties together.  In the same account Robert and William Bell 
jointly leased some grass land.  There is a possibility that these men were father and son but the 
Montagu accounts specified such details so it is more likely they were siblings or more distantly 
related.  But joint tenants were not necessarily related at all and did not always share a 
surname.  Of these, whilst pairs such as Elizabeth Cooper and J. Smith could potentially have 
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been siblings or brother- and sister-in-law, others such as Adam Tirrell and Robert Everitt are 
less likely are less likely to have been related and were certainly not direct relations.373 
 
Thus farm sizes increased because tenants wanted them to in order to increase their own profits 
but at the same time others were prepared to take on small farms and farms were both 
increased in size and broken down, increasing the size of some farms and creating other small 
farms. 
 
Supply and Demand for Leasing Land 
 
In their most basic sense, rent levels were directly governed by the supply of and demand for 
land.  Where supply outweighed demand rents would fall in order to attract tenants and / or to 
convince those on the land to take on larger holdings.  Whereas, where demand outweighed 
supply rents could rise as tenants would be prepared to pay more.  Where more lands were 
brought into cultivation this was usually to take advantage of high demand for land.  
Essentially, where demand for land rose (such as periods of high prices) landlords would be 
able to ask for higher rents and it was these periods when further land was brought into 
cultivation as there was sufficient demand to take on the extra supply.  Rents were governed on 
the most basic level by supply and demand.  A landlord would supply land to fulfil tenant 
demand - the supply of land varied year on year, particularly in periods of high enclosure 
levels, as lands were brought into cultivation from woodlands or wastes or were taken out for 
parks, gardens or the plantation of trees.374  However, using the supply of land to actively 
govern prices was a more difficult practice and one which would overall be detrimental to 
landlord’s profits as limiting their land supply may drive up prices but would also drive up 
profits for other local landlords who had more land to supply.  
 
That is not to say that the supply of land remained constant throughout the nineteenth century, 
quite the contrary in fact.  When prices were high extra lands would be brought into cultivation, 
as there was money available for improvements which were more viable (i.e. likely to be 
profitable) such as drainage or bringing woodland into cultivation.  Enclosure and the 
encroachment of commons, Neeson and others have noted, also enabled landlords to bring 
more land into cultivation as farmland for rent.375  This extra land is generally considered to 
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coincide with the increase of farm sizes.  Not only is enclosure identified as bringing with it 
great farms at the expense of the small farmer, but, as discussed above, there is a strong 
argument amongst historians that farm sizes were increasing more consistently across the 
century and large farms were not merely a product of enclosure.  Indeed, H.G. Hunt also found 
that landlords increased the size of farms in a recession.  On the Kent estates of Lord Darnley of 
Cobham, Hunt found that in the recession following the French Wars farms were all increased 
slightly in size in order to maintain rents in a period of falling prices.376  Therefore, even though 
the amount of land under cultivation was increasing and it was becoming increasingly 
consolidated into fewer large estates there was still demand for land and this was an enabling 
factor in increasing farm sizes (or the creation of new farms) and one would expect this to both 
increase the overall rental income of an estate across the period but also to show a notable 
change in the spread of rents across the period as an increasing proportion of lands were 
encompassed in larger farms or at least farms increasing in size.  As a result, a net fall in the 
total income of an estate all else being equal was more likely indicative of a fall in agreed rents 
than of a fall in the amount of land in cultivation.  An increase in the total rent, on the other 
hand, may well have been the result of an increase of the amount of land under cultivation or 
let out to tenants on an estate. 
 
Demand for land, in turn, was governed by confidence in its profitability.  If a landlord set rents 
too high demand would fall and lands would be left in hand whilst if he set the rent too low he 
would get tenants but be losing out on the profits available to him whilst his tenants would 
make better profits for themselves.  Where produce prices were high and land productivity was 
good and one could speculate tenant profits would remain high or even increase, confidence in, 
and therefore demand for, the land would be high.  Where harvests had been bad, prices were 
depressed and there seemed little hope of short-term improvement, demand for land would 
fall.  Outside of confidence in the land demand was also affected by population levels.  Where 
the population was large or increasing there would be greater demand for land simply because 
there were more people whilst low population may mean there were not enough people to fill 
holdings.  Even though population levels were increasing across this period the growth of 
industry affected many regions as would-be tenants went to find work in industrial towns and 
cities.  However, Northamptonshire lacked any significant amount of industry, limiting the 
levels of migration as people would have to travel further to find work.  Coupled with the 
increase in population taking place across the period the result appears to have been that 
migration did not cause any significant drop in demand for land in the county.377 
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Demand for land is often calculated based on the idea that both landlords and farmers sought to 
maximise their own incomes.  Inevitably a farmer would be unlikely to take a farm if he did not 
feel he could profit from it, although there was some attraction in the status which landholding 
afforded.  As a result, it is often assumed that both landlords and tenants took land with the 
intention of maximising their own incomes.  Turner et al, however, identified two problems 
with this assumption.  Firstly, there has been an assumption that tenants calculated their likely 
profits before accepting a lease and secondly that if a landlord set the rent at a level too high 
once costs of capital and labour had been accounted for a tenant would simply move to a 
holding where the landlord was offering better terms.  However, they pointed out that the 
calculations were not only significant in themselves but relied on unknowns (such as prices and 
the size of the harvest) and so could not be carried out.  This, they argued, ignored the social 
factors affecting rent levels - the reliability of a tenant or his family as well as his local standing 
could help to secure him a lower rent than that the market dictated he should pay.378  In terms of 
the former, even though it is unlikely tenants calculated their predicted income from a holding 
before taking on a lease it is evident that they did lose confidence in the profitability of land 
where prices were low and were more willing to agree higher rents where prices were high in 
the current year.  As well as the evidence of the national rental index, Hunt found in his study 
of leases signed that following the French Wars and the fall in prices which began in 1812, on 
Lord Darnley’s Kent estate “after 1814 it was exceptional for a rent to be increased at the expiry 
of a lease” whilst in times of high profits tenants had been willing to sign leases on the 
assumption that profits would remain high.379 
 
However, economically speaking, there is still a great deal to be said for demand for land 
dictating rent levels and this is evident in the Northamptonshire correspondence.  Rising yields 
and rising population increased demand meaning that rents increased considerably, in spite of 
any social bargaining factors tenants and potential tenants may have had.  In North 
Buckinghamshire, for example, John Broad found that from the 1770s inflation and population 
increase were accompanied by not only rent increases but also by a change in farming to what 
were perceived to be more profitable types of farming.380   
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At other times, when demand for land was low, landlords had little choice but to abate rents 
and even then would not necessarily be able to fill holdings.  This type of situation has occurred 
throughout history at times of low population and severely depressed prices.  In the period 
covered by this study the two most notable instances of low tenant demand for land are the two 
most notable periods of low prices and economic slump in the agricultural market – the 1820s-
30s and the 1870s-80s.  In particular, F.M.L. Thompson noted the contrast in demand during 
and following the French Wars.  He found that in Norfolk, Shropshire, Wiltshire and the North 
Riding of Yorkshire in 1833 witnesses agreed ‘that it was scarcely possible to find a tenant 
willing to take a farm on lease, while ten to twenty years before they had been pressing to do 
so’.381  There was a similar situation in the 1870s when, Lord Ernle found, stewards across 
England complained of vacant lands and no eligible tenants to fill them.382  Indeed, Lord 
Overstone commented on the problems of increased arrears and lands in hand in 1880, 
problems he claimed the estate had never experienced until recent years.383 
 
Thus, supply and demand for land were the central factors governing rent levels.  Where 
demand rose rents could also rise but where demand fell rents would often have to fall, even if 
only temporarily.  Supply of land remained constant where demand was low as landlords 
would be unable to profit from bringing extra lands into cultivation.  However, as population 
increased and towns required greater quantities of agricultural goods further land was brought 
into cultivation as tenants could profit from it and thus demand was high enough to increase 
supply without a fall in rent levels.  Yet within this there was always room for negotiation and 
even in times of high demand good tenants would attempt to obtain leases at a lower rent, 
although they were not always successful. 
 
Leases 
 
As noted above, leases were a good indication of demand for land and depended on 
assumptions of the future market for produce.  Yet despite rents being heavily led by price 
levels and demand for land there was still a great deal of negotiation of leases.  Landowners 
would prefer reliable, capable tenants and thus would reduce the rent in order to get them but, 
at the same time, they sought to have tenants take on leases beneficial to maintaining the 
profitability of the estate.  Indeed, as far back as 1907 it was suggested that rent levels needed to 
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be examined in terms of the tenure lands were under as this affected their response to prices 
and other external variables.384 
 
One of the reasons rents in the nineteenth century appear to have been more responsive to 
prices than those of the eighteenth was a change in the type of leases used on landed estates.  A 
move to shorter leases enabled rents to change more quickly to respond to a changing market 
whilst longer leases could be used to maintain tenants on the land in times of low prices.  
Therefore, demand for land was, in turn, affected by both flexibility in land holding and tenants 
being held into contracts.  Turner et al identified the Napoleonic Wars in particular instigating a 
move away from long leases – usually up to 21 years – to tenancies ‘at will’.  This was because 
demand for land was high and tenants were more willing to take on land and would 
compromise on shorter leases in order to do so.  Tenancies at will meant that tenants could give 
notice to quit the land but also that landlords were more able to change rents in order to 
maximise their own profits.  Under tenancies at will and at enclosure landlords were able to 
cream off a greater proportion of the farm profits.385  R.C Allen argued that the move to 
tenancies at will was complete by the end of the eighteenth century.  On the Grafton estate in 
Northamptonshire, for example, he found that the move to tenancies at will “had been 
accomplished by 1757”.386   
 
Others have identified the change in tenancies as a part of a more complex form of estate 
management.  In his study of rents and leases on Lord Darnley’s Kent estates, Hunt found that 
there was a notable move from longer leases to tenancies at will between 1795 and 1812 which 
enabled Darnley to change rent levels more frequently and to “tap more quickly into increases 
in his tenants’ incomes due to rising prices”.  Hunt, however, argued that there was not a 
complete move to tenancies at will in the early-nineteenth century but that different types of 
tenancy were used by Darnley in order to best manage his estates.  Leases for a number of years 
were granted even in the early years of the nineteenth century but these were based on an 
assumption that prices would continue to rise, such as a 12-year tenancy for Green’s Farm 
signed in 1803.  As shall be seen in chapter 5, it was where leases ran for a number of years that 
abatements of rent were most often required in years of depression.  However, it must also be 
noted that after 1824, when prices began to recover, Hunt found that Darnley’s estate began to 
revert once more to longer leases, to tie tenants to the land and secure rents for more significant 
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periods now tenants were willing and able to commit to longer leases again.387  This method of 
estate management using leases was also commented on by J.V. Beckett in his 1989 article on 
estate management, where he noted that long leases were employed by landlords to safeguard 
their lands against damage and to maintain levels of profitability whilst shorter leases gave 
landlords greater control of rents.  Even if Beckett did view there being a move from long leases 
and security in the eighteenth century to short leases and greater risk (but also greater profit) in 
the nineteenth, the importance of leases in estate management is still apparent.388 
 
The move to shorter leases (often year-on-year) has been viewed as a negative move for tenants 
by some.  Allen identified the move away from leases for a number of lives enabled landlords to 
replace tenants with those more desirable (usually those with more money to invest in farming 
or simply those able and willing to take on larger farms) and saw this as resulting in the loss of 
the yeoman in English agriculture even in the eighteenth century and regardless of whether or 
not lands were enclosed or still under open field agriculture.389  Added to this, on the Montagu 
estate, the accounts for the nineteenth century list all holdings as ‘year to year’.  However, the 
estate employed rent abatements rather than reducing rent levels proper throughout the post-
French Wars recession and there was a commencement date for each piece of land a tenant took 
on listed in every account.  One explanation for this is that tenants renegotiated rents as 
required (year-on-year) but were assumed to be long-term occupiers of their farms.  Fitting with 
this assumption, Turner et al found that along with tenancies at will tenants had tenant right.  
This meant that if a tenant invested in the soil but for some reason his tenancy was not renewed 
when it ran out he would be compensated for ‘the unrewarded proportion of their investment’.  
Thus investment (which would again improve landlords’ profits) was still encouraged.390  
Added to this, Cragoe found that in Carmarthenshire short leases were the will of the tenants, 
not simply a measure to increase landlord profits.  As well as tenant right, he found that tenants 
viewed shorter leases as protection from high rents if their own incomes fell but still had a 
certain security of tenure and protection for any investment they made in the land, although 
Cragoe pointed out that Carmarthenshire agriculture was, in the main, poor and so little tended 
to be invested in the land anyway.391 
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Social Factors Considered when Leasing Land 
 
E.P. Thompson saw a transition by the early-eighteenth century from the traditional paternal 
economy - in which landlords took care of their tenants and tenancies were held for lifetimes 
and inherited through families for generations - to a new market economy model in which 
lands were leased to the highest bidder as dictated by market levels and the forces of capitalism.  
Thompson described this new market as based on a belief that 
 
The natural operation of supply and demand in the free market would maximise the 
satisfaction of all parties and establish the common good.  The Market was never 
better regulated than when it was left to regulate itself. 
 
As such the market should, theoretically, be free of interference from individuals and the state 
in order to provide balance to the common weal.392  The theory of the free market and rents has 
often been accredited to the work of Adam Smith.  Turner et al noted that Smith expected 
population growth to increase demand which would in turn create rising prices and increased 
agricultural output (by investment).  He predicted that increased profits resulting from this 
would first be enjoyed by the farmer but would soon be creamed off by the landowner.  As a 
result rent would equal ‘the highest which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual 
circumstances of the land’.393 
 
However, whether a tenant was considered a good tenant was also a factor in rent negotiation 
even in the nineteenth century. It was considered usual for tenants to attempt to negotiate lower 
rents and even where demand was high a good tenant may have been able to negotiate a lower 
rent than the one asked as they were trusted to pay their rent in full and maintain the land as 
well as manage a farm.  According to J.V. Beckett: 
  
William Marshall maintained that the qualities of a good tenant were capital, skill, 
industry, and character, and finding tenants with all these attributes, together with a 
tolerable political outlook was sufficiently difficult to ensure that landowners did 
not easily turn away qualified men.”394 
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Thus the social side of rent negotiations was, on one level, driven by demand for land and the 
need to keep lands fully tenanted.  As a result, known reliable or ‘good’ tenants would often be 
able to negotiate lower rent levels even where demand for land was high because a landlord 
would rather have a reliable tenant who would pay the rent in full, maintain the productivity of 
the soil and be able to manage the farm successfully.  Yet reliability or being a good tenant 
would not necessarily guarantee the tenant was granted the lease at all.  As shall be seen, where 
demand was high enough a landlord would be able to choose his tenant.   
 
Need for Tenants 
 
In his study of agrarian capitalism and its effects on rural English society, Kerridge argued that 
landlords needed tenants as much as the tenants needed them and therefore landlords would 
not price tenants out of their holdings or evict them without good reason.395  This is evident in 
Northamptonshire, as shown in chapter 2 where approaches to estate management are 
discussed, but can also be traced with regard to rent levels.  H.J. Habakkuk suggested that in 
Northamptonshire in the late-seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century a large 
number of small owner-occupiers sold their lands, making the need for tenants greater as more 
lands were amalgamated into large estates and leased out.  As a result, he argued, a market 
arose in ‘good tenants’ and landowners would negotiate rents and improve lands in order to 
convince good tenants to take up holdings on their estates.396   
 
Johnstone observed that in lowland Scotland and England landlords were tempted to maximise 
their rents but were aware this would have led to a loss of tenants and ‘an outcome in no one’s 
economic interest’.397  However, as Andrew Mackillop pointed out, 
 
Ironically, the landlords’ effort to retain tenantry took place against the backdrop  
of their own determined and extremely successful strategy of rent increase.398 
 
Even though both were discussing Scotland, the strategies described by both Mackillop and 
Johnstone can be identified in Northamptonshire.  Despite differences in management and how 
rents were set, there was an overarching aim to profit from estates, whether this was by 
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charging high market rents or negotiating levels in order to maintain tenants, to obtain a better 
guarantee of receiving the monies owed by the tenants, or having the land kept well and 
farmed successfully.   
 
Indeed, if one begins with the assumption that landlords sought to maximise rental income, 
which is a safe assumption as one of the primary reasons for owning land was, after all, to profit 
from it, then the importance of tenants is apparent in that they were the ones supplying the 
rental income and therefore were needed in order to maximise estate profits.  Holdings left 
empty provided no profit and could even be a loss to the estate but rents set too low would also 
limit profits.  The result was a need to negotiate rents in order to keep lands profitable and 
prevent them being a cost to the estate but also to ensure there was a fair income coming into 
the estate from a holding and the tenant would pay the monies owed.  Turner et al 
acknowledged this as one of the basic principles of rents.  They found that small tenants on 
beneficial leasing arrangements survived in some areas into the twentieth century and 
commented on 
 
the extent to which rent was a matter of negotiation, on an individual basis, between 
tenant and landlord (or agent).  Whatever Adam Smith and the classical economists 
may have argued, bargains were struck according to perceived economic conditions 
and almost in defiance of any clear notions of accountancy.399 
 
Once again they emphasised the importance of tenants to the landowners and estates and the 
importance of negotiation in order to both fill holdings and get reliable tenants.  The importance 
of good tenants also comes to the fore, with reliable tenants who would pay their rents being 
favoured over those unknown to the landlord. 
 
However, there were other ways to profit from landowning and by the late-nineteenth century 
these had become apparent in some parts of England.  English found that in 1861 it was 
suggested that Yorkshire landlords frequently made more money from timber sales than from 
leasing the land.  Home farms could prove profitable too.  English also ascertained that on the 
Sledmere estate in the late-nineteenth century the home farm existed primarily to provide 
goods for the estate and its owners but most years it still made a small profit.400  In 
Northamptonshire Lord Overstone wrote on several occasions around the same time regarding 
both the extensive timber sales and the home farm profits on his Overston estate.  However, the 
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home farm at Overston undertook considerable sales of animal produce in this period and 
appears to have had more of a profit motive than that English identified at Sledmere.401  Yet 
throughout this period in Northamptonshire rental income was still used as the primary way of 
profiting from the land. 
 
Cost of Replacing Tenants  
 
Even with flexibility in rents provided by flexible leases and changing lease types depending on 
the economy, landlords wanted secure tenure almost as much as tenants.  If a tenant left the 
land and there was no one to take on the holding immediately it would have to be maintained 
by the estate and a new tenant would have to be actively sought.402  An estate may even have to 
pay to advertise land to let.  All of these factors would be exacerbated where a large number of 
tenants left the land at once.  Both James Langham in the 1820s and Lord Overstone in 1880 
voiced concerns about land falling into hand. Indeed, the latter wrote to his friend C. Wood 
 
I have recently opened two new Columns in my Rent Book. Vis:- Arrears of rent – 
and Capital Advanced on Farming in Hand 
 
and complained the costs of running his estate were increasing.  This was in response to Wood’s 
concern that on his Northumberland estate he had 5 farms in hand, 3 more given notice to quit 
and a further 5 or 6 had only agreed to stay with heavy rent reductions.403  
 
How Rent Levels Were Calculated 
 
Turner et al based their study on the Ricardian school of thought – the economic theory of 
David Ricardo (1772-1823) and his followers – which was that rents represented (and therefore 
should equal) what was left over after wages for labour and the farmer’s capital costs and 
profits had been deducted.  However, the remaining money (Ricardian surplus) varied 
depending on the productivity of the farm and many tenants had further outgoings, paying 
taxes on top of rent, or negotiated rents more favourable than they should have had to enable 
the operation of the model.  Thus the Ricardian model provides an important insight into how 
rents were negotiated and worked in theory whilst also demonstrating the social factors in their 
negotiation - farmers’ profits and labourers' wages were both open to negotiation.  As a result, 
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although his model is not noted in the Northamptonshire evidence, one can see its operation in 
not only rent levels but also negotiations, a point which was also noted by Turner et al in their 
national sample.404   
 
Furthermore, Donald Ginter, amongst others, found that land values changed ‘quite 
dramatically and in highly varying degrees’ across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.405  
Thus charging the full difference between costs and profits on a farm would not only require 
knowledge of the productivity and costs of each individual farm year-on-year but also the price 
of produce.  In other words, charging rent equivalent to the full Ricardian surplus would 
require annual valuations of the land to keep up with changing land values which would have 
been costly and impractical and would have negated the value of social factors affecting rents 
and in practice lands were not valued regularly.406  Indeed, F.M.L. Thompson noted that rent 
levels were ‘not sensitive to year-to-year fluctuations in the prosperity or adversity of 
farmers’.407  But the overall trends in rent levels provide a great deal of information on landed 
estate management and tenurial relations.   
 
In practice, rent levels were calculated based on demand for land and prices for produce as well 
as the farmer’s cost and profits, as shown above, but were also based on land values and land 
valuations were rare.  Cragoe noted that in order to calculate rents accurately an accurate land 
valuation (productivity, farming type and demand for land) could provide an accurate market 
value for the land and the rent a landlord should expect to get for it.  However, land valuations 
were costly, time-consuming and as a result rarely carried out.  Where rents were adjusted to 
the value of land they were usually reasonably consistent but estates were revalued 
infrequently, meaning the valuation and associated rent levels may well have remained the 
same for over a generation.  For example, the Tyllwyd estate near Newcastle Emlyn was 
revalued in 1874, leading to rent increases of 2-5 per cent on those based on the 1818 evaluation 
and, Cragoe found, a great deal of money had been ploughed into buildings and other 
improvements on the estate.408  Mingay also noted that Sir Jacob Bouverie, on his Kent estate, 
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sought to raise rents in the early-eighteenth century because land values had increased.409  In 
Kent in the early-nineteenth century too, stewards were seeking to ensure rents kept up with 
the market, with Lord Darnely’s steward increasing rents on the expiration of leases to ensure 
rents were maintained at an economic level.410   Furthermore, J.R Wordie calculated that an 
average rent doubled at enclosure but he rejected the idea that this was because the value and 
output of the land had also doubled.  Here, he argued, land values had not increased and 
higher rents simply represented ‘a simple transfer of income from pocket of the tenant to the 
pocket of the landlord’.411 
 
Cragoe also argued that in Wales there is no evidence of land ‘being let to the highest bidder’.412  
In Northamptonshire there is some evidence of landlords trying to maximise their rental income 
but at the same time tenants were expected to negotiate rents and therefore levels for reliable 
tenants, known to the landlord were often lower than the maximum market rent.  In March 
1705, however, Lord Fitzwilliam chose his tenant on the basis of good reputation rather than on 
the basis of the rent they were prepared to pay.  Despite competition for a holding he, 
eventually, offered an abated rent to his preferred tenant – Widow Thompson – commenting 
that she ‘is so good a tenant I will reduce the rent 40s a year for her, but for nobody else’.413  The 
differences in rent increases for new tenants coming into the land in the nineteenth century 
accounts indicate that this practice was also undertaken on the Montagu and Overston estates.  
For example, Joseph Keep’s land at hanging Houghton on the Montagu estate had the rent 
reduced from £280 to £200 in 1814, despite rents elsewhere being increased Charles Lucas being 
described as insolvent and John Stevens being helped to pay his rent by “two respectable 
persons” who had agreed to be sureties for his rent.414  Therefore even though some landlords 
were willing to let lands to the highest bidder, there were significant non-monetary factors 
affecting to whom land was let which could result in agreements of a rent below the maximum 
available level.   
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Landlords required tenants not only for a rental income but also to maintain the land.  Were a 
holding left empty the estate would have to maintain it in a fit condition for a new tenant to 
farm, would be losing the rental income and may even be reduced to farming the land 
themselves, making them susceptible to changes in the market and liable for labour costs.  Were 
a landlord of significant wealth he may well be able to leave a small number of holdings empty 
until a tenant was found willing to pay the rent he asked but in the main landlords wanted to 
keep lands tenanted in order for them to bring in profit to the estate rather than form a costly 
burden.  Tenants, on the other hand, could gain clear advantages in terms of profits, financial 
security and social status but were not wholly reliant on the land.  That is to say were a tenant 
being asked for a higher rent than he felt he could comfortably profit from he could refuse the 
lease or quit the land whilst a landlord usually relied on his tenants for his income.  Quittals 
were not common but tenants may well leave the land or give notice to quit unless rents were 
reduced in times of prolonged recession.  Landlords were also usually men of great wealth and 
even though they required tenants for their income would be prepared to make concessions in 
order to get a good tenant or refuse the ‘highest bidder’ as it were if they feared their reliability.  
As a result the rent agreed for a holding would often be lower than what the landlord had 
initially asked and if the economic climate changed whilst the tenant was on the land rents may 
even be reduced further. 
 
The final factor in how rent levels would be calculated was who would pay the taxes.  Paying 
taxes on top of rents would eat into a tenant’s profits and could lead to real problems in times of 
low prices.  Landlords on the other hand would begrudge paying taxes which were rightfully 
their tenants’ to pay and would eat into estate profits which, if applied across the entire estate, 
would be a significant amount of money.  Within the Northamptonshire evidence it is quite 
clear that rents involved negotiation of taxes and both parties begrudging being liable for them.  
Landlords seemingly begrudged the burden of tax falling into their hands though, despite 
tenants negotiating away their liability.  In 1799 James Langham had found himself liable for 
the majority of his tenants’ tax burden and wrote ‘in my opinion no great hardship would arise 
by their being made to discharge it’.415  
 
Therefore overall rents were calculated based on land values and the potential profits of tenants 
which established the market value based on supply and demand.  Added to this there were 
social factors such as the reliability of the tenant to pay the rent, his ability to successfully farm 
the land and the social situation and status of the tenant.  Furthermore, tenants would not only 
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try to negotiate lower rents but may well seek to shift their tax burden to their landlord in order 
to decrease their outgoings. 
 
Who Set Rent Levels 
 
As already shown rent levels were set based on estate valuation of the land and presumption of 
its productivity but were agreed by negotiation with the prospective tenant until a level was 
agreed.  But setting the levels and changing them for a particular tenant was a role of the estate, 
being in part a duty of the steward who had the most in-depth knowledge of the estate and a 
part that of the landlord, whose profit levels would be directly affected by the level agreed, as 
well as the influence of the tenants themselves. 
 
  Role of Stewards 
 
Stewards were the ones who actually collected rents and compiled the accounts.  As a result it 
was they who knew the reliability of a tenant or family to pay their rents on time.  Their 
presence on the estate also meant they were more aware than landowners (who were often 
absent) of the ability of a tenant to farm and manage a holding successfully as well as the 
quality and value of the land.  However, what is apparent in the Northamptonshire evidence, 
and supported by other localities, is that when it came to rents stewards could advise and 
enforce levels but it was the landlord who set rents.  Outside of Northamptonshire, L.J. Bellot 
observed that Earl Temple was often absent from his estates in Somerset and Dorset but gave 
his steward a great deal of instruction on various matter of the estate.  What is most noteworthy 
here is that Earl Temple, Bellot noted, ‘was especially critical of the steward’s failure to rent 
lands at the rate he expected’, demonstrating how Earl Temple set the rents but his stewards 
were expected to find tenants willing to pay them.416 
 
Within Northamptonshire stewards also had a limited role in the setting of rents but were 
expected to find tenants willing to pay the rent the landlord was asking.  However, landlords 
(especially absentee landlords) did not just set rent levels blindly.  If a landlord had not seen the 
land of late he would generally ask the opinion and get the guidance of the steward as to its 
rental value.   
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Role of Landlords  
 
Whilst stewards had the role of advising on rent levels, landlords decided and set the levels of 
rent for their lands.  Landlords were interested in profiting from their lands and ensuring they 
were not losing out dramatically on its value.  C.G.A. Clay commented that 
 
the extent to which owners showed sympathy for tenants under pressure, their 
willingness to evict, and the degree of help they were prepared (or indeed able) to 
provide naturally varied from estate to estate.  So did their attitude towards the 
raising of rents, at times and in places where economic circumstances made this a 
feasible proposition, and the extent of their willingness to push through schemes of 
enclosure or farm reorganization whose implementation adversely affected the well-
being of some of their tenants. To a degree the varying attitudes of landlords 
reflected differences in their socio-economic status and the nature of their estates.417 
 
Clay noted that landowners would usually have a large enough margin between ‘unavoidable 
outgoings’ and rental income to enable them to weather a recession, although during a 
prolonged recession this may well not have been the case.418  However, this emphasizes the 
importance of the ability of landlords in setting rents.  Where a landlord was struggling with a 
depressed income, debts and unavoidable outgoings he would be less likely to reduce a rent in 
order to get a better quality tenant but might be more likely to reduce the rent in order to get a 
tenant sooner and not have lands in hand.  In Northamptonshire Spring found that the 
Fitzwilliam family was amongst those heavily indebted in the mid-nineteenth century, whilst 
the Ishams relied on their rental income to form the majority of their income.419  The Loyd 
family on the other hand were bankers by trade and so until late in Lord Overstone’s career had 
a significant income from business as well as the estates.  An income based primarily on rents 
would mean that a landlord would lose more if rents fell whilst an external income could, if 
necessary, be used to prop up the landed one. 
 
Furthermore, the size of an estate would also affect a landlord’s decisions in setting rent levels.  
A small estate would be less affected by falling rents in terms of actual income but would also 
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be bringing in a lower total income than its larger counterpart even without the fall.  Thus a 
large estate would often in itself be able to weather a recession without external money than a 
small one but a wealthy landlord may have more significant fixed outgoings than his more 
modest counterpart, somewhat complicating the issue.  Both Habakkuk and Howell 
commented on the difference in rents on the estates of large and smaller landlords.  Howell 
argued that landlords did not charge overly competitive rents and that large estates in 
particular did not exploit high demand for land in the nineteenth century.  What they tended to 
do was to pass farms on to relatives of the previous tenants.420  Habakkuk, on the other hand, 
found that the opposite was true when it came to smaller gentry landlords.  He claimed that in 
Northamptonshire during the Napoleonic Wars smaller landlords increased their rents as much 
as possible but this only resulted in their tenants moving onto the estates of larger landlords.421   
 
Therefore a landlord’s decision in setting rent levels was not based purely on the land market 
but also on his personal situation and the reliability of individual tenants plus the personality 
and management type of the landlord.   
 
Role of Tenants 
 
Despite belief and suggestion that landlords raised rents to the maximum they possibly could, 
driving out the smaller and poorer tenantry in favour of wealthier, more capitalistic tenants, 
there is a great deal of evidence that rents were negotiated and tenants seldom paid the full 
asking price for a holding across England and Wales and indeed the Northamptonshire 
evidence supports this.  Cragoe observed that in Wales in the 1860s many landowners ‘were 
keen to point out’ that the rents they charged were far below the levels they could have been.422  
And negotiations of rent levels were a common if not normal feature of English rural life too. 
 
Turner et al found that eighteenth and nineteenth-century agricultural experts condemned the 
granting of rents below the market level.  They argued that low rents meant farmers could 
profit comfortably with less exertion and would therefore do less work.  Those paying over the 
economic level of rent on the other hand were equally bad for the economy, tending to over 
crop the land in order to meet their rents and living costs and abandoning the farm with 
exhausted soil.423  Criticisms of this system of leasing land for below the market rent were in 
                                                          
420
 Howell, Land and People, p.81. 
 
421
 Habakkuk, ‘English Landownership’, p.12. 
 
422
 Cragoe, Anglican Aristocracy, p.52. 
 
423
 Turner et al, Agricultural Rent, p.17. 
135 
 
some cases justified.  Cragoe discussed how in the late-nineteenth century Broderick was critical 
of landlords in Wales for their accepting lower rents from tenants who could not afford the full 
market rent.  He argued that landlords were willing to do so as these tenants would let them 
hunt across their lands and if they went bankrupt the landlord had the security of ‘first claim on 
the residual estate’.  However, Cragoe pointed out that this criticism assumed that tenants of 
greater means were available to take holdings which, in Carmarthenshire, was not the case as 
the majority of tenants sought land for social not economic reasons and emphasis lay on self-
sufficiency.  Welsh agriculture compared unfavourably to English as it was comparatively 
unproductive and undercapitalized.424  However, in practice few rents appear to have been set 
at the market level, the majority falling below it although some tenants paid more than the 
going rate for their holdings. 
 
Indeed landlords actually expected tenants to negotiate before taking on leases and even set 
rents accordingly.  In March 1823, for example, William Pearce wrote to James Langham that he 
had been offered 40s per acre for a vacant holding but had asked 45s and was holding out for 
42s an acre.425  In practice, Turner et al found that few landlords charged rents equivalent to the 
full ability of their tenants to pay because they either wanted or needed to maintain good 
relations with their tenants.426  This, of course, went hand in hand with desiring good, reliable 
tenants who would pay the rent due and on time, for whom rents were often reduced below the 
levels asked of those unknown to the estate.  Furthermore, where tenants acted en masse - such 
as in 1830 when 17 of James Langham’s tenants signed a letter requesting better payments to the 
poor or help in providing employment to them as they feared an uprising,427 - landlords were 
often unable to deny them their requests as losing good relations with their tenants could result 
in mass-quittals and the loss of a great deal of income to the estate.  Therefore it was in a 
landlord’s interests not only to keep tenants on side as individuals in order to keep his lands 
tenanted but also to adhere to reasonable requests they made as a collective in order to retain as 
many as possible on his lands, even if this was for a slightly lower income per tenant than he 
could have had.   
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Labourers too were important.  Hunt noted that wages of labourers were closely linked to the 
“fortunes of farming” and therefore responded to changes in a similar manner to rent levels.428  
For example, even in 1911 the Hammonds had observed that when labourers demanded higher 
wages tenant farmers would tell them they could not afford to pay more unless their rents were 
reduced, as was reported in The Times in 1830, which turned labourers’ attentions to objecting 
against rent and tithe levels, particularly tithes.429  Indeed in Northamptonshire in 1830 James 
Langham reduced rents for his tenants on the condition that they increased their labourers’ 
wages ‘according to some determined scale’.  In fact rents would only be reduced as long as 
wages had been increased and by a corresponding amount.430 
 
Even though rents were negotiated on an individual basis there is also evidence of tenants 
working as a group in order to achieve a particular result.  The Montagu accounts, for example, 
appear to show a number of tenants exchanging lands between themselves and joint tenancies.  
In 1811, for example, John Brett of Brigstock held lands worth £100 a year but in the 1821 
account he held lands worth only £65 whilst Thomas Brett (who was absent from the previous 
account) held lands worth £22 per year.431   
 
Yet how far this negotiation was based upon calculations of profitability on the part of the 
farmers is questionable.  As already noted, Turner et al commented that few tenants had 
sufficient wealth and education to undertake accountancy calculations to ascertain the 
profitability of the land. However, they also argued that tenants often ‘had their own ideas’ 
how rents should be calculated and the levels at which they should be set.432  What tenants were 
aware of, and used to their advantage, was that landlords favoured those reputed to be reliable 
and would lease them lands at a lower rent and that they could negotiate before agreeing to a 
lease.  Furthermore, once a tenant was on the land the cost of replacing him may well be more 
than granting him an abatement on his rent and many tenants already on the land appear to 
have exploited this too.  Of course when tenants were coming into the land landlords would 
want to ensure they had good, reliable tenantry but this came at a cost.  Even after the initial 
bargaining of rents below the market level good tenants would still expect favourable 
treatment.  Roebuck found that Sir Marmaduke Constable of Everingham, in the early 
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eighteenth century, was reassured that the good tenants holding land on his estate would be 
offered lands when they became vacant before they were offered to others.433  Indeed Mingay 
noted the qualities landlords and estate managers sought in good tenants, the primary one of 
which was reliability.  A reliable tenant was considered one who was reliable in paying his rent 
(and on time), of good character and had sufficient ability in husbandry.434 
 
In the main tenants were more able to negotiate lower rents in times of low prices but often one 
must assume they usually required lower rents as they were themselves making less money and 
still had their living costs to cover.  Habakkuk pointed out that following the French Wars 
tenants were in a stronger position than they had been before and were able to prevent 
landlords increasing rents or making them liable for the land tax, many were even able to 
negotiate the renewal of their tenancies so they were no longer liable for tithes.435   
 
However, English’s study of the Sledmere Estate in East Yorkshire showed the limits of tenurial 
power of negotiation.  In July 1876, when prices were falling and agriculture was sinking into 
deep depression, Sir Tatton Sykes II actually increased rents on his estates, much to the dismay 
of his struggling tenants.  Even Sir Tatton’s brother condemned his actions in the local 
newspaper, writing that they would destroy confidence between landlord and tenants.  
However, tenants had annual tenancies and, following an unsuccessful petition, many accepted 
the new, higher rents hoping, as English suggested, that prices would rise or Tatton would 
change his mind before the rises came into effect.  In this case even with petitions and outside 
condemnation tenants remained subject to the landlord’s rent increases despite falling prices 
and even with the option of quitting the land many chose to stay.  However, in 1879 thirty-nine 
tenants quit the land and many were not re-let for a significant time, despite offers of lower 
rents (reduced by up to 25%).436   
 
Therefore power in negotiating rents worked both ways.  When a tenant was considered 
reliable he could often negotiate a lower rate than that at which the land was offered but when 
rents were increased across an estate many tenants objected but it took 3 years before there were 
significant quittals.  Furthermore, landlords could use rent levels in order to select tenants, 
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lowering the rent for a particular tenant only or raising the rent on renewal of tenancy to 
encourage a tenant to leave the land.  Outside the period of this study, in 1706, Lord Fitzwilliam 
provided a good example of this when he refused to lower the rent of Benjamin Burton as he 
and his two sons were reputed to be drinkers and he hoped they would leave the land as a 
result of the rent being kept high.437  
 
Thus rents were a construct of landlords’ expectations, stewards’ knowledge of the value of 
land and ability of a farmer and the tenants’ ability to negotiate the rent.  However, these factors 
were not in isolation, all being subject to produce prices and changing supply of and demand 
for land and, as shown above, both tenants and landlords were primarily interested in their 
own profits.   
 
Rent Collection 
 
The most important factor in the rental economy was probably rent collection.  Whatever level 
the rent had been agreed at it made no difference if it wasn’t paid.  Chapter 5 will show that 
rents were not always paid in full and arrears and abatements were integral parts of the rural 
economy but here the primary focus is on how rents were collected and the role of stewards and 
landlords in their collection as well as the duties of a tenant in paying them. 
 
English summarised the role of stewards with regard to rents thus: 
 
It was the agent’s duty to collect the rents and to advise his landowner about rent 
rises or rebates, about delay in payment or selling up a tenant.  It was customary for 
most of the nineteenth century for tenant farmers to pay the rents personally, at the 
great house or estate office, at twice-yearly rent days, related to (but not exactly at) 
Lady Day and Michaelmas.438 
 
Evidence of rent collection for the estates of this study is limited, with only two estates 
providing any evidence at all and these falling around a hundred years apart.  On the Langham 
estate William Pearce would arrange a convenient day for collection with both the tenants and 
James Langham himself which fell around the appointed rent day (Lady Day or Michaelmas).  
Any monies not paid on collection day would then be collected from tenants and chased 
throughout the year.  This is also evident to some extent in the Montagu accounts, where 
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arrears outstanding in one account book may have been paid off by the compilation of the next.  
For example, Thomas Pack of Geddington was £86.0.0 in arrears at the making up of the 
account in April 1823 but had just £16.0.0 outstanding by the April 1824 account.439 
 
Landlords also played a part in collecting rents.  James Langham appears to have ensured they 
were present at rent collection whilst the Lords Montagu did not but still showed great interest 
in the income of their estates, Walter Montagu analysed his own accounts (as did his 
predecessor Elizabeth) and those still extant often contain notations questioning the actions of 
his agent Philip Pain and comparing these accounts to the last.   
 
Of the estates of this study only Lord Overstone appears to have been as remote from his estate 
as it is often suggested that landlords in general were and this was not from ignorance or lack of 
knowledge as he had run the estate for his father and been much more involved in the day to 
day running of things.  When Overstone came into his inheritance he was 60 years old and had 
made his money from banking, as well as having been granted a peerage in 1850 and thus he 
was interested in the estate but not in managing it himself, preferring to leave that to others.  
Having said that, one can assume that Overstone would still have looked over the accounts and 
he showed enthusiasm and an informed interest in how the estate was run, although he left the 
majority of the actual work to Beasley, his steward.  Therefore collections were undertaken by 
the steward on set days, theoretically Michaelmas and Lady Day but in practice days which 
suited both steward and tenants (and often landlord too).  Twice yearly rents may well have 
been collected annually with the agreement of all parties involved too.  Landlords, whether they 
were present at rent collection or not, would check the annual accounts to check not only that 
rents were being paid but that arrears were being paid off and stewards were not defrauding 
the estate.  Where rents were unpaid or only partially paid and arrears were accruing landlords 
would take the appropriate action, whether this be to chase or evict the tenant or to look at 
abating rents.  This will be dealt with in chapter 5. 
 
Thus both landlords and stewards were usually involved in rent collection and tenants were 
given a set date to pay the monies owed.  If a tenant did not pay his rent action may be taken 
against him but, as chapter 5 will show, there were exceptions to this.  It is also evident that the 
majority if not all tenants turned up on rent collection day even if only to pay a token sum or 
explain why they could not pay their rent. 
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Conclusion 
 
Therefore rent levels depended upon a number of factors, not in the least prevailing prices for 
agricultural produce, population levels and demand for land, all of which are factors discussed 
by the landlords themselves in their correspondence.  The personality of landlords and 
individual tenants also affected rent levels and as a result rents varied considerably from 
holding to holding, whether it be for the holding overall or per acre. What was theoretically an 
economic sum calculated based on land values and the prevailing market price was, in practice, 
a social calculation based upon the reliability of tenants, personality of individual landlords and 
individual negotiating skills within the prevailing market. 
 
The predominant trend for rents across the period was an increase, as demand for agricultural 
produce increased.  Even where rents fell temporarily the levels at the end of the period were 
considerably higher than those at the beginning.  The most notable changes in rent levels were 
the peaks of the early-nineteenth century and the 1870s and the troughs which followed.  But 
unlike the recession of the 1820s where rents fell but recovered and several short recessions 
followed, the recession of the 1870s was prolonged and the severity led to landlords and landed 
estates struggling financially. 
 
In terms of the spread of rents, this study has found that changes in the spread of rents were not 
hugely significant as the economy changed.  Even though landlords may have increased farm 
sizes as prices fell to enable tenants to remain on the land, or rents may have remained stable as 
arrears and abatements were employed, the general spread of rents for both the Montagu and 
Overstone estates appear to have remained reasonably consistent, particularly following the 
French Wars, a time when one would have expected more significant changes in rent levels.  As 
has been shown, rent per acre did change significantly in this period in particular and therefore 
one must look to other explanations for the consistent spread of rent such as temporary 
abatements or tenants falling into arrears.  These will be examined in detail in chapter 5.  Where 
these measures were not an explanation of the consistency in the spread of rents it is perhaps 
indicative of other forces at work, such as rents initially being set below the market level or 
tenants having savings or other forms of income with which to pay monies due. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: The Payment of Rents and the Role of Temporary Abatements 
 
Introduction 
 
Arrears and abatements provided an integral function in rural landed society and estate 
management which is often overlooked by historians.  In times of fixed rents and a fluctuating 
economy the ability to temporarily lower rents or not to pay the full rent provided the landed 
estate with some flexibility, flexibility necessary for solvency in difficult times.  Even though 
changes could be made to the levels of rents due, abatements provided a temporary measure 
and were usually dependent on the price of produce directly.  Arrears, on the other hand, were 
often the tenant’s way of indicating he could no longer afford his rent if he were to feed his 
family.  High levels of arrears across an estate were usually taken as an indicator by landlords 
that rents were too high in the short-term and as a result abatements could be granted to ease 
some of the financial strain on the tenantry.  This chapter will demonstrate the varying use of 
both in Northamptonshire 1800-1881. 
 
However, one must exercise some caution in using arrears and abatements to signify the ability 
of tenants to pay rent at any one time.  A landlord may well have abated rents for individual 
tenants in order to fill holdings or ensure they did not fall empty; he may even have abated the 
rent for an elderly or infirm tenant to allow them to retain their home.  On the other hand, 
rather than abate rents a landlord may have allowed tenants to build up huge rent arrears and 
may even have written those arrears off.  Thus the levels of arrears and abatements were linked 
not only to the economy and one another but also to the management decisions and personality 
of the individual landlord.  Overall levels are, however, indicative of the estate response to 
changes in the economy. 
 
Arrears levels are further complicated by individual tenants.  Whilst wide-spread arrears 
indicate a problem with the farmers’ finances, individual arrears may indicate a lack of will or 
effort to pay.  Yet this in itself shows an aspect of estate management – how landlords dealt 
with struggling or lazy tenants.  It also shows that farmers often had greater priorities than 
paying their rents.  Indeed, Turner et al commented on the difference between expected and 
received rents thus: 
 
Setting the rent was one thing, paying it – from the farmer’s point of view – or 
extracting it – from the landlord’s – quite another. 
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Therefore arrears demonstrate the will of the tenant in paying his rent as well as his ability.  But 
primarily where the economy fell into depression rents agreed would be higher than rents paid 
and therefore provide another dimension to the rental analysis.440 
 
Arrears are most simply defined as monies outstanding after the collection of rents.  
Abatements, on the other hand, are simply the amount of money a rent was reduced by on a 
temporary basis when the economic situation was poor, intended to last only until prices 
improved.  A number of terms have been employed by historians to discuss abatements, 
including remissions of rent and rebates,441 but the generally accepted term in landlord 
correspondence was abatements.  Abatements could also be granted to tenants coming into the 
land or taking new holdings, intended to convince a tenant to take a lease in times of poor 
prices, but were still not permanent rent decreases.  Here we are concerned primarily with 
abatements granted to tenants already on the land, in often significant numbers, to help them to 
weather a recession and thus to help the estate survive and remain profitable beyond the 
recession.  Abatements were closely linked to rising arrears levels, but arrears could exist 
without abatements being granted.  Thus the two are interlinked but the concepts very separate. 
 
Importance of Arrears and Abatements to Historians 
 
Compared to rent levels and farm sizes little work has been done on arrears and even less on 
abatements.  Historians have concerned themselves with evictions of tenants, but generally as a 
part of a political study or as an effect of enclosure and not in regard to defaulting on rent 
payments.442  Perhaps this is because levels of arrears and abatements have been viewed as less 
a result of landlord control or enclosure and more an inevitable response to changes in the 
agricultural economy, although, as shall be seen, landlords did have a certain amount of control 
over arrears and set levels of abatements.   
 
The major scholarship on the subject of arrears and abatements is again Turner et al’s work on 
rents, although even their work on abatements is negligible.443  Further to this, H.G. Hunt in his 
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work on leases and David Stead in his work on risk management looked at abatements as a way 
of managing estates and estate income.444  Studies of Northamptonshire, in particular that of 
J.M. Neeson, focus primarily on the social history of the county and whilst great analysis has 
been undertaken of enclosure and common rights, virtually no attention has been paid to 
arrears or abatements.445  Yet both arrears and abatements were integral economic responses 
which helped to form social and economic structures and relations on the landed estate. 
 
Turner et al employed a number of statistical calculations in order to analyse rents, arrears and 
other factors affecting monies paid by tenants to their landlords and created a national arrears 
index for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  This provides an index to compare my 
Northamptonshire evidence to and a stable methodology which to apply to my data.  Outside 
of this there has been little interest in arrears or abatements from historians in more than a 
peripheral sense.  The general trends in the economy to which arrears will be shown to be 
related - the power of landlords, living standards of tenants and the role of stewards on landed 
estates have all been examined in a manner linked to arrears or relevant to a study of arrears 
but arrears have not been studied in their own right. 
 
Prior to Turner el al’s work in 1997 reference to arrears and abatements was quite rare.  English 
listed setting rent and abatement levels amongst the duties of the steward whilst both 
Chambers and John Davies acknowledged arrears and abatements as a part of wider economic 
change.446  Chambers included arrears figures in his analysis of the prosperity of the farmer.  For 
example, he observed that in the 1750s prices and rents rose at the same time as arrears and 
vacant farm numbers fell.  Thus arrears were one of the four factors which depict the prosperity 
of the farmer and levels were inversely proportionate to prices but Chambers provided no 
further analysis.447  Davies again acknowledged the relationship between arrears, abatements 
and rents operating in the wider economy.  In his study of the nineteenth century Davies 
summarised the major economic trends of the period: 
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The rapid increase in rent and arrears before 1815, the remissions of the early-1820s 
and the early-1830s, the development of the covenant, and the drive towards high 
farming in the 1840s and 1850s are the commonplaces of the history of nineteenth 
century agriculture.448 
 
Yet none of these provided any actual arrears or abatements figures. 
 
The importance of the relationship Chambers discussed between prices and arrears and the 
importance of arrears themselves was acknowledged by Turner et al in their arrears index: 
 
A trend of rent arrears may act like a thermometer to gauge the general health of 
agriculture, the ‘Feast and Famine’ within the agricultural sector.  In plotting the 
fluctuations in agricultural prosperity in this way, particularly the very short-run 
movements, an index of rent arrears provides vital information.  Indeed, it may 
even be more useful than an assessed rent series, because it points to the ability of 
tenants to pay.  Assessed rents point to the market value of rent in optimum 
agricultural conditions, but in a depression the tenants responded by failing to pay 
part of all of their rents.449 
 
But within this one must also acknowledge the context of arrears and build a more complete 
picture acknowledging abatement and rent levels too.  J.R. Wordie even commented that stable 
rent levels in themselves suggested not rising or stable prices but falling price levels.  If prices 
rose landlords would increase rents but when prices fell they were reluctant to reduce them.  
Therefore rents proper would remain stable as prices fell.450  While Chambers implied that rents 
rose as arrears fell, Wordie explained that rents were able to rise because arrears had fallen.  This 
also fits in with Turner et al’s conclusions.  Rents would rise as a result of higher prices and 
higher tenant profits, which were indicated in part by falling arrears.  If tenants had previously 
been unable to pay their rents in full the ability to do this (and to pay off arrears) would be 
necessary before rents could be increased. 
 
However, it must also be stated here that these are, of course, generalizations.  But it is as this 
that they work.  Both Chambers and Wordie based their models on the period c1700 – c1750 but, 
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as Turner et al’s arrears index has shown, the economy reacted in this manner to economic 
peaks and troughs throughout the entire period 1690-1914.  However, Turner et al also pointed 
out the limits of what can be learnt about the English agricultural economy based on arrears 
levels.  How a landlord reacted to rent arrears ‘depended on various considerations, among 
them the number of tenants involved, and the general trend of agricultural conditions’.  This is 
reinforced by their assertion that ‘individual tenants must occasionally have experienced a bad 
year or two, but then made up ground with an extra payment’.451  Where an individual 
‘experiencing a bad year’ was a large tenant with substantial rent his non-payment could form a 
greater percentage of rent due being owed in arrears than if a significant number of 
smallholders were struggling.  Therefore, as useful as an arrears index is, the number (or 
percentage) of tenants in arrears is also important in informing us of tenant ability to pay the 
rent relative to the prevailing conditions of the agricultural economy. 
 
The relationship between tenant and landlord is also of great importance when one discusses 
the payment of rents.  As Turner et al noted, landlords were flexible where tenants had a bad 
year or two and did tolerate some arrears.  Indeed, John Beckett noted the importance of 
landlord-tenant relations and the complexity of the ties between the two groups, without which 
improvements and investment in the soil would not have taken place but, at the same time, a 
relationship underpinned by the rental system.  In particular, he identified this relationship in 
times of depression when, although the differences in their situations became more apparent, 
landlords and tenants attempted to “reach amicable working arrangements”.452  These 
arrangements included the arrears and abatements which are the subject of this chapter but also 
other factors such as, Stead found, landlords covering the costs of insuring their tenant’s stock 
“to help guarantee their rent”.453 
 
This relationship and the place of abatements in particular is further complicated by the types of 
lease a tenant was tied into.  Hunt found that on Lord Darnley’s estates in Kent leases played a 
big part in whether a rent was reduced in times of depressed prices.  He found that tenants-at-
will had their rents reduced in 1823, when the end of the French wars was followed by several 
years of low prices.  However, those who were tied into longer leases received abatements 
instead.454  Stead, on the other hand, noted landlords may well have to abate rents even where 
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rents were fixed.455  The findings of this study are more akin to Stead’s argument.  On the 
Montagu estate in particular, all leases were noted as ‘year on year’ yet abatements still 
preceded any reduction in real rents and sometimes remained for several years, listed in each 
account as an allowance and thus on the understanding that rent would increase to its previous 
level.  James Langham, too, granted his tenants rent reductions on the understanding that their 
rents would revert to the agreed levels when the price of produce improved.   
 
Arrears were also used as a short-term method of coping with low prices, with Lord Overstone, 
for example, complaining about tolerating rents going unpaid and the Dowager Montagu 
writing off arrears to enable tenants to remain on the estate.  In terms of the link between the 
two, both were used as methods to cope with agricultural recession.  However, arrears were 
often tolerated in a hope that tenants would eventually pay off what was owed (with landlord 
eventually writing them off if this were unlikely to be the case) whilst abatements were the 
equivalent of writing off a proportion of the rent before it even became due.  Even though 
neither were intended as permanent reductions in rent, abatements represented a greater 
definite loss than did arrears but, as Beckett pointed out in a prolongued recession such as the 
final decades of the nineteenth century “rising rent arrears were followed by rent remissions 
and finally by falling rent levels”.456 
 
Therefore, despite its importance in both social and economic relations, the subject of payment 
of rent (arrears and abatements) in this period has been somewhat overlooked by historians.  
Arrears tolerated and abatements implemented demonstrate not just changes in the economy 
but also the management style and approach of particular landlords.  The evidence of this study 
shows that arrears and abatements were primarily economic, not social, responses but were also 
occasionally used (or omitted) in order to drive problem tenants off the land.   
 
However, landlord response to tenant difficulty and mounting arrears is an important part of 
the rural economy and although no great indices can be produced the localized nature of the 
current study does allow a comparison of abatements in terms of when a landlord granted 
them, the proportion of rent abated and to whom.  A similar study can be done of the forgiving 
of arrears, although this appears to have been a less frequent method of dealing with 
agricultural recession in Northamptonshire. 
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Method 
 
The first problem one faces in deciding how to calculate arrears is how one defines them – all 
those debts recorded in the accounts after collection day or just those outstanding in the next 
account or even whether one discards monies owing which were not judged unfavourably by 
the estate.  Within this study arrears are all monies outstanding at the making up of the account 
and thus anything the estate considered to be an arrear.  This does not vary across the period.  
Final accounts were not completed until a time after rent collection, allowing for a degree of 
lateness.  Anything paid after this, even if it was paid before the making up of the next account, 
shall be considered to constitute arrears as it was both money which the estate did not receive at 
an acceptable time and money the estate staff would be required to put extra effort into chasing 
and collecting. 
 
Yet one also has to acknowledge what were consistent and acceptable short-term arrears.  This 
is not to say that ongoing arrears were acceptable when sustained at a low level or that 
landlords would ignore arrears were their overall estate income satisfactory.  However, 
seemingly it was acceptable on a number of estates for tenants to pay rents annually even 
though they were due twice a year, meaning a tenant might be in arrears for 6 months before 
paying off his debt with the next rent payment due, reducing this arrear to zero.  Barbara 
English found that it was normal for rents on the Sledmere estate in Yorkshire to be paid 
around four months in arrears in the 1870s, whilst elsewhere tenants would pay 6 months in 
arrears.457  This was also the case in on the Montagu estate across the eighteenth century, 
although by the nineteenth accounts had become annual. 458    
 
Aside from the work of Turner et al the only other study which included arrears calculations 
was that of Chambers in 1953.  Chambers did not specify whether he used accrued or putative 
rent arrears calculations but the trend of his figures fits with the trend of Turner et al’s rent 
index and, to a lesser extent, my own figures for accrued arrears for the period 1720 to 1775 but 
not putative arrears for the period.  Figure 5:1 shows Chambers’ graph, although the limited 
labelling, detail and lack of figures makes it difficult to compare with other figures in more than 
a peripheral manner.459  This shows that Chambers considered the paying off of accrued arrears 
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Figure 5:1 Arrears compared to rents and prevailing produce prices 
SOURCE: Chambers, ‘Enclosure and Labour Supply’, p.343. 
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as important in establishing the ability of tenants to pay labour, presumably as they were more 
able to pay labourers when they were financially able to pay off their arrears.  This further 
makes the point for accrued arrears in demonstrating the wealth of the tenantry. 
 
Turner et al argued there were two methods of calculating arrears, the arrears owed and 
accumulated over the years (here Accrued Arrears) and the amount of rent left unpaid in an 
individual account (Putative Arrears).460  Turner et al preferred the putative arrears calculation 
in their study on the basis that this showed how much of their rent tenants could afford to pay 
in any given year.  They considered accrued arrears calculations to be a method of ‘feast and 
famine’ which ‘measures the difference between the agreed rent and the received rent’, whilst 
the putative arrears calculation, they suggested ‘is derived from a calculation involving the 
recorded rents but not the recorded arrears.  It is the difference between agreed and received 
rents, but only for the estates where both measures coincide’.461 Putative arrears they claimed 
showed the difficulty faced by tenants each year without the picture being blurred by long-term 
irrecoverable debts or debts being written off and were less variable by estate than accrued.462  
Thus, in their opinion, putative arrears were a more accurate calculation of tenants’ year-on-
year finances. 
 
However, accrued arrears are not, as Turner et al suggested, less important than putative 
arrears, they simply show different aspects of the social and economic climate of the landed 
estate.  Whilst putative arrears show the willingness and ability of tenants to pay their rents in 
any given year, accrued arrears show whether arrears were constant or increasing over time, 
plus the proportion of rent a tenant could owe before a landlord took action.  Accrued arrears 
also show the levels of arrears generally accepted by estates and how long tenants took to pay 
off their arrears.  The work of the landlord in chasing arrears and what levels were considered a 
problem by the estate also becomes apparent from the levels of accrued arrears built up and the 
point at which a landlord questioned these levels in a way that the putative arrears do not make 
clear.  Furthermore, it was the accrued arrears which were used by the estate to assess whether 
rent levels were too high and should be abated.  The estate made none of its calculations based 
on putative arrears.  Therefore, here both accrued and putative arrears have been studied. 
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Abatements are more straightforward to calculate.  The amount abated has been examined in 
terms of the proportion of rent which was abated and which tenants received abatements, when 
and whether abatements were granted at the same time on different estates. 
 
Both arrears and abatements have been looked at across the nineteenth century using a sample 
of every ten years on the Montagu estate with a case study of the post-French Wars recession 
being utilized to examine both the Overstone and Montagu accounts in detail, supported by 
correspondence and data from the Langham estate. 
 
Sources 
 
The most complete accounts of arrears and abatements (both accrued and putative) are 
those of the Montagu estate and for this estate an index of arrears has been drawn up.  
The putative index has been compared to Turner et al’s national index whilst the accrued 
index is used to add a further dimension to the study and provide a clearer study of the 
estate’s view of and response to arrears.  Added to this, a case study of arrears and 
abatements in the post-French wars recession has been undertaken utilizing not only 
Montagu data but also Overstone accounts figures and correspondence data plus data 
from the Langham estate on abatements. 
 
Arrears 
 
Putative Arrears 
 
Figure 5:2 shows Turner et al’s putative arrears index.  Where tenants paid their rents in full 
here the arrears are shown as zero and where tenants were able to pay off some of their accrued 
arrears this is a percentage below the zero line, and therefore where rents were not paid in full 
in a given account and arrears were accrued this would be shown as a positive percentage.  
Therefore the ability of tenants to pay their rents in full and whether they could pay off any 
outstanding arrears can be used to provide evidence of the profits of tenants and the position of 
the rural economy in any given year.463  
 
Compared to the national index, figure 5:3 shows the putative arrears figures for the 
Montagu estate for the period 1801-1871.  Turner et al calculated that putative arrears  
                                                          
463
 Ibid., p.184. 
 
151 
 
 
Figure 5:2 Putative Arrears as a percentage of rent agreed, 1690-1914 
SOURCE: Turner et al, Agricultural Rent, p.181. 
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Figure 5:3 
SOURCE: NRO, Montagu Estate Accounts, 1701-1885. 
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were generally under 5%, rising above 10% on only three occasions.  Compared to these, 
putative arrears on the Montagu estate were more erratic, usually lower than the national index 
but rising in the late-nineteenth century to almost 100% of the rent due.  But despite the 
differences in the actual figures the trends are the same and correspond to wider changes in the 
economy. 
 
Thus the trends in putative arrears on the Montagu estate roughly correspond with Turner et 
al’s national index.  However, the importance of putative arrears extends only to year-on-year 
changes in the tenants’ ability to pay their rents.  Long-term arrears can be assessed using 
accrued arrears figures, which are covered in the next section which also discusses the relative 
merits of both calculations as a method of studying tenant prosperity. 
 
Accrued Arrears 
 
Turner et al argued that ‘feast or famine’ or accrued arrears provided an inaccurate figure of 
outstanding arrears on an estate because they included money which was irrecoverable due to  
 
a combination of inefficient collection, the unwillingness of landlords to accept that 
arrears could not be recovered, and problems with tenants which were resolved by 
allowing arrears to build up.464 
 
This, they argued, rendered accrued arrears an inaccurate indicator of tenurial finances and 
therefore less valid for analysis than putative arrears.  However, this argument doesn’t stand up 
because inefficient collection would be as apparent year on year as it would in the longer term. 
 
Turner et al presented a number of examples to demonstrate the utility of putative over accrued 
arrears calculations but this only shows their significance to studies of current arrears.  Turner et 
al’s argument in favour of putative arrears calculations goes as follows: 
 
Until 1750 the recorded arrears on the Manvers estate at Adwick in South Yorkshire 
were negligible, both in nominal terms and as a proportion of the agreed rents – the 
standard method we have employed in ‘Feast and Famine’ [i.e. accrued rent arrears] 
– but on other Manvers’ estates the recorded arrears as proportions of agreed rents 
varied from an annual average of 2 per cent at Holme Pierrepont to 7 and 8 per cent 
at Beighton and Thoresby, and to nearly 21 per cent on the Crowle estate in 
                                                          
464
 Turner et al, Agricultural Rent, p.183. 
 
154 
 
Lincolnshire.  Such a persistently high level of arrears points to a measurement 
problem.  Nor is this a lone example.  At face value the average recorded rent 
arrears on the Castle Howard estate for the decade 1701-10 were 31 per cent of the 
level of agreed rents, and over the period 1724-50 the equivalent annual average 
recorded arrears on the badminton estate stood at an astonishing 130 per cent of the 
agreed rent.  In the first year when the data are available for Badminton the 
accumulated arrears were £1,850 while the assessed rent was £865. 
 What these examples point to is the difference between accumulated arrears, and 
freshly acquired arrears.465 
 
Yet this differential is precisely why accrued arrears are important.  Where a tenant could not 
pay one year or only paid a proportion of his agreed rent, putative arrears will show his 
difficulty but where he defaulted for several years, maintaining or increasing the monies owed, 
this will be apparent in accrued arrears.  Thus accrued arrears are important in showing how 
much a landlord would tolerate and how his tenants behaved in terms of paying off their 
arrears.   
 
Figure 5:4 shows the accrued arrears on the Montagu estate and figure 5:5 provides Turner et 
al’s national index for comparison.  Whereas the putative arrears fall into negative figures 
where tenants were paying off some of their arrears (i.e. paying off more than 100% of the year’s 
rent) the accrued arrears graph shows that even though tenants in general were wealthy enough 
to pay off some of their arrears in good years, arrears often remained outstanding. 
 
In 1821, for example, the putative arrears figure of -15.94% shows that on average tenants were 
paying more than their agreed rent.  However, for the same year the accrued arrears stand at 
5.76 percent, showing that tenants were able to pay off a proportion of their arrears but some 
remained outstanding.  Putative arrears figures show what percentage of the annual rent a 
tenant paid but do not give any information on what sort of debt level the tenant was paying 
off.  Whereas a tenant may seem prosperous in paying double the rent whether he owed a 
single year’s arrears or was several years in debt tells us a lot more about his financial situation. 
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Figure 5:4 
SOURCE: NRO, Montagu Estate Accounts, 1701-1885. 
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Furthermore, putative arrears as an indicator of tenant prosperity also fall down where the 
putative arrears index figure is zero.  Whilst a positive figure shows on average tenants were 
paying less than their agreed rent and a negative figure shows they were paying more, a zero 
figure shows tenants were paying the rent due, no more, no less.  Therefore one cannot tell if 
they were prosperous and paying all they owed having previously paid off their arrears in 
another account or if they had high levels of arrears but had generally managed to scrape 
together their current rent.  The former situation is more likely but it is also entirely possible 
that tenants had paid the rent due because they hoped, thought or knew the landlord would not 
threaten to evict based on their arrears so long as those arrears were not increasing.  Indeed this 
was common on the Montagu estate where increasing arrears were a far greater cause for 
concern and action than those remaining stable, with tenants able to build up several years’ 
arrears and maintain that level without landlord action.  Thus where putative arrears are zero 
the state of tenant prosperity is somewhat ambiguous.  In this situation the point can easily be 
clarified using the accrued arrears index.  Accrued arrears also enable one to identify whether 
estate attempts to reduce arrears were implemented or successful based on how many years’ 
rent a tenant was in arrears and reinforced by other data recording estate opinion and plans to 
reduce arrears levels. 
 
It was also accrued arrears, not putative, which landlords acted against.  Therefore the two 
types of arrears answer different historical questions and vary in importance depending on the 
historian’s focus.  A tenant unable to pay his rent in a single year or a single account would 
usually manage to pay at least a token amount from his rent (unless otherwise agreed) and 
unless landlords were exceptionally strict about arrears a tenant would not be threatened with 
eviction or noted by the landlord as having exceptionally high arrears.  Outside of stewards 
chasing and attempting to collect putative arrears they would have little effect in isolation.  
Estates and landlords were more prone to take action against accruing arrears, not just tenants 
unable to pay in full in a single account.  Therefore landlord and estate action on arrears and the 
levels tolerated can only be examined using the accrued arrears index, not the putative.  For 
example, in a rare instance of compassion, tenant arrears were written off on the Montagu estate 
in 1821.466  This was not a result of (or a writing-off of) putative arrears but of tenants struggling 
from price falls following the end of the French Wars in 1815 and therefore obvious in the 
accrued arrears index by the rise in accrued arrears between 1811 and 1821 but figure 5:3 shows 
tenants still attempting to clear their outstanding arrears. 
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Figure 5:5 
SOURCE: Turner et al, Agricultural Rent, p.180. 
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Compared to other estates, the Montagus were extremely reluctant to abate rents or write-off 
arrears but accrued arrears do demonstrate that there was still some compassion.  In the 1851-2 
account, for example, one John Russell was in effect acquitted his arrears.  Russell had built up 3 
years’ arrears but when Montagu wrote a memorandum questioning this increase his steward, 
Phillip Pain noted the following: 
 
The occupier of this cottage is an old wood labourer who has been employed on the 
Estate nearly the whole of his days, he is now supported by the Parish and cannot I 
think live long, he begs hard not to be sent to the Union as his time cannot be long. 
 
Therefore the tenant was allowed to remain in his cottage despite the knowledge that neither 
his arrears nor his rent would be paid.467  However, few arrears were written off and the years 
where this was done were generally years of trouble for farmers or there were extenuating 
circumstances in the case of individuals.  It must also be noted here that those exonerated were 
often labourers and where a tenant could not farm the land they held estates would usually 
look at moving them to a smaller holding or landless cottage rather than allowing them to 
remain.468  Throughout the Montagu accounts arrears were also written off where a tenant 
became a pauper, absconded or died. But the build-up of arrears, not the reasons and incidents 
of the landlord writing them off, is what is of interest here.  The rarity of instances of writing off 
arrears simply makes the figures for the accrued arrears generally more accurate, usually 
disappearing when they were paid off and not written off. 
 
One significant difference between the Montagu figures and Turner et al’s rent index is the 
‘background arrears level’ which they identified in their accrued arrears calculations.  The 
Montagu estate did not correspond to this national trend, with tenants seemingly determined to 
pay off as much of the money they owed as possible and certainly for the nineteenth century 
there was no background level of arrears since arrears levels fell to zero whenever the economy 
looked promising.  Where what Turner et al would describe as background arrears do occur it is 
because few tenants were significantly in arrears, pushing up the average even where most 
tenants owed nothing.  In fact, with the exception of the 1860s the Montagu arrears were always 
lower then Turner et al’s national index identified across the country.  In terms of general trend, 
however, Turner et al’s index arrears remained stable at around 5 percent (the background 
level) in 1800 and 1810 whilst in the Montagu accounts there were no arrears in 1791 but arrears 
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rose to 5.7 percent in 1801-2, falling back to 0 in 1811.  The two zero figures can be explained by 
an absence of background levels of arrears, probably resulting from the lower numbers of 
tenants used in my study.  The 1801 arrears, however, show an increase in arrears during the 
French Wars, which is not easily explained in general terms.  The 1800-1 account shows very 
few tenants in arrears but those who were had accrued great amounts – 2 at 100 percent, 1 at 
almost 200 percent and one at 310 percent of 1 year’s agreed rent.   
 
The Montagu arrears rose in the 1850s and remained high in the 1860s, whilst in the national 
index they fell.  This is where Montagu’s arrears were higher than the national figures.  The 
1850s and 1860s figures again are a result of anomalies which would be balanced out in a 
national sample but which stand strongly in the accounts of a single estate.  In 1861 there were 
several tenants in arrears, two of whom owed more than 250 percent of their annual agreed 
rent; one owing over 400 percent and one almost 500 percent.  In 1851-2 only two tenants were 
in arrears at all but one of these owed over nine-and-a-half years’ rent and the other over ten-
and-a-half years’ rent.  This is the problem Turner et al complained of with accrued arrears 
figures but the extremities of this year emphasise the importance of accrued arrears – from the 
1840s to the 1850s these tenants had been allowed to build up arrears virtually unchecked 
despite there being no problem in the economy.  The rental index shown in chapter 4 (see page 
98) shows that rents were steadily increasing for this decade and the absence of high numbers of 
tenants in arrears adds to this evidence to indicate that those who did fall into arrears were 
struggling personally or neglecting to pay and not a part of a wider struggle facing agricultural 
tenants on even just the Montagu estate, let alone at a national level.  The building up of over 10 
year’s arrears shows that Montagu and his steward had not taken action to evict this tenant or 
to agree a deal to get his arrears paid off but the tenant in question, one Henry Draper, does 
have notes of concern beside his arrear in the 1851-2 account, including a note from steward 
Phillip Pain stating 
 
I fear the affairs of this tenant are in a bad state and that there is but little chance of 
getting his arrears reduced without destraining his effects. 
 
But there is no indication whether this arrear had been chased previously or why action had not 
been taken sooner. 
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Figure 5:6 
SOURCE: NRO, Montagu Estate Accounts, 1701-1885. 
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Figure 5:6 shows the numbers of tenants in arrears on the Montagu estate at any one time as a 
percentage of the tenants on the estate.  Tenant numbers fluctuated over the period for a 
number of reasons such as tenants coming on to or quitting the land, landlords buying and 
selling land, land being taken out of cultivation for other purposes (e.g. parks) or brought into 
cultivation from other uses and changing farm sizes.  Therefore, the number of tenants on the 
land at any one time was not consistent so one is unable to produce a productive study of 
tenant numbers across the period.  However, as can be seen from figure 5:6, the percentage of 
tenants in arrears can be used to ascertain, to a degree, the relative wealth of the tenants on the 
Montagu estate at any one time. 
 
The numbers of tenants in arrears enables one to draw a more complete picture of tenant 
finances and, indeed, of the economy of the landed estate.  For example, 1810-11, at the height of 
the French Wars when prices were rising rapidly due to French barricades.  The Montagu rents 
do not appear to have been raised dramatically in the wars, despite the year-on-year leases, and 
thus at this point putative arrears were zero with rents being paid in full.   
 
Therefore, in spite of Turner et al’s conclusion that one can learn most from putative arrears 
calculations and that these provide the greatest accuracy, one actually requires accrued arrears 
figures and proportions of tenants in arrears in order to build up a complete picture of tenurial 
finances and their place in estate management.  Putative arrears do provide the most accurate 
catalogue of the tenants’ ability to pay at any particular time but do not give an accurate 
indication of ongoing trends across the period, even in the national index which loses the 
limitations created by my sample size but also smoothes out the patterns at the risk of losing the 
social dynamics.  Accrued arrears face problems if one wishes to use them to look at short-term 
financial ability but, particularly when used with putative arrears, can be used to look at the 
current and ongoing prosperity of tenants and also provide information of the levels of debts 
both subjected to and tolerated by the estate.  Yet even when used in conjunction with one 
another putative and accrued arrears figures can be skewed by tenant numbers, with few 
tenants with high debts producing similar figures to many tenants with low debts even though 
it is probable only the latter situation is evidence of wider economic problems troubling the 
estate.  Few tenants with high debt levels are also indicative of the levels of debt landlords were 
prepared to tolerate.  Therefore the trend in both tenant finances and estate management across 
the entire period 1700-1885 requires all three sets of figures in order to be studied with any 
accuracy and to build up a complete picture. 
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Estate Management of Arrears 
 
Of course, landlords relied on tenants for a significant quantity, if not all, of their estate income.  
Rather than farm the land themselves with paid labour, landlords leased it out to tenants.  This 
was because, in the words of C.G.A. Clay, tenants 
 
provided them with a buffer against a fall proportionate to the fall in agricultural 
profits in times of depression, for the tenants had to maintain rent payments as far 
as they could, even at the expense of their own savings, consumption, and 
reinvestment in their farms.469 
 
However, this buffer could only work provided the tenants paid the rent, it also relies on the 
assumption that the tenants not only had savings and money to re-invest but that they could 
and would reduce their consumption in order to pay their rent.  In other words we return to the 
difference between agreeing and paying the rent.  Some tenants managed to fall into arrears 
even when agricultural profits in general were high, others became bankrupt or absconded in 
arrears during even short recessions.  It is doubtful these tenants had any money to rely on in 
times of economic downturn, making them useless as a buffer.  Turner et al also appear to blame 
estate management for arrears remaining on the accounts, suggesting a mixture of inefficient 
collection and refusal to admit arrears were irrecoverable as reasons for high levels of arrears on 
estates.470  But however far one accepts tenants had an obligation to pay their rents even at the 
expense of their own livelihood, Turner et al’s reasoning suggests that the reasons for arrears 
(especially in times of stable or increasing prices) lay with the estate not chasing them 
effectively rather than with the tenants who failed to pay.  This does correlate to the 
Northamptonshire evidence where stewards appear to have chased rents although action was 
seldom taken against them. 
 
The Montagu arrears figures and Turner et al’s arrears index, along with the correspondence 
evidence of other estates, show that the majority of tenants made a great effort to pay their rents 
in full.  Even though arrears rose in a recession they would be paid off when times were better, 
sometimes even falling to zero on the Montagu estate.  Elsewhere there are many comments of 
rents being ‘well paid’.  How far this was due to tenant conscience and how far to stewards’ 
work in ensuring rents were paid cannot be established with a great degree of certainty.   
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However willing tenants were to pay their rents, or however obliged they felt to do so, there is a 
large body of evidence both within and outside of Northamptonshire of both stewards chasing 
up tenants for monies owed and landlords chasing up stewards to collect in the arrears due.  
The success of the steward in collecting rents was dependent again on the willingness and 
ability of tenants to actually pay the monies owed.  Leveson-Gower steward Plaxton best 
explained the problem in 1704: 
 
Ralph Wood saith he visits them often but can get no money.  Now your lordship is 
under an odd dilemma.  If you sue them or distreyn, you bring a great clamour on a 
good landlord: if you for bear them too long, you bring loss and damage to yourself.  
I wish they would act with more vigour, and yet you must be forced to make an 
example of some for a terror to the rest... I know times are bad, but here are many 
very rich men behind and in arrear with their Mic. Rents. 
 
As evident above stewards were responsible for the collection of arrears and at least some 
performed this duty with vigour if not success.  Wordie suggested that Plaxton was obsessed 
with what he perceived to be the arrears ‘problem’ of the estate.  Wordie noted that arrears were 
a serious problem on the estate in 1691 and pointed out that Plaxton viewed rent collection as 
extremely inefficient complaining in 1704 of the inefficient rent collection and the levels of 
arrears remaining from the previous year.  Despite Plaxton’s campaign against arrears however, 
they were at exactly the same levels in 1705 as they had been in 1702, although Mingay pointed 
out this was as a result of outstanding arrears not being paid off, but that tenants were paying 
off their current rents.471   
 
Where rents were not paid, the job of chasing arrears and ensuring tenants paid their rents fell 
to the estate steward, especially where a landlord was often absent from the estate.  Yet this did 
not mean they had sole charge of the accounts.  The Lords Montagu, for example, would check 
the accounts and write marginal comments although these were seldom more detailed than 
‘Arrear must not be allowed to remain’.472  Landlords almost exclusively focussed on the 
failures of their stewards in collecting rents but this was presumably because it was their duty 
to collect all monies due.  Nathaniel Kent was very much of the opinion that where rents 
collected were less than rents due the steward was at fault: 
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I know that the Rents should be returned, and would be returned if the 
Responsibility could be so impressed upon the Minds of all the different 
Superintendants, so that they might act with the same zeal as a Farmer does for his 
own immediate interest.473 
 
Indeed, the Montagu accounts have comments throughout whereby the estate owner questions 
the actions of his steward and why arrears have been allowed to build up, often even saying 
that the arrear must be reduced or “cannot be allowed to continue”.  Stewards can also be seen 
regularly justifying their actions in their accounts, for example, in April 1816 steward Robert 
Edmunds noted Charles Lucas of Geddington Chase’s arrear: 
 
See Note in the Last Account, and for the reason there stated this Arrear will in 
future be discontinued in my account 
 
having previously stated the arrear would be written off if it could not be recovered.474  In their 
correspondence both Lord Overstone and James Langham appear content with their stewards’ 
actions, making no complaints, although this does not mean there were not problems, 
particularly as one of Langham’s stewards was removed from his post for dubious 
bookkeeping.475  However, whether this carried over into their actions one could not say.  
Outside of Northamptonshire landlords appear to have taken a similar approach.  Mingay 
commented in his study of the Bouverie estate in eighteenth-century Kent that ‘the unfortunate 
steward was constantly instructed to... keep down his rent arrears’ and commented that 
Bouverie frequently complained about his steward’s failing in this task.476   
 
Mingay found that Sir Jacob Bouverie had to instruct his steward when to take action against 
arrears but in Northamptonshire stewards appear to have been much more organised and 
usually having reasons for allowing arrears or a plan to deal with them.477  Philip Pain, a 
Montagu steward of the nineteenth century, was clearly productive in the chasing and 
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collecting of arrears.  Where a tenant could not pay an arrear he would often negotiate with 
them and agree they were to pay a proportion of the arrear and the rest would be written off.  
Pain would also justify tenant arrears for reasons such as tenant poverty or ill health, sometimes 
suggesting the tenant would recover and pay off the arrear, or that the tenant had been a loyal, 
hard-working employee of the estate and would probably die soon so should be allowed to live 
out his days outside the poor house or was too poor to stay but he did not want to send them to 
the poor house.  In the 1851-2 account, for example, Lord Richard Francis Montagu questioned 
an increasing arrear and Pain replied that  
 
The occupiers of this cottage sleep on the floor, they have no bed nor any other 
furniture, therefore there is nothing to distrain, they belong to Warkton but no one 
will have them as Lodgers & they refuse to go to the union. 
 
But tenants who were deemed capable of paying the full rent due were unlikely to receive 
compassion.  In the same account Montagu commented that Richard Bagshaw had not paid 
enough of his outstanding arrear (he had reduced it from £467 by just £29 to £438) and Pain’s 
response was to detail his efforts in collecting the arrear: 
 
I have pressed this tenant hard to reduce his arrear which he promises to do before 
my next account is made up, but I cannot depend on his word.478 
 
Thus stewards were aware of who was able or should have been able to pay their arrears and 
did work hard to collect monies owed.  It was they who understood best how to act on tenant 
arrears.  Yet landlords who wanted full receipt of rents may have been right to suggest their 
stewards were being lenient towards some tenants in arrears but in many cases they acted as 
they did with good reason. 
 
Elsewhere struggling tenants could be treated with compassion, even if this involved moving 
them from their farms to smaller agricultural holdings or landless cottages.  In July 1831 for 
example, William Dean of the Langham estate wrote 
 
On the morrow I expect to have possession of the Cottage &c of the late Joseph 
Pursers.  You will please to take into consideration who is to be the future tenant 
and give me your instructions accordingly, as some final arrangement must be 
made respecting the Widow Wiggins who is still residing in the house and land her 
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late husband occupied I am sorry to say without any means of being able to pay up 
the arrears of rent.  I think I did mention to Mr Pearce some little time back in one of 
my letters to him respecting her being allowd to occupy a Cottage which might 
enable her to keep a Cow or two and with the assistance of her late husbands 
Brothers she would be able to live comfortable with her two youngest children, one 
a little Girl and the other Boy a cripple, the two other Boys are now at service.479 
 
Other stewards gave reasons other than illness or poverty to justify the arrears of some tenants.  
Catlin commented that tenants ‘take very little care’ to pay their rents including one Benjamin 
Wright who could not pay as he had to pay a bill for looking after sheep and a Mrs Vaughan 
who could not pay as she ‘must buy some beasts to eat her hay stacks first’.480  But these were 
not reports of justified arrears but of those reprehensible that he had failed, despite best efforts, 
to collect.  Indeed elsewhere he complained to Fitzwilliam that 
 
Mr Smith of Deepingate is in arrears for meadow and other land, which I have 
asked for (he is to pay some of it for Dr Wigmore), but he makes no haste about it 
although three or four years behind, and many others are also.481 
 
Stewards on other estates used different approaches to justify arrears to their landlords.  A letter 
from the Finch Hatton estate in the early eighteenth century commented that since Michaelmas 
and the date of the letter (26th December) ‘Old Mr Wilson has gathered you some money 
amongst your Tenants’.482  On the Langham estate, manager William Pearce often wrote 
informing his landlord that money was coming in too.  In 1817 he wrote that he had left £100 
with Fellows (sub-steward) but was unable to leave anything more as ‘Parkwood and Clarke 
will both pay something in the course of a Month towards their Rent... they promise to do it’.483  
In a previous letter Clarke and Parkinson were both noted as tenants ‘always tardy’ with their 
payments.484  This is not evidence of more competent or thorough collection but simply of the 
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steward pointing out he was in control of the situation before the landlord could complain of 
monies outstanding, as is the case of Old Mr Wilson on the Finch Hatton estate.   
 
Stewards also appear to have been forward-thinking in terms of rent collection, maybe allowing 
a short-term arrear as they believed this would be the most profitable course in the longer term.  
In 1822, following large abatements on the Langham estate, Rippon paid only £32 on his £208 
rent which had already been abated by £70.  Pearce advised Langham not to evict the tenant but 
to write-off the arrear so that the tenant would remain on the land: 
 
I understand that there are nearly 20 farms to let in the Neighbourhood of Oundle, 
and that though many of them have been advertised, they still remain unlet from 
Michaelmas next!!  The only course to pursue in my opinion in these most trying 
Times, is, to keep the Land if possible in Cultivation – and to prefer Old Tenants to 
new ones, for to either – great allowances must be made ‘till the Produce bears a 
better price.485 
 
L.J. Bellot’s study of steward Leer on Earl Temple’s Dorset estate included evidence of similar 
management.  In 1771 Leer took no action against a widow in excessive arrears because ‘her 
prospects improved daily with the growth to manhood of her son’.486  Thus the retaining of 
tenants who could pay their arrears off eventually was often preferred over having to write-off 
the money due and lay out further money in order to secure a new tenant. 
 
Stewards would also advise lords how to respond to arrears. The dowager, Lady Montagu, 
forgave a number of arrears in the 1820-1 account on the advice of steward Robert Edmunds 
and for the year 1821-2 a number of notes are made regarding tenants unable to pay.  William 
Cobley, a tenant less than one year in arrears but whose rent had been abated and whose arrear 
was increasing, is noted as ‘Reduced to £35 a year from 5th April 1821.  I fear this tenant cannot 
be allowed to continue’ when he managed to pay only £30 of his £35 rent and increased his 
arrears to £30.  But Edmund’s luck appears to have been more limited than Pearce’s optimism.  
Another tenant, one Elizabeth Bird, was noted as insolvent owing £3 in arrears which had to be 
written off.  The arrear is not particularly high as the tenant taking on her holding paid £22 per 
annum for it but the loss of her as a tenant without monies secured indicates less success than 
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Pearce enjoyed.487  It must be stated however that whilst Pearce was writing at the beginning of 
the recession the Montagu account was several years later and the recession had deepened but 
the fact that Edmund advised on mounting arrears even after abatements had been granted and 
Pearce advised on action to be taken if a payment was not made shows Pearce thinking further 
forward and implies he was more in control of the estate.  The bankruptcy of Elizabeth Bird 
with an arrear to the value of such a small part of her rent further implies limited control of 
rents whilst Pearce was entirely in control knowing the men to be serial defaulters and 
managing to extract full rent and only having to chase outstanding arrears.  In 1823 Pearce was 
again having a level of success with his rent collection, writing to Langham that ‘those tenants 
that were behind have paid off a considerable Portion of their arrears’.  This was again when the 
estate was in the midst of a recession and a year after Edmund’s account in 1821-2.   
 
On the Langham estate (although not evident elsewhere in the county) Pearce would also go 
further than advising his landlord when not to take action but would actually take action 
against tenants as required and inform Langham he was doing so.  In September 1818 Pearce 
wrote to Langham informing him that he had sent ‘a sharp letter’ to Thomas and Robert 
Houghton in an attempt to extract payment but if the arrears were not paid in the next 3 months 
he would take action against them.488 
 
Turner et al had suggested one of the reasons for arrears was inefficient rent collection but from 
the evidence of steward actions (as opposed to landlord views) in Northamptonshire collection 
was well managed, with arrears being expected at certain times, stewards calling upon those 
owing money regularly and arrangements being made with those who were unable to pay, as 
well as arrangements being made with some for reasons of compassion.489  Yet the landlord’s 
view on arrears rarely seems to have accepted or acknowledged the difficulties faced by 
stewards in gathering in arrears.  On the Montagu estate the Lords Montagu would often 
question why an arrear was outstanding, James Langham questioned arrears levels and Lord 
Overstone discussed tenants unable to pay their rents with Beasley to determine whether 
arrears were justified.   
 
Roebuck also found that arrears increased when landlords were absent from their estates.  
Before 1725 on the Everingham estate in East Yorkshire, Roebuck calculated that arrears levels 
were very low but increased thereafter when the landlord was long-term absent from the estate, 
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resulting in a ‘significant reduction in the size of his annual income’.490  Both Mingay and 
Roebuck’s findings imply that landlords were greater supervisors of rent collection and indeed 
put successful extra pressure on stewards to keep arrears down when they were present on the 
estate, not able to check accounts or check up on the steward’s work as regularly when long-
term absent. 
 
Therefore stewards and landlords did indeed work hard in an effort to collect (or indeed avoid) 
rent arrears.  However, the problem was that the tenants were not always willing to pay nor 
were they always able.  Here stewards tended to be compassionate towards those elderly and 
infirm or those who would soon be able to pay off their arrears, sometimes to the dislike of their 
landlords.  Sometimes it was even more economically viable to write-off an arrear in order to 
retain a tenant long-term.  These details were often discussed between stewards and landlords 
but it was the stewards who were blamed for arrears, even if they were doing all in their power 
to collect them.  If an arrear remained outstanding year-on-year however action would 
eventually have to be taken. 
 
Abatements 
 
Arrears on landed estates were tolerated for a number of reasons, primarily based on an 
assumption that they would be paid off or because landlords would rather tolerate arrears and 
have tenants pay what rent they could than reduce rents, even on a temporary basis.  Whilst 
David Stead argued that arrears levels in general fell over time owing to better management of 
the farming risk by tenants, where they did accrue the estate had to acknowledge them and 
decide whether to take any action.491   
 
Abatements were temporary rent reductions in periods of low prices which lasted only until 
prices rose again.  Turner et al described them as ‘practical short-term remedies’ to low prices; a 
way of aiding struggling tenants without permanently reducing rents.492  However, Hunt found 
that whilst landlords had been more than eager to increase rents during the French Wars they 
were reluctant to lower them again in the recession which followed.493  In times of depression, 
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where a tenant was signed into a lease, a landlord may well tolerate arrears or even offer 
temporary abatements of rents to his tenants.  Indeed, were the recession prolonged, Hunt 
noted that landlords would often abate rents to prevent tenants becoming bankrupt and being 
forced to quit their holdings.494  Added to this, however, Stead noted that abatements were not 
generally granted unless tenants complained.495  However, in the Montagu accounts at least, 
abatements do not appear to have been limited to those tied in leases for a number of years, but 
were applied to those already on the land on a year-on-year basis, depending on the 
agricultural economy, with no reduction in the agreed rent.  Robert Thompson found that 
abatements usually lasted for several years before becoming permanent reductions in rent but, 
if prices improved before this, rents would return to their agreed levels.496 
 
Indeed, in Northamptonshire the short-term, temporary nature of abatements was of great 
importance to those granting them, as was the necessity of granting them.  In 1822 Pearce 
advised Langham that ‘great allowances must be made ‘till produce bears a better price’.497  
However, the temporality of abatements had already been set for the Cottesbrooke estate in 
1816 when it was decided that abatements would be halved when the price of wheat was over 
70s per quarter and rents would return to their 1811 levels once the price was over 80s per 
quarter.498  Unfortunately prices continued to fall.  Therefore abatements were rent reductions 
intended to be temporary but which could remain in place for a significant period of time or 
could become permanent rent reductions.  However, as shall be shown, the intention and 
purpose of rent abatements was to provide a temporary reprieve for tenants in times of low 
prices, even if this extended throughout a prolonged recession. 
 
Along with arrears, abatements were an important factor in managing a landed estate.  
However, unlike arrears, abatements were granted and their levels set by the estate.  Their 
application was linked closely to the economy as well as the need of individual estates to retain 
tenants on the land at a particular time and their levels depended on prices, demand for land 
and the importance of maintaining individual tenants (most easily gauged by the level of rent 
or size of holding of the tenant). 
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Historians have done little work on abatements, even within studies of rents, but their 
importance in estate management and the rural economy necessitates their inclusion here.  
Turner et al noted their importance as the response of estates to rising arrears levels but did not 
study them statistically and analyse levels as they did for rents and arrears.499  Muir Johnstone, 
however, did note the importance of abatements in East Lothian and Lanarkshire, although not 
all the reasons identified for abatements in the lowlands are apparent in the Northamptonshire 
evidence.500  In fact, abatements were an alternative to both high arrears and permanent rent 
reductions, making them the most profitable option for an estate without the risk of tenant 
bankruptcies arrears or high rents could bring.  Their existence was common and their purpose 
important, if not necessary, for the survival of landed estates but, probably as a result of little 
work concentrating on tenants and rents, little work has been done on the subject of abatements. 
 
Who Granted Abatements 
 
Unlike arrears, which were the tenants’ to accrue, abatements were controlled by the landlords.  
Therefore landlord personality and personal finances played a significant part in determining 
whether abatements were granted at all.  However, stewards and tenants also affected this 
decision.   
 
Stewards would advise on both the need for abatements and the extent to which rents ought to 
be abated based upon their knowledge of individual holdings and the tenants renting them.  
Indeed, English considered rebates and delaying payment as part of the role of the steward.501  
Within Northamptonshire this was certainly the case on the Langham estate where Pearce 
advised on abatements, even going so far as to provide calculations of the sums to be abated, 
although the final decision rested with Langham himself.  It was Pearce who, in 1816, ‘inspected 
every cottage and fixed what I think a fair rent upon each’.502  But in 1821, despite Pearce’s 
advice to accept the tenants’ requests for abatements, Langham instead proposed ‘taking up 
each individual Case distinctly’, taking into account whether poor rates or other local costs were 
particularly high, but until this was done he would ‘take no notice of their application for a 
Reduction at present – but desire Dean to press for the Arrears in the usual way hitherto 
                                                          
499
 Turner et al, Agricultural Rent, p.179. 
 
500
 M. Johnstone, ‘Farm Rents and Improvement: East Lothian and Lanarkshire, 1670-1830’, AgHR 57 (2009), p.37. 
 
501
 English, ‘Patterns of Estate Management’, p.40. 
 
502
 NRO L(C)1089. 
 
172 
 
done’.503  The reference to the tenants requesting abatements is also an interesting one, for 
tenurial requests were also an important factor in a landlord’s decision to abate rents.  Whilst 
Langham refused to abate rents in 1821 he did look into individual cases to see if some holdings 
were being overcharged.  In 1859 W. Lewis also wrote about the role of tenants in the decision 
to grant abatements.  In a letter to Lord Overstone Lewis commented that prices were low but 
‘the farmer has not yet begun to complain and rents have been well paid’.504  Thus tenants 
would let landlords know if they were struggling and felt rents should be abated, seemingly by 
method of complaint as well as by accruing arrears. 
 
Why Rents Were Abated 
 
Abatements would work to maintain tenants by helping them to avoid bankruptcy and heavy 
arrears in times of recession, enabling them to remain on the land.  Turner et al suggested that 
despite their being introduced as a method of self-preservation by the estate abatements  
 
could be dressed up as temporary expedients to help out tenants during times of 
distress and would also convey the correct image of a landed hierarchy acting with 
local responsibility.505 
 
Yet despite their being portrayed as an aid to the tenantry in hard times, abatements were 
intended for the preservation of the estate by keeping the lands as fully tenanted as possible.  
This meant that when rents rose again there would be a greater estate income than if some 
tenants had left the land and also minimized lands in hand which the estate would have to 
maintain.  Johnstone noted that in the lowlands abatements were also sometimes granted to 
encourage improvements but there is no evidence of this in the Northamptonshire records 
covered by this study.506  Outside of Northamptonshire abatements also appear to have been 
used as a method of retaining tenants.  In the 1870s C. Wood wrote that on his East Riding 
estate 5 tenants had left the land, 3 more had given notice to quit and a further 5 or 6 had been 
convinced to remain by the estate granting heavy abatements. 507  Thus abatements had an 
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important function in keeping the land tenanted and thus under cultivation rather than 
maintained at the expense of the estate. 
 
Abatements were occasionally granted for reasons outside of maintenance of tenants in times of 
recession.  In 1830, for example, following unrest amongst labourers on the estate, Langham 
advised Dean to offer abatements to tenants who increased the wages of their employees, the 
abatement to be equal to the increase in wages paid out by the tenant.508  The Hammonds had 
also picked up on this point and in 1911 they had suggested this to be not necessarily a common 
practice but certainly a common complaint of tenants to their landlords was that they could not 
pay labour more unless their rents were reduced.509  This form of abatement adds a further 
dimension to the economic workings of the estate, with labourers’ grievances also coming 
through in the accounts and adds to the complex picture of landlord actions taking an interest 
in the financial well-being of their tenants whether out of interest for their own long-term 
profits or out of a feeling of paternal duty towards those residing on their estates. 
 
Thus abatements acted as a way of retaining tenants on landed estates in times of poor demand 
for land.  However, they were also used in a paternalist manner, to aid struggling tenants 
simply because they were struggling, whether it be due to economic problems, illness or 
infirmity or even so they could, in turn, increase the wages of their labourers.  When abatements 
were granted will be discussed below. 
 
When Landlords Granted Abatements 
 
Rent abatements were granted based on a number of considerations, listed by Turner et al as 
including ‘the number of tenants involved, and the general trend of agricultural conditions’ and 
were only made after ‘an extended period of difficulty’.510  This is evident in estate accounts 
(and indeed correspondence) where abatements were not granted until arrears levels were high 
and prolonged.  But even when arrears were high tenants usually had to complain, request 
abatements or even threaten to quit the land. 
 
The evidence of the Cottesbrooke estate in 1821-2 best demonstrates the purpose and 
application of abatements as well as their relationship to arrears.  Ongoing, increasing arrears 
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led to the granting of abatements in order to prevent arrears further increasing.  In September 
1821 Pearce wrote to Langham 
 
Viz a long Account of Arrears, and a record of the discontent expressed by the 
Tenantry – two things unusual on your fine Property.  But the same state of 
discontent pervades I believe every part of the Island amongst others of your 
Tenantry – Jones and Davis (who are both you will know – respectable Men and 
whose assertions I think we may believe) told me that they had lost so much during 
the last Two Years they should be constrained much against their Wishes to give 
Notice to quit before Michaelmas unless their Rents were reduced.511 
 
By January 1822 Pearce wrote again, stating his hope that arrears would not increase following 
the abatements which had been granted but he worried this may not be enough were prices to 
remain low for a considerable period.512  Low prices did continue however and in August 1822 
Pearce only managed to collect a third of the money he expected, in spite of the abatements 
granted.513  Thus abatements were both granted as a result of and intended to prevent 
increasing arrears.  But ongoing low prices could, as in this case, result in tenants unable to pay 
even the abated rents. 
 
Yet abatements were still not the first choice of an estate where tenants were struggling to pay 
their rents.  In 1822, for example, rather than abate rents Pearce simply moved the winter audit 
from 16/17 December to 7/8 January 1823 to enable tenants to take produce to the Christmas 
market in London and other fairs.514  This was intended to enable tenants to pay their rents in 
full.  However, the fact that rents were further abated after this account shows it was ineffectual 
in the longer term. 
 
Where a recession was prolonged an estate could also end up making a series of abatements 
and, Turner et al commented, may even be faced with no option but to make permanent rent 
reductions.515  Reducing rents permanently was not an option landlords took unless it was 
deemed absolutely necessary though.  In the prolonged recession at the end of the period of this 
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study permanent reductions were required on a number of estates, as prices did not rise again 
as they had been expected to.  In 1887 C.L. Norman wrote to Lord Overstone suggesting that 
permanent rent reductions would have to be granted for his lands to remain profitable.516 
 
Despite their being deemed necessary to maintain an estate through a recession there were 
limits to when abatements would be granted.  If a tenant requested further abatements on a 
threat of quitting the land he may well be allowed to leave.  This was based on whether the 
estate would benefit more from keeping the present occupant or if a new tenant could be found 
who would pay a higher rent than he was asking for.  In 1822, for example, when prices had 
fallen steeply and large-scale abatements were granted on the Cottesbrooke estate, Pearce 
feared Bennet Sharpe would request a greater abatement than the £45 which he had been 
offered.  Pearce commented to Langham that any further abatement would be unreasonable 
and that if Sharpe could not cope with the holding at the offered rent he should leave the 
land.517  Further to this, those deemed incapable of managing a holding at the reduced rent 
would not be viewed favourably by the estate.  In 1816 William Earl suggested that tenants 
unable to afford to continue on the land should be given notice to quit to avoid their becoming 
bankrupt.518  Thus abatements were limited to tenants acceptable to the estate and who the 
landlord and steward deemed capable of maintaining the holding as profitably as possible 
through the recession and were still only granted when it was deemed necessary for the 
economic survival of tenants and estate.  Were a tenant deemed likely to go bankrupt (at an 
even greater loss to the estate both financially and socially) he would be denied rent abatements 
and possibly even evicted to prevent his bankruptcy.  Tenants were also evicted entirely for 
social reasons.  In 1706, for example, Lord Fitzwilliam refused one of his tenants an abatement 
as he and his sons were reputed to be drinkers.519   
 
Abatements granted also depended to an extent on the importance of the tenant to his landlord.  
As seen above and in previous chapters the importance of a tenant to a landlord was based 
primarily on the income the tenant would bring in, i.e. how reliable he was in paying his rent in 
full and on time and how much rent was due from him.  The latter was obviously dependent to 
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a large extent on the size of the tenant’s holding. Generally the larger the holding the higher the 
rent and the higher the rent and the more land would fall in hand were the tenant to quit. 
 
Thus the primary reason for abatements was when tenants complained en masse that they could 
no longer afford their rents.  Abatements were not the first choice of estates and often second 
only to excessive arrears but they did occur where the economy was poor.  Furthermore, the 
social standing of a tenant and his ability to manage his farm were also taken into account when 
deciding to abate rents and rents would seldom, if ever, be reduced below the level the steward 
thought he could find others willing to pay. 
 
Case Study: Post-French Wars Recession 
 
Where abatements were considered necessary they usually varied across a single estate and 
were certainly not applied by landlords on different estates at the same time or to the same 
extent.  However in a prolonged recession estates would usually use abatements of rent as a 
method of retaining tenants, helping them financially to keep ands under cultivation and ensure 
able farmers stayed on the land so they could profit in years to come. 
 
Within the sources available, the greatest wealth of evidence on abatements covers the years 
following the French wars (1815-1831).  Therefore, rather than examine the short times in the 
century where abatements were made, this study will focus on these years and compare estate 
levels of and approaches to both arrears and abatements.  This will work to show arrears levels 
and estate reaction to them in context as well as the workings of abatements as an estate 
management tool.  F.M.L. Thompson observed that demand for land fell in 1815 and continued 
to do so until 1833, resulting in landlords struggling to find tenants for holdings across a 
number of English counties.520  Therefore the maintenance of tenants, large and small, was of 
paramount importance to landlords reliant on their landed income throughout this period with 
even owners of extensive lands like the Montagus making some rent abatements and their 
smaller counterparts (here represented by the Langhams) made several lots of abatements in 
order to maintain what they considered a liveable income in the medium to long term.   
 
Whilst the Montagu accounts provide comprehensive data on arrears levels the Lords Montagu 
seldom granted abatements and when they did so they granted them only to a minority of 
tenants whom they did not wish to leave the land.  Essentially the Montagus did not often abate 
rents because they did not need to; the estate could afford to lose some tenants without its own 
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finances suffering too greatly in a recession.  Elsewhere, there are figures for the Overstone 
estate can provide a direct comparison for a short period (1828-31) but, as shall be seen, whilst 
the estate had higher levels of arrears, abatement levels were lower and they were granted to a 
smaller proportion of tenants, despite Lord Overstone’s insistence in his correspondence and 
other writings that he prioritized the wellbeing of his tenants over his own profits.  The 
Langham correspondence also provides some evidence of rent abatements.  Whilst these figures 
are less comparable to those of the other two estates the correspondence surrounding them 
provides evidence of the reasons for abating rents and why the estate was being managed in 
this way. 
 
Figure 5:7 demonstrates the accrued arrears on both he Montagu estate and the Overstone estate 
in this period.  Accrued arrears figures have been used here as these demonstrate the amount of 
rent that was still outstanding across the period and the ability of tenants to pay off monies 
owed.  They are also the figures which estates based their assessments on in deciding to abate 
rents, evict tenants or lower rent levels.  The rent figure used is the rent due rather than the rent 
agreed, taking into account any abatements being applied and showing what was still 
outstanding.  As can be seen, the figures for the Montagu estate show fluctuations and a 
particularly bad year in 1817, although a great deal of these arrears were cleared off by the 1818 
account.  Arrears tail off by 1831, when the economy was picking up again.  In contrast the 
Overstone arrears were increasing from the first available figures (1828) and were still rising 
upto 1831.  This may be because the estate was employing lower abatements or simply because 
Lord Overstone was more tolerant of arrears when his tenants were struggling. 
 
Figure 5:8 shows abatements granted as a percentage of total rent due and figure 5:9 shows the 
percentage of tenants on each estate receiving abatements.  Whilst the Montagu abatements 
fluctuate across the period, peaking at 23 percent of rents due in 1823, they fell to zero in 1831.  
In the same period the number of tenants receiving abatements fluctuated considerably with the 
first abatements granted in 1817, no abatement in 1819 and almost 50% of tenants having a 
proportion of their rent abated from 1823 to 830, again falling to nothing in 1831.  The 
Overstone accounts, on the other hand, show only one set of abatements, with only 15% of 
tenants receiving abatements of only around 2% of the agreed rent.  This may well be as the 
economy was showing signs of recovery and tenants were more able to pay their rents.  
However, the figures are notably lower than those for the Montagu estate and with the 
Overstone estate also having tenants in greater levels of arrears, one is inclined to view these 
differences as different approaches to estate management, with Lord Overstone aiding his 
tenants by allowing arrears whilst the Lords Montagu granted abatements and even wrote off a 
number of arrears in 1820, explaining the zero figure. 
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Added to the above, there are four sets of rental data available for the Langham estate in this 
period – one rent increase in 1811 and 3 sets of post-war abatement figures (1815, 1822 and 
1827).521  Owing to its proximity towards the end of the wars this was most likely not the first 
rent increase of the wars.  However, the general increase was greater for larger farmers, with the 
average rent increase being as high as 40%.522   The three sets of rent reductions coincide with 
the end of the wars, when the Montagu estate was reluctant to reduce rents, and two of the 
years in which the Montagu estate had the highest level of abatements. The first rent reductions 
took place in 1815, just after the end of the wars.  Johnstone pointed out that in the lowlands 
rents were also abated after the end of the French Wars due to falling prices and ‘despite much-
improved practice’.523 Added to the abatements of 1815, rents were further abated by 16-40% in 
1822,524 and by a further 10-12% in 1827.525  Further to this, with a lack of records between these 
dates and demand for land continuing to fall beyond 1827 it is probable Langham abated rents 
between these years and abated them even further after 1827, although unfortunately no further 
figures are available.  However, the notable difference in these reductions is that whilst the 
Langham estate had lower average abatements the later ones were further reductions on the 
abated rent not, like the Montagu estate, reductions on the same agreed rent level.  As a result, 
the Langhams’ expected rents fell from their 1822 levels in 1827, whilst the proportion of agreed 
rents expected on the Montagu estate remained level. 
 
The reasoning behind the Langham rent abatements are further explained in estate 
correspondence.  In 1816 Pearce wrote to James Langham that a number of tenants had left the 
land and in order to replace them he would have to abate rents by 30 to 40 percent.  Of these 
leavers 3 had quit the land, 1 had gone bankrupt and 1 had run away.  In the same letter he 
proposed abatements for remaining tenants of up to 30 percent (for those who came into the 
land as prices were beginning to fall or those in parishes with exceptionally high poor rates) and 
that 
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Should any one of them be so unreasonable after the great sacrifice you have made 
as to grumble at the allowance he is no longer observing of the considerations and 
ought to have notice to quit. 526 
 
Thus at this point Pearce considered it necessary to reduce rents for new tenants by a greater 
amount than for current and there would also be costs incurred in maintaining the holding or 
improving it so that new tenants would rent it as well as looking for a new tenant.  Therefore 
costs incurred in replacing a tenant were far greater than the cost of abating the rent for a 
current one. 
 
Vacant holdings were clearly more of a worry to the Langham estate than lower rental income.  
In 1822 Pearce wrote to Langham advising he grant further abatements ‘rather than run the risk 
of having the land unoccupied’ which he worried may even result in landlords having to ‘farm 
the land themselves’.527  Pearce was also concerned that lands had already been neglected, with 
tenants having little or no money for investment for several years leaving their holdings ‘in a 
deteriorated state’. 528 
 
By 1829 tenants were threatening to quit the Langham estate and Pearce had a list of 13 tenants 
who had given notice to quit on Lady Day 1830.  Yet the maintenance of tenants by rent 
abatements was still a successful management policy on the estate.  Of those who had given 
notice to quit 6 had agreed to stay in return for rent reductions, two were considering 
reductions (Pearce thought at least one would accept) and one of the remainder had received 
notice to quit due to his arrears.529  This left only 4 tenants’ notices to quit being followed 
through. 
 
Quittals and Evictions: When and Why Tenants Left the Land 
 
Where a tenant was unable to pay his rent and had lost confidence in the land or in ever being 
able to make a living from it (at present rent) or simply felt he could make a better life for 
himself and his family elsewhere he might have given notice to quit the land.  Where a tenant 
was heavily in arrears he may make a deal with his landlord or steward to ease the burden of 
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arrears but tenants also reacted to mounting arrears by quitting the land, absconding or simply 
ignoring the arrear.  In the last case the estate would often be obliged to step in either to write-
off the arrear as irrecoverable, to distrain the tenant’s goods in order to recoup the loss or to 
evict and replace the tenant on the holding. 
 
The accounts of the Montagu estate show that there was usually land in hand regardless of the 
economic situation as lands changed hands and tenants left or died.  However, the levels of 
tenant quittals varied greatly, increasing where prices were low but falling when profits were 
high.  The often hereditary nature of holdings, passing them down from generation to 
generation, can be identified in the Montagu accounts and was studied by Cragoe.  This 
longevity of tenant families demonstrates that tenants were not prepared to leave the land and 
thus it makes sense that those quitting voluntarily would increase in a recession when farmers 
could no longer support themselves and had perhaps lost confidence in the longer-term 
profitability of the land.530  In terms of insolvency levels, landlords were generally concerned 
with minimizing these both in order to appear good landlords and to keep the land under 
cultivation, aiding capable men in keeping their farms.  Stead found that fewer than 5% of 
tenants failed across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although he said this number may 
have been higher as not all insolvency was recorded.531 
 
Lord Overstone wrote extensively about tenants leaving the land in the recession of the late 
nineteenth century and Lord Fitzwilliam and his steward often discussed the quantities of land 
falling into hand as a result of recession in the eighteenth century.532  Indeed the majority of 
tenants quitting the land throughout the nineteenth century appear to have done so during 
periods of low prices, with William Pearce commenting in February 1823 that he had failed to 
find new tenants for any of the lands being quit at Lady Day and he would have written ‘long 
since’ but he had been hoping to let these lands first.533  The economic slump of the 1880s saw a 
similar reaction, with Beckett finding that landlords were more willing to negotiate to keep 
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tenants on the soil as they struggled to replace them.534  Indeed, Barbara English observed that 
in the 1880s some estates had so much land in hand they began to farm it themselves.535  Thus 
the nature and status of landholding amongst tenants appears to have made many reluctant to 
leave their lands, only quitting where prices were too low for them to continue.  This 
attachment of tenants to the land continued throughout the period of this study. 
 
James Langham’s correspondence, however, shows that perhaps not all tenants quitting the 
land did so entirely voluntarily and notice to quit was also employed as a negotiation tool.  In 
1822, when Bennet Sharpe asked for a greater abatement than that he had been offered and said 
otherwise he would quit the land, Pearce calculated that at the abated rent the tenant could be 
replaced and thus his notice was accepted.  Pearce even commented to Langham 
 
Sharpe cannot object to such a rent with reason.  If however he has sunk his capital 
and cannot go on stocking and cropping the farm – the Rent to be paid by him 
becomes a nullity – in short it will be better he should leave the farm than go on 
involving himself in further distress.  These are times when the weak must be borne 
down - and I fear he was never strong enough to undertake the Quantity of land he 
engaged with.536   
 
Yet this is not the only example of one of the Cottesbrooke tenants using notice to quit in order 
to negotiate a greater reduction in rent.  In 1821 it was noted that several tenants had threatened 
to quit the land but that none had actually given notice to quit.  Therefore quitting the land was 
of course a resort for tenants when they felt they could make a better living elsewhere than they 
could farming but threatening to quit was also used (intentionally or otherwise) to negotiate a 
better rent and enable tenants to stay on the land.537 
 
J.R. Wordie argued that quitting the land was usually the resort of smaller tenants who did not 
have the cash reserve of their larger counterparts.  This therefore meant that in times of low 
prices larger farmers could cut their spending and pay their rents whilst those with only basic 
consumption would have to give up their lands.538  However, the poor were more likely to have 
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their arrears forgiven or ignored by stewards and these arrears were not monetarily as high as 
those of larger farmers.  Nor did the poor expect to profit greatly from their lands, whilst those 
more well off may have sought profit elsewhere more easily.  Indeed those who gave notice to 
quit on the Langham estate were noted as significant landholders, as was Bennet Sharpe who 
wished to negotiate a greater abatement for himself by threatening to quit the land.  Plus it was 
the poor tenant or cottager who often gained the compassion of a steward, it was they who 
would be allowed to remain in their cottages through illness or in old age as there was not a 
great loss to the estate nor an assumption that they would have money to fall back on to keep 
them out of the poorhouse.  Small tenants who were deemed likely to recoup their losses were 
also allowed to remain in arrears or move to smaller agricultural holdings they could run 
effectively.  But the figures and actions of Northamptonshire landlords indicate that whilst the 
poor did not have a cash reserve in times of low prices it was more likely that the larger tenants, 
not the smaller, would leave the estate. 
 
Eviction 
 
Eviction was rare but did occur.  It was deemed a failure of an estate to have to evict a tenant, 
not least because the arrears owed were unlikely to be recouped if the tenant was removed from 
his livelihood.  Indeed even the threat of eviction was so rare that Turner et al noted that many 
tenants did not get leases for their holdings.539  As such stewards would only advise on eviction 
and it was the landlord who made the decision.  Even two hundred years prior to the period of 
this study evictions were rare but Appleby found the reasons for such to be similar to those of 
our period: 
 
Individual tenants were evicted from time to time, of course, for non-payment of 
rents or fines, or for a felony.540 
 
Whist stewards would refrain from evicting in some cases owing to mitigating circumstances or 
a belief that the arrear could be recovered and the tenant make the holding profitable given time 
landlords appear to have been less lenient, more interested in maximising their profits, 
especially if their own finances were struggling.  Lord Fitzwilliam told Guybon in 1703 to 
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take grounds away from tenants that run in arrear and let them to others.  I wrote 
you about Adam Johnson, Cornell and others and their arrears.  I hope you have 
secured these rents and relet the lands.541 
 
Outside Northamptonshire Roebuck also observed Sir Marmaduke Constable ordering his 
steward to evict those in arrears, including those having difficulty in paying.542  Even the 
compassion of stewards would be lost where a tenant was seen to be unable to recover from 
their debts.  In 1816 Pearce wrote to Langham of tenants in arrears.  Of the three he discussed he 
suggested one was ‘too far gone to be recovered’ and he believed her son to be ‘an idle one’ and 
suggested she be evicted.  This condemnation of the tenant’s son was not one of his morals but 
one of the likelihood of him being able to farm the land profitably and pay off the arrears.  The 
other two he was convinced would pay off their debts so suggested no such action.543  Thus 
Pearce, like Philip Pain, was happy to allow tenants to remain on the land as long as the debt 
could eventually be recovered.  Therefore evictions for economic reasons did take place but in 
practice there were often mitigating circumstances and it was seen as a last resort, usually 
against those deep in debt who were seen as unwilling to work to pay off the debt rather than 
those struggling, despite landlord views to the contrary. 
 
These evictions were of individuals.  Where groups of tenants were falling into arrears the 
wider economic situation was usually to blame and rather than evicting tenants estates would 
allow arrears or abate rents.  Indeed, Hunt commented on the Kent estates of Lord Darnely that 
 
Tenants in difficulty between 1819 and 1823 were not evicted, since the landlord 
preferred to adopt a realistic attitude rather than see his land withdrawn from 
cultivation.544 
 
In 1821 rather than evicting tenants the Langham estate sought to retain as many as possible.  
Pearce sent a list of 13 tenants in arrears but noted 
 
I believe all the foregoing Tenants brought every shilling they could raise (for every 
one paid Money on account) – and I have no fear of losing any thing by them should 
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they find they cannot go on as I consider the Property each has on his respective 
farm will be more than sufficient to discharge the arrears that may be due.545 
 
So economic eviction was mainly reserved for those who should have been able to pay their 
rents and was undertaken in the interest of longer-term profit to the estate.  Where many 
tenants were struggling and new tenants could not be found estates were less likely to evict, 
especially where economic circumstances were likely to improve and tenants would be able to 
pay off their debts. 
 
Despite the profit-driven motives detailed above some evictions were undertaken for the benefit 
of the tenant who it was deemed would not be able to profit from their lands and would 
struggle as long as they remained unsuccessfully farming them.  In rare cases (about 5 can be 
identified across the period and these are across three of the estates) an associate or relative 
stepped in to pay the rent for a tenant.  This occurred in the case of Mrs Ewen on the 
Fitzwilliam estate whose 1700 rent was paid by a Mr Brimrose.  Guybon, however, advised 
Fitzwilliam that Mrs Ewen should not be allowed to keep the land because he doubted that Mr 
Brimrose would maintain the buildings on the land and as it was understocked it was less likely 
Mrs Ewen would be able to make a living herself from it.  He did advise she be allowed to find 
new habitation though: 
 
But so she is not destitute of a habitation she shall continue the farm for a year until 
she can provide otherwise.  If I hear when I come next spring that she can deal with 
it I may let her continue, taking a lease but I will promise nothing.546   
 
Eviction for what was deemed to be the good of the tenant was not limited to cases where 
others were paying the rent, or indeed where tenants were presently in arrears.  In 1822 Pearce 
asked Langham for his opinion on the lease of a holding on the Cottesbrooke estate.  Mrs Hales 
was to be evicted but had since paid her rent.  Her son had since claimed he should take her 
holding (with the help of his wife’s family in paying the rent).  Pearce, concerned that Mrs Hales 
did not have the finances to properly stock the land asked Langham if he should transfer the 
holding to the son.547  Thus where tenants struggled to pay their rent on the basis of inability to 
farm profitably the estate would sometimes evict for the long-term benefit of not only the estate 
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but also of the tenants themselves, who would have continued to struggle in poverty had they 
remained on the land until they faced bankruptcy. 
 
The majority of evictions took place for economic reasons, be they tenurial poverty or estate 
profit, but there were other reasons tenants were sometimes evicted.  Occasionally a landlord 
would reclaim an expanse of the estate to create a park and the tenants on that land would be 
evicted, or if a tenant had committed a felony he would be asked to leave the estate.548  The 
other reason often suggested for tenant eviction in the latter part of this period was political – 
tenants would be evicted if they did not vote as their landlords required them to.  However, 
Cragoe commented there was little evidence of this in England and, in his comprehensive study 
of Carmarthenshire, found accusations of political eviction unfounded and the tenants evicted 
were so for defaulting on rents.549  In Northamptonshire in 1868 Lord Overstone was accused of 
managing the way his tenants voted by Fitzpatrick Henry Vernon, losing candidate for North 
Northamptonshire, in a letter to The Times.  Overstone’s reply (printed 3 days later) went thus 
 
I believe I may state without any reservation that I have never communicated with 
any tenant on my property, personally or in writing, upon the subject of his vote; 
and as regards my tenants in North Northamptonshire I can add that my agent has 
in no way interfered with them... I do allow my tenants on this and on all similar 
occasions to vote as they please.550 
 
Thus the majority of evictions in Northamptonshire and indeed England more generally in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were for economic reasons with few evictions taking place 
for social reasons such as the tenant’s poor character or the landlord creating a park and 
accusations of political evictions generally proving unfounded. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Arrears and abatements were both expected in times of economic recession and both were 
utilised by the estate as methods of management to keep the estate under cultivation and to 
ensure lands were tenanted when farmers’ incomes improved.  Low levels of arrears or high 
arrears accrued by just a few tenants were viewed as a failure of rent collection but when 
arrears became more widespread it was usually a result of economic conditions and landlords 
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would often tolerate or even write off some level of arrears to aid their tenants to weather tough 
economic climes. 
 
Where arrears were high and agricultural incomes low for a number of years abatements were a 
useful and sometimes necessary device to aid tenants to weather the recession and remain on 
the land, although they were undesirable to estates as they represented a definitive loss of 
income.  Where a recession was prolonged abatements could be extended to permanent rent 
decreases but this was undesirable to the estate and often landlords specified that abatements 
were for a set period only or until prices rose above a certain level.  Tenants also used 
abatements to their advantage requesting them where prices were depressed or even 
threatening to quit the land were their rent not abated or permanently reduced. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Rural society in the nineteenth century has been the subject of many historical studies.  There 
has been great interest in landed society in terms of improvements and developments in 
farming, changes in rural social relations and the structure of rural society in this time of 
significant economic change.  Within this context the agricultural community was bound 
together by agricultural rents, the principal link between landowners and tenant farmers.  Rent 
levels and the setting and payment of rents were closely linked to changes in prices, farm sizes 
and agricultural improvement, making them an important factor in the agricultural economy of 
the nineteenth century.  In practice, rent levels were as much a social construct as an economic 
one.  The negotiation and agreement of rents depended on personalities of individuals and the 
circumstances of individual tenants as well as the social and financial value of land. 
 
The study began life as an examination of the moral economy of the landed estate, examining 
correspondence and other qualitative data in order to examine estate management and the 
relative roles of landowners, estate stewards and agricultural tenants as rural society changed 
over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  However, the availability of large 
amounts of accounts data led to a different focus. Rather than the moral economy and social 
views of landlords, the available evidence painted a clearer picture of their economic decisions 
and the rental economy on the Northamptonshire landed estate than of paternalism and the 
moral economy.  As a result the study developed into an examination of the rental economy.  
Accounts data shows the flexibility in the economy afforded by the tolerance of arrears and 
granting of abatements, both of which were an essential part of the rental economy.  The period 
of study was also amended to 1801-1881 as it allowed for a more in-depth examination and was 
a period for which a wealth of accounts data was available.  Whilst the study has moved almost 
entirely away from its roots, the relative roles of different groups upon the landed estate and 
the economic ties which bound them remain a central focus. 
 
Whilst rent levels themselves have been considered by a number of historians and examined as 
an essential part of both the agricultural economy and the landed estate, less work has been 
done on the payment of rents and estate management of rental income.  The importance of rents 
paid, in addition to rent levels set, has been examined in detail in this study to provide a more 
complete picture of the nineteenth-century rental economy in Northamptonshire.  This 
demonstrates the importance of tenants in paying their rents and the function of the estate in 
collecting them, adding a further dimension to our knowledge of the nineteenth-century 
agricultural economy.  As Cragoe pointed out, there was no definitive method of setting rents 
as farming income was dependent upon future prices.  Rents were set based on often outdated 
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land valuations and a prediction of prices and profit to be made at the next harvest.551  Evidence 
from this study indicates the importance of individual negotiations in the initial agreement of 
rents, which becomes even more prevalent when looking at arrears and abatements, with 
landlords taking into account tenants’ standing and reputation in the local community, their 
wealth and that of their families, plus their age and farming ability.  These factors were in 
addition to the more directly economic factors such as the acreage of the tenant’s farm, type of 
farming undertaken, capital invested (in terms of machinery and animals, not just investment in 
the soil) and, of course, prevailing prices and trends in the wider agricultural economy. 
 
The accounts data used in this study provides detail on the payment of rents, agreed rent levels 
and the views of landowners and stewards on the estate and rental economy, but they also have 
notable limitations.  One of the principal problems with the accounts data is the limited 
information they include.  What is left out of the accounts (primarily farm sizes, but also often 
the type of farming undertaken) in itself indicates the level of knowledge of the estate possessed 
by its owners and stewards but unfortunately limits the information available to historians.  As 
a result, it is not possible to create a study of rent per acre comparable with Turner et al’s 
national index and instead the spread of rents has been examined.  The study of arrears and 
abatements is more detailed as the accounts include detail of agreed rents, amounts paid, 
accumulated arrears, abatements and arrears forgiven.  The wider application of abatements 
across an estate provides an indication of both the agricultural economy and the individual 
estate.  As landlords personally looked at rents and set abatements, in the interest of 
maintaining the long-term profitability of the estate, accounts figures are supplemented by 
opinions expressed and ideas and solutions developed in annotations on the accounts and 
estate correspondence, forming an interesting and informative study. 
 
Within the accounts data itself there are also further limitations.  Not only is data bias acquired 
through choosing estates on the basis of available evidence but it can be difficult to distinguish 
farm rents in books containing all forms of agricultural rent.552  Robert Thompson, writing in 
1907, commented on the fact that not all account books had survived and in those which had it 
was difficult to separate out agricultural holdings from woods, moors, parks and residential 
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buildings.553  Where identifiable, non-agricultural holdings have been removed from the 
sample.  However, some, particularly smallholdings, are not possible to identify and have been 
retained in the figures.  This does mean the data used includes a large number of small rents.  
As a result the spread of rents across the estate is examined but it must be borne in mind that 
this is not limited to farm rents. 
 
The principal concern of this thesis with regards to the payment of rents is how 
Northamptonshire tenants and landlords responded to negative changes in the economy and 
how the landed estate as an entity weathered recession.  As shown in chapter 4, the rural rental 
economy underwent a number of changes across the nineteenth century.  Generally speaking, 
rent levels were increasing at the beginning of the nineteenth century owing to the inflationary 
effect of the French Wars.  When the wars ended in 1815 these artificially high prices fell and the 
agricultural economy underwent a number of peaks and troughs, not stabilising again until the 
1830s.  From the 1830s the agricultural economy then grew (at a slower rate than at the 
beginning of the century) until the major agricultural depression of the 1870s which continued 
beyond the end of the century.   
 
Available account books and periods covered in estate correspondence do limit the scope of this 
study.  Whilst the estate accounts for the Montagu Boughton estate are fairly complete, those for 
the other estates are more fragmentary.  As a result a sample across the period 1801-1881 have 
been used to provide the long-term picture with the case study of 1815-1831 providing extra 
detail of the post-French Wars recession. 
 
As J.D. Chambers, Turner et al and others found, there is a strong link between agricultural 
rents and prevailing agricultural prices, although there is a time-lag between a change in price 
levels and a corresponding change in rent levels.554  In terms of increasing rent levels a number 
of reasons for rising rents have been identified.  Andrew Appleby distinguished two types of 
rent increases – those as a result of improvements to the land and those designed to transfer a 
greater amount of income from the land to the landowner.555  It is within this context that 
landlords are often portrayed – as profit maximisers who increased rents wherever possible in 
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order to transfer the profits of the land from their tenants to themselves.  The Northamptonshire 
data shows that what this meant in practice was that landlords were much more closely 
involved in the management of their estates and took a great interest in the survival of their 
tenantry and the long-term profits of the estate, not simply transferring money from the land to 
their own pockets.  Landlords were often absent from their estates and, as Webster found, the 
prevalence of stewards was increasing in this period; however, this did not mean they were 
detached from their estates entirely.556 
 
In practice, Northamptonshire landlords negotiated some rents personally and decided when to 
abate rents and by how much, as well as managing arrears and evictions.  The correspondence 
of Lord Overstone to his steward Beasley and his friends and family show he had a great 
interest in the maintenance of his estate and had a practical understanding of estate 
management whilst the Montagu accounts have memoranda from the Lords Montagu 
questioning arrears and notes from their stewards explaining the breakdown of new rents and 
justifying underpayments.  Landlords were also often avid improvers in their own right and 
were the ones to put forward the capital to encourage improvement or aid tenants wishing to 
improve.  Some, such as Lord Overstone, even led by example by adopting improvements on 
the home farm in order to encourage tenants to adopt similar methods or technologies on their 
own farms.  
 
Landlord involvement in the setting and negotiation of rents was therefore significant.  The 
Northamptonshire evidence also demonstrates that landlord decisions were not made in 
isolation.  Whilst the estate set and collected rents, tenants had to agree to them upon taking a 
lease and pay them thereafter.  As shown in chapter 5, tenurial grievances and mass complaints 
were reflected in rent levels in terms of estates tolerating arrears or abating rents whether in 
response to falling prices, poor harvests or even to prevent unrest amongst labourers.  Arrears 
have thus been of interest to historians and viewed as a method utilised by tenants to show that 
rents were too high or to undertake political protests against the estate.  The payment of rents 
was managed by the estate to a certain extent though and where necessary action was taken 
against individual tenants or abatements and other methods were utilised in order to aid 
tenants in time of need and to maintain both tenantry and long-term profitability of the estate. 
 
The time-lag between falling prices and falling rents was when other temporary measures were 
used in order to prevent tenant bankruptcies and maintain the long-term profitability of the 
estate.  The utilization of arrears and abatements to manage estates and their importance in the 
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rental economy of the nineteenth century has been less of a focus of historians, with even 
Turner et al’s study of national farm rents not undertaking an in-depth look at abatements.557  
Yet both measures were vital methods of estate management essential to the nineteenth century 
rural rental economy.  Indeed, the role of the estate in managing rent levels and responding to 
negative changes in the economy was as important as its role in negotiating and setting rents.  
The payment and collection of rents from the estate’s point of view was as important as the 
agreement of levels.   
 
It is well established by Clay and others that tenants provided a buffer between landlords and 
market prices, with rents agreed and due even where prices fell or harvests were poor.558  As 
this thesis demonstrates, this was more complex than simply setting rents and waiting for the 
money to come in.  Tenants were, in the main, willing to pay their rents when they were able 
and would pay off arrears when their finances improved but where they were not able to pay 
there had to be flexibility in the rental economy.559   
 
Whilst the responses and operations of the estate and those upon it are the essence of the rental 
economy they acted in response to external factors throughout the nineteenth century.  Whilst 
the economy was, in the main, growing throughout the period, with an increasing population 
migrating to towns and cities putting greater pressure on English agriculture to produce larger 
quantities of food, there were a number of economic slumps in which prices fell and the 
agricultural economy (and by extension the rental economy) had to respond in order to survive.  
The most notable of these in the nineteenth century were the recession following the end of the 
French Wars in 1815 and the recession of the 1870s.  However, whilst the recession of the 1820s 
was a result of a mixture of bad harvests and a dramatic fall from the artificially inflated prices 
of the wars, the 1870s were affected by poor harvests and increased competition from overseas 
where an unprotected English market was increasingly infiltrated by cheap imported goods, 
particularly as transport from America improved and refrigeration techniques became possible, 
meaning the methods which the agricultural estate had previously adopted to survive were no 
longer working.560  In desperation landowners invested in and improved land and dropped 
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rents in order to try and retain tenant numbers and those heavily indebted struggled and faced 
bankruptcy.  Lord Overstone actually commented that for land to become profitable a new way 
of profiting from it may need to be found and, indeed, in 1907, Robert Thompson was 
undertaking academic study in order to find a method of making English agriculture profitable 
once again.561 
 
The nature of the recession of the 1870s and the inability of estates to recover is a part of the 
reason this study has utilised the post-French Wars recession as a case study, as this was a more 
a-typical recession and one where traditional methods of recovery were successful and estates 
recovered.  Indeed, the period 1815-1831 demonstrates the core concepts studied in this thesis 
and the response of estates to economic slump in terms of negotiation of rents themselves, the 
tolerance of arrears, implementation of abatements and even investment and improvement of 
lands. 
 
In terms of method, it has been shown that both putative (year-on-year) and accrued arrears are 
important if one wishes to gain a complete picture of the rental economy.  Whilst the putative 
arrears (in which Turner et al placed the greater importance) indicate the ability of tenants to 
pay their rents in any given year, accrued arrears better demonstrate estate management of 
arrears over time.  Looking at accrued arrears enables one to look beyond collection issues and 
other short-term problems and to see how the rental economy operated across a number of 
years.562  The build-up of arrears over time better demonstrates tenants trying to pay their rents 
in a struggling economy rather than simply tenants attempting to clear arrears when they could.  
Taken together with abatements both arrears calculations enable one to build a more complete 
picture of how the rental economy operated in a recession. 
 
Accrued arrears are also the most closely linked to temporary abatements.  Indeed, Lord 
Overstone reduced rents after 1870 only where accrued arrears were high and tenants were 
complaining.563  Abatements themselves were a short-term solution intended to keep tenants on 
the land and solvent until the economy improved.564  In practice abatements were only granted 
by the Northamptonshire estates of this study in limited circumstances.  As shown in chapter 5, 
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where a tenant could be found to agree the unabated rent the current tenant would often be 
given the choice of paying the full rent or leaving the land.  In the recession of the 1820s 
abatements worked as a management strategy to enable tenants to remain on the land but, as on 
the Langham estate, a number of abatements were made and agreed on the proviso that they 
would last only until prices improved.565  The recession of the 1870s was different, however, 
with arrears and abatements leading to permanent rent reductions and investment in the soil 
and landlords and stewards unable to prevent extensive numbers of tenant quittals. 
 
The setting and payment of rents were central to the economy of the landed estate, affected by 
stewards, tenants and external factors – primarily prices and advances in farming – all overseen 
by landlords.  The negotiation of rent levels and the flexibility of the rental economy in response 
to changes in the wider economy provide vital information on this aspect of landed estates and 
their management, as well as the tenant economy and landlord-tenant relations.  The interest of 
Northamptonshire landlords in maintaining the long-term profitability of their estates goes 
some way towards explaining why they were prepared to negotiate rents and their interest in 
maintaining tenants on the land.  To the landlord a tenant would not only provide an income 
but also maintain the land and losing a tenant would incur costs of finding a replacement and 
having the land out of cultivation as well as the loss of rental income whilst a new tenant was 
found.  Tenants, on the other hand, were more interested in profiting from the land in the short 
term but were eager to improve the land and maximise their own profits.   
 
In all, this study highlights the importance of the rental economy to both the landed estate and 
the agricultural economy in nineteenth-century Northamptonshire.  The payment of rents was 
as important a part of estate management as the setting and agreement of rent levels and 
abatements.  Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that the rental economy was much more flexible than is 
often supposed, with tenants holding powers of negotiation and having the power to withhold 
the payment of their rents, whilst landlords had powers to evict (which were not often used), 
powers of negotiation and the power to temporarily reduce rents or tolerate arrears.  All of 
these enabled both tenants and estates to survive fluctuations in the economy and weather 
recessions such as the one following the French Wars.  Agricultural rents were of vital 
importance to the Northamptonshire economy and measures were taken to ensure the survival 
of the estate and the tenants upon it.  The majority of these measures were intended as 
temporary but where recession was prolonged abatements became rent reductions and arrears 
were written off in order to ensure the survival of the tenancy and, as a result, that of the landed 
estate. 
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